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ABSTRACT
Quantum Stabilizer Codes and Beyond. (August 2008)
Pradeep Kiran Sarvepalli, B.Tech., Indian Institute of Technology, Madras;
M.S., Texas A&M University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Andreas Klappenecker
The importance of quantum error correction in paving the way to build a practical
quantum computer is no longer in doubt. Despite the large body of literature in quantum
coding theory, many important questions, especially those centering on the issue of “good
codes” are unresolved. In this dissertation the dominant underlying theme is that of con-
structing good quantum codes. It approaches this problem from three rather different but
not exclusive strategies. Broadly, its contribution to the theory of quantum error correction
is threefold.
Firstly, it extends the framework of an important class of quantum codes – nonbi-
nary stabilizer codes. It clarifies the connections of stabilizer codes to classical codes over
quadratic extension fields, provides many new constructions of quantum codes, and devel-
ops further the theory of optimal quantum codes and punctured quantum codes. In partic-
ular it provides many explicit constructions of stabilizer codes, most notably it simplifies
the criteria by which quantum BCH codes can be constructed from classical codes.
Secondly, it contributes to the theory of operator quantum error correcting codes also
called as subsystem codes. These codes are expected to have efficient error recovery
schemes than stabilizer codes. Prior to our work however, systematic methods to construct
these codes were few and it was not clear how to fairly compare them with other classes of
quantum codes. This dissertation develops a framework for study and analysis of subsys-
tem codes using character theoretic methods. In particular, this work established a close
link between subsystem codes and classical codes and it became clear that the subsystem
iv
codes can be constructed from arbitrary classical codes.
Thirdly, it seeks to exploit the knowledge of noise to design efficient quantum codes
and considers more realistic channels than the commonly studied depolarizing channel.
It gives systematic constructions of asymmetric quantum stabilizer codes that exploit the
asymmetry of errors in certain quantum channels. This approach is based on a Calderbank-
Shor-Steane construction that combines BCH and finite geometry LDPC codes.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
In the 1980s and 1990s, it gradually became apparent that the theory of information founded
by Claude Shannon was a purely classical theory in that it did not take into account quan-
tum mechanics. This realization crystallized the notion of quantum information as distinct
from classical information. Despite the success of the abstract formulation of information
by Shannon, it is far more physical∗ than it appears. The representation of information i.e.,
the mechanism/device used to store does affect its behavior. Two level systems such as a
switches or more realistically transistors can be used to store and manipulate classical bits.
One can also use systems such as photons or electrons. In case of photons for instance,
information maybe stored on the polarization of the photon. The photon can be vertically
or horizontally polarized. Other quantum mechanical systems such as spin-1
2
systems i.e.,
systems with two spin states can also be used for representing information. These quantum
mechanical representations give us something more than what we bargained for. Because
they operate in a regime where the quantum mechanical effects can come into play†, in ad-
dition to representing the usual logical states they permit phenomena (such as linear com-
bination of the logical states), which have no classical analogues. These phenomena seem
to confer additional power when it comes to information processing. A far reaching ram-
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Information Theory.
∗R. Landauer.
†It might be argued that quantum mechanical effects are present even when information
is stored on a transistor (or any other device). That is true, however, when we speak of
quantum mechanical effects we are not so much interested as to how they affect the func-
tioning of the device as much as how they affect the logical state of the device. In so far as
the logical state is considered, the transistor behaves classically.
2ification due to differences between quantum and classical information is that computers
processing quantum information, if they were built, could provide exponential speedups
over computers that process classical information alone. For instance, Shor’s algorithm
for factoring integers provides an exponential speedup over the best known classical algo-
rithms. A little less dramatically, Grover’s search algorithm provides a quadratic speedup
over its classical counterparts. Quantum computers therefore pose a challenge to one of the
central tenets in theoretical computer science – the (modern) Church-Turing thesis which
states:
Any reasonable model of computation can be simulated on a (probabilistic)
Turing machine with at most a polynomial overhead, (see [25, 153]).
It must be emphasized that quantum computers cannot solve problems that are not solvable
on classical computers, for the simple reason that a quantum computer can be simulated on
a classical computer albeit with exponential slowdown. Quantum computers can potentially
change the landscape of tractable problems. But to realize their promise we have one
important hurdle to cross – which is the central theme of this dissertation – that of protecting
quantum information.
B. Quantum Error Correction
A quantum computer that can implement something nontrivial and useful as Shor’s algo-
rithm would require the control and manipulation of a large number of sensitive quantum
mechanical systems. Any practical quantum computer would require the ability to protect
quantum information against not only noise but also the inevitable operational (i.e., gate)
errors that accompany its processing. It was initially supposed that it would be impossible
to protect quantum information not only because of the scale of computation but because
of reasons intrinsic to quantum information. Fortunately, such skepticism was laid to rest
3when Peter Shor [142] and Andrew Steane [144, 145] independently proposed schemes to
protect quantum information from noise and operational errors. Gottesman [61] and in-
dependently Calderbank et al., [35] proposed methods to construct quantum codes from
classical codes. Commonly referred to as “stabilizer codes”, these codes are the most stud-
ied class of quantum codes. Their work was followed with a substantial body of results
related to quantum error correction. More importantly, it was shown that if the overall
error rate was lower than a “threshold”, it was possible to perform an arbitrarily long quan-
tum computation with any desired accuracy with only a polylogarithmic overhead in time
and space [1].
With these fundamental results in place, the focus of quantum coding theory shifted
to the design of good codes, systematic methods for construction, efficient decoding algo-
rithms, passive error correction schemes, optimizing codes for realistic noise processes and
the like. These questions are in some sense interrelated. This dissertation seeks to address
these questions‡ in varying degree as will be elaborated below. It explores various models
and methods of quantum error correction. Broadly, its contribution to the theory of quan-
tum error correction is threefold. Firstly, it extends the framework of nonbinary stabilizer
codes. It clarifies the connections of stabilizer codes to classical codes over quadratic ex-
tension fields, provides many new constructions of quantum codes, and develops further the
theory of optimal quantum codes and punctured quantum codes. Secondly, it contributes
to the theory of operator quantum error correcting codes (also called as subsystem codes).
These codes are expected to have efficient error recovery schemes compared to stabilizer
codes. This dissertation develops a framework for study and analysis of subsystem codes
using character theoretic methods. The framework has made it possible to study subsystem
codes by translating them into classical codes. Thirdly, it seeks to exploit the knowledge
‡In this dissertation we do not focus so much on fault tolerance.
4of noise to design efficient quantum codes and considers more realistic channels than the
commonly studied depolarizing channel. In addition to providing many explicit construc-
tions for quantum codes, it seeks to integrate developments such as low density parity check
(LDPC) codes into quantum coding theory.
C. Outline and Contribution
This dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter III, we consider the theory of nonbi-
nary stabilizer codes initiated by Rains [126] and Ashikhmin and Knill [11]. This work was
motivated in part by the comparatively little attention that codes over nonbinary alphabet
had received. Currently it appears that binary quantum systems are comparatively easier to
control and implement than multi-level quantum systems. However, the growing interest
in nonbinary implementations suggests that nonbinary codes deserve a closer study, espe-
cially as quantum technologies mature. Further, many of the quantum mechanical systems
naturally allow for a multi-dimensional representation of quantum information. Instead of
simply ignoring them as is often the case, it might be to our benefit to exploit these addi-
tional degrees of freedom. It could for instance lead to implementation of quantum proces-
sors with fewer systems. In fact, there are proposals to exploit these additional modes not
only to implement nonbinary quantum systems [30] but also use them to simplify binary
implementations [51, 130]. It stands to reason that we need a systematic theory to design
good codes for nonbinary implementations. This chapter concerns itself with generalizing
many of the ideas of stabilizer codes to the nonbinary setting. The nonbinary generaliza-
tion turns out to be a nontrivial task and in fact there still remain many open questions with
respect to nonbinary quantum codes. We derive a number of important results with regard
to structure and constructions of nonbinary stabilizer codes.
Armed with the framework of nonbinary stabilizer codes developed in Chapter III, we
5then turn to a more constructive task of designing good quantum codes in Chapter IV. As
in the classical case, quite often, imposing the constraint of linearity on the code structure
substantially simplifies our task. We have more control over the parameters of the codes
we design and more importantly, imposing the linearity constraint simplifies the encoding
and decoding complexity. Therefore, we focus on the construction of some linear quan-
tum codes bringing into bearing the machinery of the previous chapter. As in the case of
classical codes, optimal codes generate a lot of interest not only because of their optimality,
but because, not infrequently, they possess additional combinatorial structure that leads to
interesting mathematical problems. We also study the quantum MDS codes in this chapter,
establishing some structural results related to them.
While error correcting codes address the problem of protecting quantum information,
there are still certain hurdles to be crossed if we are to build a quantum computer. Unlike
classical case where we can, with good reason, assume that the encoding and decoding
operations are noiseless or at least that they are not as noisy as the channel, quantum infor-
mation processing does not allow us to do so. The process of encoding and decoding can
be as noisy as the channel itself. Codes then have to designed to allow for fault tolerant
computation not merely communication or storage. The theory of fault tolerant quantum
computation was developed to address this challenge. In keeping with this goal of fault
tolerant quantum computation some researchers have been investigating passive forms of
quantum error correction, where information was encoded into subsystems that were im-
mune to noise. Kribs et al., [99, 100] proposed a generalized framework for understanding
both active and passive forms of quantum error correction. Such codes are called operator
quantum error correcting codes or subsystem codes because in this model information is
protected by encoding into subsystems as against the subspaces. Informally, this amounts to
encoding each logical state into an equivalence class rather a unique state in the codespace.
The equivalence class is actually a subspace and any state in the subspace is a representa-
6tive of the logical state. This is accomplished through the use of additional qubits called
gauge qubits. This method also generalizes the class of stabilizer codes studied in the
Chapters III, IV. In view of its relevance to fault tolerant quantum computing we devote
Chapter V to the study of operator quantum error correcting codes. Using character the-
oretic methods we establish a connection with classical codes that enables us to construct
these codes systematically. In particular, we relax the constraint of self-orthogonality on
the classical codes used to construct stabilizer codes.
In Chapter VI we extend the theory of operator quantum error correcting codes. The
results are of interest in that they provide insight into the structure of subsystem codes.
Additionally, they enable us to compare the gains that subsystem codes provide over sta-
bilizer codes. An important question that had been raised when the subsystem codes were
first discovered was the possibility of improving upon optimal stabilizer codes in the sense
of requiring fewer syndrome measurements than them. We demonstrate in this particular
sense the subsystem codes, at least the linear ones, cannot outperform the MDS stabilizer
codes.
The presence of gauge qubits in subsystem codes not only simplifies error correction
procedures, but it can potentially simplify the encoding process. Usually, the complexity
of encoding is not as large as the complexity of decoding and is often neglected. But in the
context of fault tolerant quantum computing, it is useful to have simpler encoding schemes.
Previous work on subsystem codes contained claims that the encoding could also benefit
due to subsystem coding but the exact circuits and the trade offs involved in achieving these
gains were either absent or not rigorously justified. In Chapter VII we show how subsystem
codes can be encoded, and how to exploit the presence of the gauge qubits to simplify the
encoding process. We contend these simplifications in the encoding circuitry should also
lead to additional benefits for fault tolerant quantum computation.
Much of quantum coding theory followed the same path as the classical coding theory
7did historically. That is it took on an algebraic outlook with great emphasis on the distance
of the code. But modern coding theory has gradually moved away from such a one dimen-
sional characterization of code performance. In the modern picture instead of requiring
that all errors up to a certain weight be correctable it has shifted the focus to achieving
the capacity of the channel while keeping the complexity of encoding and decoding low.
But these insights have not yet been fully absorbed by quantum coding theory. The reason
is not that it has not been attempted. Starting with the works of Postol [119], MacKay
et al., [105], Camara et al., [37] and more recently Poulin and Chung [122], there have
been attempts to incorporate these modern developments into quantum coding theory. The
difficulty is addressing the conflicting requirements that are posed on the classical codes
from which the quantum codes are constructed. The additional constraints usually imply
that these are bad codes classically and unlikely to lead to good quantum codes. In Chap-
ter VIII, we contribute to the ongoing discussion on quantum LDPC codes by providing
new constructions of algebraic quantum LDPC codes.
In Chapter VIII we also study a problem that has generated a lot of interest lately viz.
the use of realistic noise models in quantum error correction. Much of earlier work often
assumed that the channels are depolarizing channels. The depolarizing channel while being
particularly simple is not necessarily the most accurate noise model which reflects many
of the current quantum technologies. In Chapter VIII we study the design of codes that are
in some measure optimized to channels that are asymmetric. For these channels we also
address the problem mentioned earlier, how to incorporate the modern developments such
as LDPC codes effectively. We study the theory of codes for asymmetric quantum channels
and also provide systematic constructions of classes of quantum codes for them. While it
remains to be seen if these codes are suitable for quantum computation, they seem most
suited for quantum memories.
In Chapter IX we slightly change tracks to illustrate how the study of quantum codes
8can shed light on classical codes. In this chapter we show how studies in quantum codes
led to us to gain additional insight into the properties of BCH codes. Despite the fact these
codes have been known for more than forty years now, there remain open problems with
regard to their properties. We make some contribution to our understanding of these codes
in the context of quantum error correction. We characterize the dimension and duals of
narrow-sense BCH codes giving simple closed form expressions for their dimensions and
simple criteria to identify dual containing BCH codes.
The material in Chapters III and IV is due to a joint work [83] with Andreas Klap-
penecker, Avanti Ketkar, and Santosh Kumar. Part of this material has appeared earlier in
the theses of Avanti Ketkar and Santosh Kumar. Chapters V, VI and VII are in collabo-
ration with Andreas Klappenecker and are based on [90, 91] and [135]. The material in
Chapter VIII is the outcome of a joint work [136] with Martin Ro¨tteler and Andreas Klap-
penecker and was partly performed while at NEC Laboratories America, Inc. The results
in Chapter IX are due to a joint work with Andreas Klappenecker and Salah Aly [8].
To keep the dissertation of a manageable and readable size, I have not included my
investigations of algebraic geometric quantum codes (in collaboration with Andreas Klap-
penecker) [133, 134], quantum convolutional codes [3, 9] (together with Andreas Klap-
penecker, Salah Aly, Martin Ro¨tteler and Markus Grassl), degenerate quantum codes [5],
group algebra duadic codes [7], some additional results on subsystem codes from [6] which
were due to joint work with Andreas Klappenecker and Salah Aly.
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BACKGROUND
To make the dissertation self-contained and also to provide the context for the research per-
formed, this section provides a brief review of ideas relevant to quantum error correction.
Because the breadth of the contents precludes any possibility of covering it completely in a
short space, we recommend the lecture notes by Preskill [123] and the textbook by Nielsen
and Chuang [114] for an accessible introduction to quantum computation. Those familiar
with quantum computing can skip this chapter and proceed directly to topics of interest.
While there is a logical progression of ideas, effort has been made so that the chapters can
be read independently to some extent.
A. Quantum Computation
1. Qubits
Just as bits are abstractions of classical two level systems, qubits are an abstraction of
two level quantum systems. We denote the basis states in the so-called Dirac notation
where |0〉 (ket zero) and |1〉 (ket one), are simply column vectors [ 10 ] and [ 01 ] respectively.
This notation also serves to distinguish them from the classical states. The first essential
difference with respect to bits is that the qubits can be in superposition of the basis states
i.e., they can be in any linear combination of the basis states subject to a normalization
constraint. For instance, consider a single qubit. This qubit can be in the state
a |0〉+ b |1〉 , where a, b ∈ C and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1.
So the state space of a qubit is C2.
While the qubit can be put in any superposition of the basis states, the observed state
10
of the qubit is restricted to be either one of the states. We cannot observe the superposition
itself. Any observation of the qubit “collapses” the state of the qubit to either |0〉 or |1〉
with probability |a|2 and |b|2 respectively. This underscores the second difference between
bits and qubits. Observation of qubits can change their state in general.
If we have n qubits, then the state space is actually a tensor product of the individual
state spaces. We refer to the state space of the system as the Hilbert space and denote it
by H. We have H ∼= C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2 with dimH = 2n. An orthonormal basis for
H is given by |x1〉 ⊗ |x2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉. The basis states are also sometimes denoted as
|x1x2 . . . xn〉 or |x1, x2, . . . , xn〉, where the xi take the values zero or one. We can also
label the basis elements by x ∈ Fn2 . Then a general state is given by
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈Fn2
αx |x〉 ;
∑
x∈Fn2
|αx|2 = 1. (2.1)
The state of the system is a unit vector of length one in H. The probability of observing
the system in state |x〉 is given by |αx|2. The normalization constraint is due to the fact
on measurement some state will be observed. To describe a general state then, we require
2n − 1 complex numbers. This is in contrast to the classical case where the state space is
only n dimensional. As an example, a two qubit system can be put in the state
a0 |00〉+ a1 |01〉+ a2 |10〉+ a3 |11〉 ,
where |a0|2+ |a1|2+ |a2|2+ |a3|2 = 1. The basis state |00〉 is actually |0〉⊗|0〉 = [ 10 ]⊗ [ 10 ].
Other basis states are given similarly.
Often we will need to observe only a part of the system. This is a little more involved.
Assume that we have a system of m + n qubits and we want to observe m qubits. An
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arbitrary state of the system is of the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈Fm2 ,y∈Fn2
αx,y |x〉 |y〉 ;
∑
x∈Fm2 ,y∈Fn2
|αx,y|2 = 1. (2.2)
Let us assume that we want to observe the qubits whose states correspond to |x〉. Then the
probability of observing these qubits in state |x〉 is given by
px =
∑
y∈Fn2
|αx,y|2.
Assuming that we observed |x〉, the state of the system after observation is given by
1√
px
∑
y∈Fn2
αx,y |y〉 |x〉 .
Observing quantum systems can be described using the more powerful measurement for-
malism, see for instance [114].
An important consequence of the fact that the qubits can be in superposition is a phe-
nomenon known as entanglement. Consider the following state. We ignore the normaliza-
tion factors for convenience.
|ψ〉 = |01〉+ |11〉 .
We could also write this state as the product state i.e.,
|ψ〉 = |0〉 ⊗ (|0〉+ |1〉).
When the states of the qubits can be written as product states then we can observe each of
the product states without disturbing the rest of the system. However there are states such
as the following which cannot be written as the product of individual qubit states.
|ψ〉 = |00〉+ |11〉 |ϕ〉 = |01〉+ |10〉 .
Such states are said to be entangled and this phenomenon is called entanglement. When
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qubits are entangled it is not possible to observe the state of one of the entangled qubits
without disturbing the rest of the system. One could view the speedup provided by quan-
tum computers as being due to entanglement.
We associate to every state |ψ〉 in H a row vector denoted as 〈ψ| which is simply the
adjoint of the column vector corresponding to |ψ〉. Two vectors |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 are said to be
orthogonal if their scalar product denoted as 〈ϕ | ψ〉 = 0. This is also called the inner
product of two vectors.
2. Quantum Gates
Just as classical data is manipulated using gates, qubits are also manipulated using quantum
gates. Since the quantum states are unit vectors in C2n , we could view the application of
gates on the qubits as matrices on C2n . The postulates of quantum mechanics require the
matrices to be unitary, i.e., they must satisfy U−1 = U †, where U † is the adjoint of the
matrix. We denote the action of a gate U on a state |ψ〉 as U |ψ〉. We denote the inner
product of U |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 as 〈ϕ|U |ψ〉. Some important operations on a single qubit are the
following.
X =

 0 1
1 0

 ; Y =

 0 −i
i 0

 ; Z =

 1 0
0 −1

 . (2.3)
These operators are also called Pauli errors. We will denote the group generated by the
Pauli errors by P . Often Y is redefined without the i for convenience in analysis. When
we consider n qubits we define the Pauli group of matrices on them as
Pn = {ice1 ⊗ e2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ en | ei ∈ P, c ∈ Z4}, where Z4 = {0, 1, 2, 3}. (2.4)
In a subsequent chapter we will generalize the notion of Pauli group and use it to define
error operators and construct codes over prime power alphabet.
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Other important single qubit gates are the Hadamard gate, H , the phase gate P and
the π/8 gate (or T gate) which are defined as
H =

 1 1
1 −1

 ; P =

 1 0
0 i

 ; T =

 1 0
0 eipi/4

 . (2.5)
Perhaps the most important two qubit gate is the CNOT (controlled-NOT) gate. The action
of the CNOT gate on the basis states is as follows.
|x〉 • |x〉
|y〉  |x⊕ y〉
The top qubit is called the control qubit and the bottom qubit is called the target qubit. A
CNOT gate with control qubit i and target qubit j is denoted as CNOTi,j and acts as follows
on these two qubits: 

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0


. (2.6)
The CNOT gate along with H , P and T gates forms a set of universal gates for quantum
computation. Any arbitrary quantum gate can be realized efficiently using these set of gates
to arbitrary accuracy by the Solovay-Kitaev theorem. A graphic representation of the gates
mentioned so far is given below:
X Y Z H P T •

i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii)
An important point about the quantum gates is that they act linearly. Let us illustrate. The
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X gate acts as follows:
X |0〉 7→ |1〉 and X |1〉 7→ |0〉 ,
so when it acts on an arbirary state such as a |0〉 + b |1〉 we get a |1〉 + b |0〉. Later in
Chapter VII we will have occasion to give encoding and decoding circuits for subsystem
codes. These ideas will be needed then.
3. Density Operators
The state of qubits can be viewed not only as a unit vector in the Hilbert space but also
as operators on H. This approach makes it easy to analyze and study quantum channels.
Given two vectors |ψ〉 and |φ〉 we can define what is known as the outer product of |ψ〉 and
|φ〉 as |φ〉 〈ψ|. For instance if |ψ〉 = |0〉 and |φ〉 = |1〉. Then |1〉 〈0| =

 0 0
1 0

. We call
the outer product obtained from |ψ〉 with itself i.e., ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| as the density matrix or the
density operator. The density matrix is positive definite, i.e., 〈ψ| ρ |ψ〉 ≥ 0, and Tr(ρ) = 1
where Tr is the sum of the diagonal entries. Since the density operators are matrices of size
2n×2n, we can also view the states as being operators on the system Hilbert space. A view
which will be useful when defining quantum channels. More generally if a system can be
found in one of the states |ψi〉 with probability pi, the density operator associated to this
system is given by
ρ =
∑
i
pi |ψi〉 〈ψi| .
A state is pure if Tr(ρ2) = 1 and mixed otherwise. The density operator approach will
be helpful in understanding the motivation behind operator quantum error correction in
Chapter V and also in Chapter VIII, where we design codes optimized for a given channel.
When a gate U is applied to a state with density matrix ρ, it transforms as UρU †.
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4. Quantum Noise
Noise on qubits is very different from the noise that we deal with bits. The noise can be
thought to be arising out of the fact that the information bearing system cannot be com-
pletely isolated from the environment and its interaction with the environment causes its
state to change. Sometimes this phenomenon is also called decoherence.
Since the state of a single qubit is given a |0〉+ b |1〉, where a, b are complex numbers,
one can expect that errors on quantum information form a continuum unlike the classical
bits where there exist only bit flip errors. In fact, we can view noise on a qubit as a 2 × 2
complex matrix and more generally, noise on n qubits is a 2n× 2n complex matrix; for this
reason we often refer to errors as error operators.
While we have to protect quantum information from an infinitude of errors, in view
of linearity of quantum mechanics, it suffices to correct for only a basis of errors. The
importance of the Pauli errors also stems from the fact that they form a basis for the error
operators. Of course, we cannot protect against all errors. We usually make the assumption
that noise on each qubit is independent. Under this assumption we can decompose an error
on the system into a tensor product of n single qubit errors.
Errors on the quantum states can also arise due to the finite precision with which the
quantum gates are implemented. Fortunately, the same mechanisms that are used to correct
decoherence can also be used to correct for these type of errors [140, 142].
5. Quantum Channels
A quantum channel is a linear map on the density operators (on C2m) to the set of density
operators (on C2n); we usually assume that the input and output Hilbert spaces are same
i.e., m = n. Sometimes quantum channels are also called “superoperators” to indicate that
they act on (density) operators. In this dissertation we will confine ourselves to maps which
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are completely positive and trace preserving (CPTP) maps. A CPTP map E is usually given
in terms of its Kraus decomposition.
E(ρ) =
∑
i
EiρE
†
i where
∑
i
E†iEi = I. (2.7)
The quantum channel view is very convenient to understand errors. For instance if we
assume that the bit flip errors occur with a probability p and the rest of the time there are
no errors. We can represent this as the following channel.
E(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ pXρX. (2.8)
The Kraus operators are easily identified as
√
1− pI and √pX . The channel often studied
in the context of quantum codes is the depolarizing channel and it parallels the classical
4-ary symmetric channel. This channel acts as
E(ρ) = (1− 3p)ρ+ pXρX + pY ρY + pZρZ. (2.9)
In this channel, each of the Pauli errors X , Y or Z act with a probability p and with a
probability of 1 − 3p, the state is preserved. The Kraus operators are simply given by
√
1− 3pI , √pX , √pY and √pZ.
B. Quantum Error Correction
In this section we briefly review the elements of quantum error correction. The reader is
also recommended to [35,61,95] for more details. Additionally, there are many expositions
to the ideas of quantum error correction, see [13, 55, 82, 96, 108]. Here we summarize the
main features. We will restrict our attention to additive quantum codes.
A binary quantum code is a linear subspace of the system Hilbert space i.e., C2n . The
subspace structure arises due to the fact that we can have superpositions of the encoded
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states. For instance, let us assume that the logical states are the following:
∣∣0〉 = |000〉 ; ∣∣1〉 = |111〉 . (2.10)
Since we are allowed to have linear combinations of states, this implies that a |000〉+b |111〉
is also a valid state and belongs to the code. The subspace structure of the quantum code
can be seen to emerge naturally. The typical questions that we have to address when dealing
with error correcting codes classical or otherwise are:
• Construction
• Encoding
• Error correction
• Performance
In the case quantum codes, there is yet another component that plays a much more im-
portant role than in case of classical codes. The codes should be suitable for fault tolerant
computation i.e., we should be able to perform logical operations on the encoded data with-
out having to decode them. The encoded operations must also ensure that the errors must
not propagate catastrophically beyond the error correcting capability of the code. In this
thesis we will not get into the issues of fault tolerance. We shall address the problem of
construction and performance in more detail in the later chapters of this dissertation. Let
us look at the other two aspects.
Since quantum codes are subspaces in C2n , constructing quantum codes can be viewed
as packing of subspaces in H. In fact, the original approaches to quantum error correction
were along this route. This geometric picture while intuitive is not very convenient; for-
tunately, we can translate the problem of construction into one with a lot more algebraic
flavor and more importantly, into a much more familiar language involving construction of
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classical codes. We will have much more to say on this topic of how to link the classical
codes and the subspaces in H later in Chapters III and V.
Assume for now that we have some means to choose a subspace to be our quantum
code, Q. Then, from linear algebra we know that we can project onto a subspace by means
of a projector. A projector P satisfies P 2 = P . A projector for Q can be easily constructed
by choosing an orthonormal basis of the subspace Q, say {|α1〉 , . . . , |αK〉}, and forming
the following matrix
P =
K∑
i=1
|αi〉 〈αi| .
The dimension of the subspace is related to P as dimQ = Tr(P ). The subspace induces a
decomposition of the Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces. Encoding amounts to real-
izing P , though there are important subtleties to be addressed, (such as the nonunitariness
of P ). For instance, the encoding in equation (2.10) can be easily accomplished using the
following circuit.
a |0〉+ b |1〉 • •
|0〉  a |000〉+ b |111〉
|0〉 


We shall study encoding circuits in more detail in Chapter VII when we discuss encoding
of subsystem codes.
When it comes to quantum error correction, there are a few points worth highlight-
ing. Error correction or error recovery implies that we correct the errors on the encoded
information without finding out what was the original information stored. By decoding we
mean the process of extracting the information from the encoded qubits. It presumes that
error correction has already been performed. Classically, we do not have to make such
fine distinction between error correction and decoding because once error correction is per-
formed it is not difficult to obtain the information that was encoded without affecting the
encoded state. In the quantum setting decoding amounts to destroying the encoded state.
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In the context of fault tolerant quantum computation we would not like to decode until the
end of the computation as it would remove the protection afforded by the code. Unless
explicitly mentioned our focus will be on error recovery or correction. We will assume that
the decoding of the encoded information is performed at the end of the computation. In
this dissertation we will be concerned with error correction unless specified otherwise.
Let us look at the error correction process in a little more detail. Assume that we use
the encoding given in equation (2.10). Suppose that there is a bit flip error on the first qubit,
also called an X error. Then we have
a |000〉+ b |111〉 Bit flip7→ a |100〉+ b |011〉 .
We cannot take a majority voting to figure out the error as in the classical case because if
we observed the state we would collapse the state to either |100〉 or |011〉. Although we
maybe able to find that there was an error on the first qubit, we have also damaged the state.
Thus error correction process is a little more complicated in the quantum case. We must not
perform a full measurement of the system. We solve this problem by partial measurements
and the use of additional qubits called ancilla. Let us illustrate this for our running example.
We can compute the parity of the first two qubits and the second two qubits as follows.
Encoding Noise Syndrome Measurement Correction
|ψ〉 • •
N
•
R|0〉  • •
|0〉  •
|0〉  
NM
 •
_ _ _ _ _ _









_ _ _ _ _ _
|0〉  
NM
 •
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _



















_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The state of the qubits changes as follows as we move across the circuit:
a |0〉+ b |1〉 |00〉 |00〉 Encoder7→ (a |000〉+ b |111〉) |00〉 Noise7→ (a |100〉+ b |011〉) |00〉
CNOT1,47→ (a |100〉 |1〉+ b |011〉 |0〉) |0〉 CNOT2,47→ (a |100〉 |1〉+ b |011〉 |1〉) |0〉
= (a |100〉+ b |011〉) |1〉 |0〉
It will be seen that the first ancilla qubit becomes entangled with the encoded state briefly
and then becomes unentangled. At this point we can make a measurement of the ancilla
without disturbing the rest of the encoded state. The double lines indicate classical bits.
We can then perform a correction operation based on the measurement of ancilla qubits.
The value measured is usually called the syndrome.
The important thing to notice is that if we have an error then the codespace is taken to
an orthogonal subspace of C2n , in the example considered it is the space spanned by |100〉
and |011〉. On the other hand consider an error that flips all the qubits. This error takes
|000〉 to |111〉 and vice versa. Its action on Q is to merely permute the basis vectors. Since
it takes valid codevectors to valid codevectors, it cannot be detected. Finally, let us consider
an error which has no classical analogue. If we had a Z error on the first two qubits, then
it would take |000〉 to |000〉 and |111〉 to |111〉. So a nontrivial error can act trivially on the
codespace. We consider such errors to be harmless. This gives us a general principle for an
error to be detectable. We shall make use of this lemma later, especially in Chapters III, V.
Lemma II.1 ( [95]). Given a quantum code Q, with projector P , and |α〉 and |β〉 two
orthogonal vectors in Q. An error E is detectable if and only if 〈α|E |β〉 = λE 〈α|E |β〉,
where λE depends only on E. Alternatively, an error is detectable if and only if PEP =
λEP .
Given a set of errors {E1, E2, . . . , El} that are detectable by Q, their linear span is also
detectable by Q. The subspace Q induces a decomposition of C2n . Detectable errors take
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the subspace one of the orthogonal subspaces, while undetectable errors take Q to itself.
C. Classical Coding Theory
In this section we discuss some of the relevant aspects of classical codes setting the stage
for our work on quantum error correction. In view of vastness of the subject, the reader
is recommended standard textbooks in the field such as [76, 104, 107] for a comprehensive
treatment of the field.
Let Fq denote a finite field with q elements; we have q = pm for some prime p. If
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq , then we denote the Hamming weight of x as
wt(x) = |{xi 6= 0}|, (2.11)
i.e., it is the number of nonzero coordinates of x. We say that a subset C ⊆ Fnq is an
additive code if for any x, y in C, x + y is also in C. Additive codes play an important
role in quantum error correction. If in addition to being additive, C also satisfies αc ∈ C
for any α ∈ Fq and c ∈ C, then C is said to be an Fq-linear code. Such codes often have
simpler encoding and decoding schemes while being tractable in terms of construction and
analysis. The minimum distance of a set C ⊂ Fnq is defined as
wt(C) = min
x,y∈C
x 6=y
{wt(x− y)}. (2.12)
The (minimum) distance of a code is indicative of the error correcting capabilities of the
code. If C is an additive code, its distance is given by
wt(C) = min
06=c∈C
wt(c). (2.13)
A classical (n,K, d)q code C ⊆ Fnq is subset of Fnq of size |C| = K and distance
d = wt(C). If |C| = qk, then we denote it by [n, k, d]q. If C is also Fq-linear code, then
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C is a k-dimensional subspace of Fnq . Linear codes are often described by giving a basis of
codewords in the form a matrix, often called as the generator matrix. For example, consider
the [7, 4, 3]2 Hamming code with the generator matrix
G =


1 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1


.
It consists of all the linear combinations of the rows of G. When the generator matrix is in
the form [I|P ] we say that it is in the standard form. We define the Euclidean inner product
between two codewords x, y ∈ Fnq as
x · y = x1y1 + · · ·+ xnyn =
n∑
i=1
xiyi. (2.14)
The Euclidean inner product enables us to define a dual code. It is defined as
C⊥ = {x ∈ Fnq | x · c = 0 for all c ∈ C}. (2.15)
This is also called as the Euclidean dual of C. The dual code is itself a linear code with its
own generator matrix H . A generator matrix of C⊥ is also called a parity check matrix for
C. For the example just considered, a parity check matrix is given by
H =


1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1

 .
When the generator matrix for C is given in the standard form [Ik|P ], a parity check matrix
is easily obtained as [−P t|In−k]. One important relation between the generator matrix and
the parity check matrix is that GH t = 0. When a code C ⊆ C⊥, we say that C is a self-
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orthogonal code. If C = C⊥, then we say it is a self-dual code. In the context of quantum
error correcting codes, dual codes and self-orthogonal codes play a much more significant
role than in the classical case. Additionally, we encounter far more general notions of inner
products.
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CHAPTER III
THEORY OF NONBINARY STABILIZER CODES∗
As mentioned earlier, quantum codes were developed to make fault-tolerant quantum com-
putation possible. The most widely studied class of quantum error-correcting codes are
binary stabilizer codes, see [14, 15, 26, 34, 36, 41–44, 49, 56, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 84,
85, 87, 108, 127, 142, 144–147, 151, 154] and, in particular, the seminal works [35, 59]. An
appealing aspect of binary stabilizer codes is that there exist links to classical coding theory
that facilitate the construction of good codes. More recently, some results were generalized
to the case of nonbinary stabilizer codes [1,10,11,28,39,40,53,54,62,71,73,86,102,109,
126, 132, 137, 138], but the theory is not nearly as complete as in the binary case.
One would naturally ask why study nonbinary codes? There are at least three reasons
for our interest in nonbinary codes. The first reason is the generalization is a nontrivial
mathematical problem that is of interest in itself. Results which are considerably easy
to prove in the binary case turn out be much more formidable requiring the use of ele-
gant mathematical techniques to solve the problems. The second reason is a practical one
and motivated by the behavior of classical codes. Many good classical codes like Reed-
Solomon codes are nonbinary codes. Algebraic geometric codes that were the first shown
to beat the Gilbert-Varshamov bound were once again nonbinary codes. Even in the case
LDPC codes it has been shown that increasing the alphabet size improves the performance
albeit at the expense of complexity. As we shall see the close connections between the clas-
sical and quantum codes tempt the conclusion that perhaps one would expect to find good
classes of quantum codes over a larger alphabet. Thirdly, quite often many implementations
∗ c©2006 IEEE. Reprinted in part, with permission, from A. Ketkar, A. Klappenecker,
S. Kumar and P. K. Sarvepalli, “Nonbinary stabilizer codes over finite fields”. IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 52, no. 11, pp. 4892–4914, 2006.
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naturally allow for a multilevel quantum system. These extra modes are usually ignored;
but lately they have received interest, see [23,30,46,65,113] and references therein. Addi-
tionally, as shown in [130], if properly exploited, this can lead to efficient implementation
of gates. All these reasons motivate our investigations of nonbinary quantum codes.
This chapter has two primary goals. On one hand we provide a review of the theory
of stabilizer codes and on the other we also extend and generalize many of the results.
This chapter is structured as follows. We recall the basic principles of nonbinary stabilizer
codes over finite fields in Section A. In Section B, we introduce a Galois theory for quan-
tum error-correcting codes. The original theory developed by Evariste Galois relates field
extensions to groups. Oystein Ore derived a significantly more general theory for pairs of
lattices [116]. We use this framework and set up a Galois correspondence between quan-
tum error-correcting codes and groups. This theory shows how some properties of general
quantum codes, such as bounds on the minimum distance, can be deduced from results
about stabilizer codes.
In Section C, we recall that stabilizer codes over a finite field Fq correspond to additive
codes over Fq that are self-orthogonal with respect to a trace-symplectic form [11]. We
also establish the correspondence to additive codes over Fq2 that are self-orthogonal with
respect to a trace-alternating form; remarkably, this basic construction had been missing in
the literature, in spite of the fact that it is a generalization of the famous F4-codes [35].
The MacWilliams relations for weight enumerators of stabilizer codes are particularly
easy to prove, as we show in Section D. We then derive upper and lower bounds on the min-
imum distance of the best possible stabilizer codes in Section E. Section F details methods
to construct new methods to construct quantum codes from existing quantum codes. Unlike
classical codes, puncturing quantum codes is a relatively complex task. So we include a
generalization of the puncturing theory introduced by Rains to additive codes that are not
necessarily pure. In a later chapter we show how to apply it.
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Apart from the basics of quantum computing, we recommend [35] and [61] for back-
ground on binary stabilizer codes, in addition to books on classical coding theory, such
as [76,104,107]. The general theory of quantum codes is discussed in [95], and we assume
that the reader is familiar with the notion of a detectable error, as introduced there.
Notations. We assume throughout this chapter that Fq denotes a finite field of char-
acteristic p; in particular, q always denotes a power of a prime p. The trace function from
Fqm to Fq is defined as trqm/q(x) =
∑m−1
k=0 x
qk ; we may omit the subscripts if Fq is the
prime field. If G is a group, then we denote by Z(G) the center of G. If S ⊆ G, then we
denote by CG(S) the centralizer of S in G. We write H ≤ G to express the fact that H is a
subgroup of G. The trace Tr(M) of a square matrix M is the sum of the diagonal elements
of M .
A. Stabilizer Codes
Let Cq be a q-dimensional complex vector space representing the states of a quantum me-
chanical system. We denote by |x〉 the vectors of a distinguished orthonormal basis of Cq,
where the labels x range over the elements of a finite field Fq with q elements. A quantum
error-correcting code Q is a K-dimensional subspace of Cqn = Cq ⊗ · · · ⊗ Cq.
We need to select an appropriate error model so that we can measure the performance
of a code. We simplify matters by choosing a basis En of the vector space of complex
qn × qn matrices to represent a discrete set of errors. A stabilizer code is defined as the
joint eigenspace of a subset of En, so the error operators play a crucial role.
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1. Error Bases
Let a and b be elements of the finite field Fq. We define the unitary operators X(a) and
Z(b) on Cq by
X(a) |x〉 = |x+ a〉 , Z(b) |x〉 = ωtr(bx) |x〉 ,
where tr denotes the trace operation from the extension field Fq to the prime field Fp, and
ω = exp(2πi/p) is a primitive pth root of unity.
We form the set E = {X(a)Z(b) | a, b ∈ Fq} of error operators. The set E has some
interesting properties, namely (a) it contains the identity matrix, (b) the product of two
matrices in E is a scalar multiple of another element in E , and (c) the trace Tr(A†B) = 0
for distinct elements A,B of E . A finite set of q2 unitary matrices that satisfy the properties
(a), (b), and (c) is called a nice error basis, see [93].
The set E of error operators forms a basis of the set of complex q × q matrices due to
property (c). We include a proof that E is a nice error basis, because parts of our argument
will be of independent interest in the subsequent sections.
Lemma III.1. The set E = {X(a)Z(b) | a, b ∈ Fq} is a nice error basis on Cq.
Proof. The matrix X(0)Z(0) is the identity matrix, so property (a) holds. We also have
ωtr(ba)X(a)Z(b) = Z(b)X(a), which implies that the product of two error operators is
given by
X(a)Z(b)X(a′)Z(b′) = ωtr(ba
′)X(a+ a′)Z(b+ b′). (3.1)
This is a scalar multiple of an operator in E , hence property (b) holds.
Suppose that the error operators are of the form A = X(a)Z(b) and B = X(a)Z(b′)
for some a, b, b′ ∈ Fq. Then
Tr(A†B) = Tr(Z(b′ − b)) =
∑
x∈Fq
ωtr((b
′−b)x).
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The map x 7→ ωtr((b′−b)x) is an additive character of Fq. The sum of all character values is
0 unless the character is trivial; thus, Tr(A†B) = 0 when b′ 6= b.
On the other hand, if A = X(a)Z(b) and B = X(a′)Z(b′) are two error operators
satisfying a 6= a′, then the diagonal elements of the matrix A†B = Z(−b)X(a′ − a)Z(b′)
are 0, which implies Tr(A†B) = 0. Thus, whenever A and B are distinct element of E ,
then Tr(A†B) = 0, which proves (c).
Example III.2. We give an explicit construction of a nice error basis with q = 4 levels.
The finite field F4 consists of the elements F4 = {0, 1, α, α}. We denote the four standard
basis vectors of the complex vector space C4 by |0〉 , |1〉 , |α〉 , and |α〉. Let 12 denote the
2× 2 identity matrix, σx = ( 0 11 0 ), and σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. Then
X(0) =12 ⊗ 12, X(1) =12 ⊗ σx,
X(α)=σx ⊗ 12, X(α)=σx ⊗ σx,
Z(0) =12 ⊗ 12, Z(1) =σz ⊗ 12,
Z(α) =σz ⊗ σz, Z(α) =12 ⊗ σz.
We see that this nice error basis is obtained by tensoring the Pauli basis, a nice error basis
on C2. The next lemma shows that this is a general design principle for nice error bases.
Lemma III.3. If E1 and E2 are nice error bases, then
E = {E1 ⊗ E2 |E1 ∈ E1, E2 ∈ E2}
is a nice error basis as well.
The proof of this observation follows directly from the definitions.
Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fnq . We write X(a) = X(a1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ X(an) and Z(a) =
Z(a1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Z(an) for the tensor products of n error operators. Our aim is to provide
an error model that conveniently represents errors acting locally on one quantum system.
Using the new notations, we can easily formulate this model.
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Corollary III.4. The set En = {X(a)Z(b) | a,b ∈ Fnq } is a nice error basis on the complex
vector space Cqn .
Remark. Several authors have used an error basis that is equivalent to our definition
of En, see [11, 54, 86, 109]. We have defined the operator Z(b) in a slightly different way,
so that the properties relevant for the design of stabilizer codes become more transparent.
In particular, we can avoid an intermediate step that requires tensoring p× p–matrices, and
that allows us to obtain the trace-symplectic form directly, see Lemma III.5.
2. Stabilizer Codes
Let Gn denote the group generated by the matrices of the nice error basis En. It follows
from equation (3.1) that
Gn = {ωcX(a)Z(b) | a,b ∈ Fnq , c ∈ Fp}. (3.2)
Note that Gn is a finite group of order pq2n. We call Gn the error group associated with the
nice error basis En.
A stabilizer code Q is a non-zero subspace of Cqn that satisfies
Q =
⋂
E∈S
{v ∈ Cqn | Ev = v} (3.3)
for some subgroup S of Gn. In other words, Q is the joint eigenvalue-1 eigenspace of a
subgroup S of the error group Gn.
Remark. A crucial property of a stabilizer code is that it contains all joint eigenvectors
of S with eigenvalue 1, as equation (3.3) indicates. If the code is smaller and does not
exhaust all joint eigenvectors of S with eigenvalue 1, then it is not a stabilizer code for S.
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3. Minimum Distance
The error correction and detection capabilities of a quantum error-correcting code Q are
the most crucial aspects of the code. Recall that a quantum code Q is able to detect an error
E in the unitary group U(qn) if and only if the condition 〈c1|E|c2〉 = λE〈c1|c2〉 holds for
all c1, c2 ∈ Q, see [95].
It turns out that a stabilizer code Q with stabilizer S can detect all errors in Gn that
are scalar multiples of elements in S or that do not commute with some element of S, see
Lemma III.11. In particular, an error in Gn that is not detectable has to commute with all
elements of the stabilizer. Commuting elements in Gn are characterized as follows:
Lemma III.5. Two elements E = ωcX(a)Z(b) and E ′ = ωc′X(a′)Z(b′) of the error
group Gn satisfy the relation
EE ′ = ωtr(b·a
′−b′·a)E ′E.
In particular, the elements E and E ′ commute if and only if the trace symplectic form
tr(b · a′ − b′ · a) vanishes.
Proof. It follows from equation (3.1) that EE ′ = ωtr(b·a′)X(a + a′)Z(b + b′) and E ′E =
ωtr(b
′·a)X(a + a′)Z(b + b′). Therefore, multiplying E ′E by the scalar ωtr(b·a′−b′·a) yields
EE ′, as claimed.
We define the symplectic weight swt of a vector (a|b) in F2nq as
swt((a|b)) = |{ k | (ak, bk) 6= (0, 0)}|.
The weight w(E) of an element E = ωcX(a)Z(b) in the error group Gn is defined to
be the number of nonidentity tensor components, w(E) = swt((a|b)). In particular, the
weight of a scalar multiple of the identity matrix is by definition zero.
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A quantum code Q has minimum distance d if and only if it can detect all errors in
Gn of weight less than d, but cannot detect some error of weight d. We say that Q is an
((n,K, d))q code if and only if Q is a K-dimensional subspace of Cq
n
that has minimum
distance d. An ((n, qk, d))q code is also called an [[n, k, d]]q code. We remark that some
authors are more restrictive and use the bracket notation just for stabilizer codes.
We say that a quantum code Q is pure to t if and only if its stabilizer group S does
not contain non-scalar matrices of weight less than t. A quantum code is called pure if and
only if it is pure to its minimum distance. As in [35], we always assume that an [[n, 0, d]]q
code has to be pure.
Remarks. (a) If a quantum error-correcting code can detect a set D of errors, then it
can detect all errors in the linear span of D. (b) A code of minimum distance d can correct
all errors of weight t = ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ or less.
B. Galois Connection
We want to clarify the relation between stabilizer codes and more general quantum codes
before we proceed further. Let us denote by Q the set of all subspaces of Cqn . The set Q
is partially ordered by the inclusion relation. Any two elements of Q have a least upper
bound and a greatest lower bound with respect to the inclusion relation, namely
sup{Q,Q′} = Q+Q′ and inf{Q,Q′} = Q ∩Q′.
Therefore, Q is a complete (order) lattice. An element of this lattice is a quantum error-
correcting code or is equal to the vector space {0}.
Let G denote the lattice of subgroups of the error group Gn. We will introduce two
order-reversing maps between G and Q that establish a Galois connection. We will see that
stabilizer codes are distinguished elements of Q that remain the same when mapped to the
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lattice G and back.
Let us define a map Fix from the lattice G of subgroups to the lattice Q of subspaces
that associates to a group S its joint eigenspace with eigenvalue 1,
Fix(S) =
⋂
E∈S
{v ∈ Cqn |Ev = v}. (3.4)
We define for the reverse direction a map Stab from the lattice Q to the lattice G that
associates to a quantum code Q its stabilizer group Stab(Q),
Stab(Q) = {E ∈ Gn |Ev = v for all v ∈ Q}. (3.5)
We obtain four direct consequences of the definitions (3.4) and (3.5):
G1. If Q1 ⊆ Q2 are subspaces of Cqn , then Stab(Q2) ≤ Stab(Q1).
G2. If S1 ≤ S2 are subgroups of Gn, then Fix(S2) ≤ Fix(S1).
G3. A subspace Q of Cqn satisfies Q ⊆ Fix(Stab(Q)).
G4. A subgroup S of Gn satisfies S ≤ Stab(Fix(S)).
The first two properties establish that Fix and Stab are order-reversing maps. The exten-
sion properties G3 and G4 establish that Fix and Stab form a Galois connection, see [29,
page 56]. The general theory of Galois connections establishes, among other results, that
Fix(S) = Fix(Stab(Fix(S))) and Stab(Q) = Stab(Fix(Stab(Q))) holds for all S in G
and all Q in Q.
A subspace Q of the vector space Cqn satisfying G3 with equality is called a closed
subspace, and a subgroup S of the error group Gn satisfying G4 with equality is called
a closed subgroup. We record the main result of abstract Galois theory in the following
proposition.
33
Proposition III.6. The closed subspaces of the vector space Cqn form a complete sublattice
Qc of the latticeQ. The closed subgroups of Gn form a complete sublattice Gc of the lattice
G that is dual isomorphic to the lattice Qc.
Proof. This result holds for any Galois connection, see Theorem 10 in the book by Birk-
hoff [29, page 56].
We need to characterize the closed subspaces and subgroups to make this proposition
useful. We begin with the closed subspaces because this is easier.
Lemma III.7. A closed subspace is a stabilizer code or is 0-dimensional.
Proof. By definition, a closed subspace Q satisfies
Q = Fix(Stab(Q)) =
⋂
E∈Stab(Q)
{v ∈ Cqn |Ev = v},
hence is a stabilizer code or {0}.
Lemma III.8. If Q is a nonzero subspace of Cqn , then its stabilizer S = Stab(Q) is an
abelian group satisfying S ∩ Z(Gn) = {1}.
Proof. Suppose thatE andE ′ are non-commuting elements of S = Stab(Q). By Lemma III.5,
we have EE ′ = ωkE ′E for some ωk 6= 1. A nonzero vector v in Q would have to satisfy
v = EE ′v = ωkE ′Ev = ωkv, contradiction. Therefore, S is an abelian group. The stabi-
lizer cannot contain any element ωk1, unless k = 0, which proves the second assertion.
Lemma III.9. Suppose that S is the stabilizer of a vector spaceQ. An orthogonal projector
onto the joint eigenspace Fix(S) is given by
P =
1
|S|
∑
E∈S
E.
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Proof. A vector v in Fix(S) satisfies Pv = v, hence Fix(S) is contained in the image of P .
Conversely, note thatEP = P holds for allE in S, hence any vector in the image of P is an
eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of all error operators E in S. Therefore, Fix(S) = imageP .
The operator P is idempotent, because
P 2 =
1
|S|
∑
E∈S
EP =
1
|S|
∑
E∈S
P = P
holds. The inverse E† of E is contained in the group S, hence P † = P . Therefore, P is an
orthogonal projector onto Fix(S).
Remark. If S is a nonabelian subgroup of the group Gn, then it necessarily contains
the center Z(Gn) of Gn; it follows that P is equal to the all-zero matrix. Note that the
image of P has dimension Tr(P ) = qn/|S|.
Lemma III.10. A subgroup S of Gn is closed if and only if S is an abelian subgroup that
satisfies S ∩ Z(Gn) = {1} or if S is equal to Gn.
Proof. Suppose that S is a closed subgroup of Gn. The vector space Q = Fix(S) is, by
definition, either a stabilizer code or a 0-dimensional vector space. We have Stab({0}) =
Gn. Furthermore, if Q 6= {0}, then Stab(Q) = S is an abelian group satisfying S ∩
Z(Gn) = {1}, by Lemma III.8.
Conversely, suppose that S is an abelian subgroup of Gn such that S trivially intersects
the center Z(Gn). Let S∗ = Stab(Fix(S)). We have Fix(S∗) = Fix(Stab(Fix(S))) =
Fix(S), because this holds for any pair of maps that form a Galois connection. It follows
from Lemma III.9 that
qn/|S∗| = Tr
(
1
|S∗|
∑
E∈S∗
E
)
= Tr
(
1
|S|
∑
E∈S
E
)
= qn/|S|.
Since S ≤ S∗, this shows that S = S∗ = Stab(Fix(S)); hence, S is a closed subgroup of
Gn. We note that Fix(Gn) = {0}, so that Gn = Stab(Fix(Gn)) is closed.
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The stabilizer codes are easier to study than arbitrary quantum codes, as we will see
in the subsequent sections. If we know the error correction capabilities of stabilizer codes,
then we sometimes get a lower bound on the minimum distance of an arbitrary code by the
following simple observation:
Fact. An arbitrary quantum code Q is contained in the larger stabilizer code given by
Q∗ = Fix(Stab(Q)). If an error E can be detected by Q∗, then it can be detected by Q as
well. Therefore, if the stabilizer code Q∗ has minimum distance d, then the quantum code
Q has at least minimum distance d.
C. Additive Codes
The previous section explored the relation between stabilizer codes and other quantum
codes. We show next how stabilizer codes are related to classical codes (namely, additive
codes over Fq or Fq2). The classical codes allow us to characterize the errors in Gn that are
detectable by the stabilizer code.
In the binary case, the problem of finding stabilizer codes of length n had been trans-
lated into (a) finding binary classical codes of length 2n that are self-orthogonal with re-
spect to a symplectic inner product or (b) finding classical codes of length n over F4 that are
self-orthogonal with respect to a trace-inner product, see [35]. The approach (a) was gener-
alized to prime alphabets by Rains [126] and to prime-power alphabets by Ashikhmin and
Knill [11]. We simplify the arguments and include a full proof of this connection. There
were many attempts to generalize the approach (b) to nonbinary alphabets, but without
complete success (but see for instance [86, 109, 126] for notable partial solutions). We fill
this gap and introduce a natural generalization of (b). Furthermore, we discuss simpler
constructions for linear codes. Before exploring these connections to classical codes, we
first recall some facts about detectable errors.
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If S is a subgroup of Gn, then CGn(S) denotes centralizer of S in Gn,
CGn(S) = {E ∈ Gn |EF = FE for all F ∈ S},
and SZ(Gn) denotes the group generated by S and the center Z(Gn). We first recall the
following characterization of detectable errors (see also [11]; the interested reader can find
a more general approach in [88, 92]).
Lemma III.11. Suppose that S ≤ Gn is the stabilizer group of a stabilizer code Q of
dimension dimQ > 1. An error E in Gn is detectable by the quantum code Q if and only
if either E is an element of SZ(Gn) or E does not belong to the centralizer CGn(S).
Proof. An element E in SZ(Gn) is a scalar multiple of a stabilizer; thus, it acts by multi-
plication with a scalar λE on Q. It follows that E is a detectable error.
Suppose now that E is an error in Gn that does not commute with some element F
of the stabilizer S; it follows that EF = λFE for some complex number λ 6= 1, see
Lemma III.5. All vectors u and v in Q satisfy the condition
〈u|E |v〉 = 〈u|EF |v〉 = λ 〈u|FE |v〉 = λ 〈u|E |v〉 ; (3.6)
hence, 〈u|E |v〉 = 0. It follows that the error E is detectable.
Finally, suppose that E is an element of CGn(S) \ SZ(Gn). Seeking a contradiction,
we assume that E is detectable; this implies that there exists a complex scalar λE such
that Ev = λEv for all v in Q. The scalar λE cannot be zero because E commutes with
the elements of S, so EP = PEP = λEP and clearly EP 6= 0. Let S∗ denote the
abelian group generated by λ−1E E and by the elements of S. The joint eigenspace of S∗
with eigenvalue 1 has dimension qn/|S∗| < dimQ = qn/|S|. This implies that not all
vectors in Q remain invariant under λ−1E E, in contradiction to the detectability of E.
Corollary III.12. If a stabilizer code Q has minimum distance d and is pure to t, then all
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errors E ∈ Gn with 1 ≤ wt(E) < min{t, d} satisfy 〈u|E|v〉 = 0 for all u and v in Q.
Proof. By assumption, the weight of E is less than the minimum distance, so the error is
detectable. However, E is not an element of Z(Gn)S, since the code is pure to t > wt(E).
Therefore, E does not belong to CGn(S), and the claim follows from equation (3.6).
1. Codes over Fq
Lemma III.11 characterizes the error detection capabilities of a stabilizer code with stabi-
lizer group S in terms of the groups SZ(Gn) and CGn(S). The phase information of an
element in Gn is not relevant for questions concerning the detectability, since an element
E of Gn is detectable if and only if ωE is detectable. Thus, if we associate with an element
ωcX(a)Z(b) of Gn an element (a|b) of F2nq , then the group SZ(Gn) is mapped to the
additive code
C = {(a|b) |ωcX(a)Z(b) ∈ SZ(Gn)} = SZ(Gn)/Z(Gn).
To describe the image of the centralizer, we need the notion of a trace-symplectic form of
two vectors (a|b) and (a′|b′) in F2nq ,
〈(a|b) | (a′|b′)〉s = trq/p(b · a′ − b′ · a).
The centralizer CGn(S) contains all elements of Gn that commute with each element of S;
thus, by Lemma III.5, CGn(S) is mapped onto the trace-symplectic dual code C⊥s of the
code C,
C⊥s = {(a|b) |ωcX(a)Z(b) ∈ CGn(S)}.
The connection between these classical codes and the stabilizer code is made precise in the
next theorem. This theorem is essentially contained in [11] and generalizes the well-known
connection to symplectic codes [35, 59] of the binary case.
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Theorem III.13. An ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code exists if and only if there exists an additive
code C ≤ F2nq of size |C| = qn/K such that C ≤ C⊥s and swt(C⊥s \ C) = d if K > 1
(and swt(C⊥s) = d if K = 1).
Proof. Suppose that an ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code Q exists. This implies that there ex-
ists a closed subgroup S of Gn of order |S| = qn/K such that Q = Fix(S). The
group S is abelian and satisfies S ∩ Z(Gn) = 1, by Lemma III.10. The quotient C ∼=
SZ(Gn)/Z(Gn) is an additive subgroup of F2nq such that |C| = |S| = qn/K. We have
C⊥s = CGn(S)/Z(Gn) by Lemma III.5. Since S is an abelian group, SZ(Gn) ≤ CGn(S),
hence C ≤ C⊥s . Recall that the weight of an element ωcX(a)Z(b) in Gn is equal to
swt(a|b). If K = 1, then Q is a pure quantum code, thus wt(CGn(S)) = swt(C⊥s) = d.
If K > 1, then the elements of CGn(S) \ SZ(Gn) have at least weight d by Lemma III.11,
so that swt(C⊥s \ C) = d.
Conversely, suppose that C is an additive subcode of F2nq such that |C| = qn/K,
C ≤ C⊥s , and swt(C⊥s \ C) = d if K > 1 (and swt(C⊥s) = d if K = 1). Let
N = {ωcX(a)Z(b) | c ∈ Fp and (a|b) ∈ C}.
Notice that N is an abelian normal subgroup of Gn, because it is the pre-image of C =
N/Z(Gn). Choose a character χ of N such that χ(ωc1) = ωc. Then
PN =
1
|N |
∑
E∈N
χ(E−1)E
is an orthogonal projector onto a vector space Q, because PN is an idempotent in the group
ring C[Gn], see [88, Theorem 1]. We have
dimQ = TrPN = |Z(Gn)|qn/|N | = qn/|C| = K.
Each coset of N modulo Z(Gn) contains exactly one matrix E such that Ev = v for all v
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in Q. Set S = {E ∈ N |Ev = v for all v ∈ Q}. Then S is an abelian subgroup of Gn
of order |S| = |C| = qn/K. We have Q = Fix(S), because Q is clearly a subspace of
Fix(S), but dimQ = qn/|S| = K. An element ωcX(a)Z(b) in CGn(S) \ SZ(Gn) cannot
have weight less than d, because this would imply that (a|b) ∈ C⊥s \ C has weight less
than d, which is impossible. By the same token, if K = 1, then all nonidentity elements
of the centralizer CGn(S) must have weight d or higher. Therefore, Q is an ((n,K, d))q
stabilizer code.
The results of this paragraph were established by Ashikhmin and Knill [11]. It is in-
structive to compare the two approaches, since their definition of the error basis is different
(but equivalent).
2. Codes over Fq2
A drawback of the codes in the previous paragraph is that the symplectic weight is some-
what unusual. In the binary case, reference [35] provided a remedy by relating binary sta-
bilizer codes to additive codes over F4, allowing the use of the familiar Hamming weight.
Somewhat surprisingly, the corresponding concept was not completely generalized to Fq2 ,
although [86, 109] and [126] paved the way to our approach. After an initial circulation
of the results in this chapter, Gottesman drew our attention to another interesting approach
that was initiated by Barnum, see [21, 22], where a sufficient condition for the existence of
stabilizer codes is established using a symplectic form.
Let (β, βq) denote a normal basis of Fq2 over Fq. We define a trace-alternating form
of two vectors v and w in Fnq2 by
〈v|w〉a = trq/p
(
v · wq − vq · w
β2q − β2
)
. (3.7)
We note that the argument of the trace is invariant under the Galois automorphism x 7→ xq,
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so it is indeed an element of Fq, which shows that (3.7) is well-defined.
The trace-alternating form is bi-additive, that is, 〈u + v|w〉a = 〈u|w〉a + 〈v|w〉a and
〈u|v + w〉a = 〈u|v〉a + 〈u|w〉a holds for all u, v, w ∈ Fnq2 . It is Fp-linear, but not Fq-linear
unless q = p and it is alternating in the sense that 〈u|u〉a = 0 holds for all u ∈ Fnq2 . We
write u⊥aw if and only if 〈u|w〉a = 0 holds.
At this point it might be helpful to see the form the trace-alternating form takes in the
binary case. A normal basis for F4 over F2 is given by {ω, ω2}. Since ω2 + ω + 1 = 0, the
trace-alternating form simplifies to
〈v|w〉a = tr2/2
(
v · w2 + v2 · w
ω4 + ω2
)
= v · wq + vq · w, (3.8)
where we have used the facts that ω3 = 1 and x = −x over F4.
We define a bijective map φ that takes an element (a|b) of the vector space F2nq to a
vector in Fq2 by setting φ((a|b)) = βa+ βqb. The map φ is isometric in the sense that the
symplectic weight of (a|b) is equal to the Hamming weight of φ((a|b)).
Lemma III.14. Suppose that c and d are two vectors of F2nq . Then
〈c | d〉s = 〈φ(c) |φ(d)〉a.
In particular, c and d are orthogonal with respect to the trace-symplectic form if and only
if φ(c) and φ(d) are orthogonal with respect to the trace-alternating form.
Proof. Let c = (a|b) and d = (a′|b′). We calculate
φ(c) · φ(d)q = βq+1 a · a′ + β2 a · b′ + β2q b·a′ + βq+1 b · b′,
φ(c)q · φ(d) = βq+1 a · a′ + β2q a · b′ + β2 b·a′ + βq+1 b · b′.
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Therefore, the trace-alternating form of φ(c) and φ(d) is given by
〈φ(c)|φ(d)〉a = trq/p
(
φ(c) · φ(d)q − φ(c)q · φ(d)
β2q − β2
)
,
= trq/p(b · a′ − a · b′),
which is precisely the trace-symplectic form 〈c | d〉s.
Theorem III.15. An ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code exists if and only if there exists an additive
subcode D of Fnq2 of cardinality |D| = qn/K such that D ≤ D⊥a and wt(D⊥a \D) = d if
K > 1 (and wt(D⊥a) = d if K = 1).
Proof. Theorem III.13 shows that an ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code exists if and only if there
exists a code C ≤ F2nq with |C| = qn/K, C ≤ C⊥s , and swt(C⊥s \ C) = d if K > 1 (and
swt(C⊥s) = d if K = 1). We obtain the statement of the theorem by applying the isometry
φ.
We obtain the following convenient condition for the existence of a stabilizer code as
a direct consequence of the previous theorem.
Corollary III.16. If there exists a classical [n, k]q2 additive code D ≤ Fq2 such that D ≤
D⊥a and d⊥a = wt(D⊥a), then there exists an [[n, n − 2k,≥ d⊥a ]]q stabilizer code that is
pure to d⊥a .
Remark. It is not necessary to use a normal basis in the definition of the isometry φ and
the trace-alternating form. Alternatively, we could have used a polynomial basis (1, γ) of
F
2
q/Fq. In that case, one can define the isometry φ by φ((a|b)) = a+γb, and a compatible
trace-alternating form by
〈v |w〉a′ = trq/p
(
v · wq − vq · w
γ − γq
)
.
One can check that the statement of Lemma III.14 is satisfied for this choice as well. Other
variations on this theme are possible.
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3. Classical Codes
Self-orthogonal codes with respect to the trace-alternating form are not often studied in
classical coding theory; more common are codes which are self-orthogonal with respect
to a euclidean or hermitian inner product. We relate these concepts of orthogonality as
follows. Consider the hermitian inner product xq · y of two vectors x and y in Fnq2 ; we
write x⊥h y if and only if xq · y = 0 holds.
Lemma III.17. If two vectors x and y in Fnq2 satisfy x⊥h y, then they satisfy x⊥a y. In
particular, if D ≤ Fnq2 , then D⊥h ≤ D⊥a .
Proof. It follows from xq · y = 0 that x · yq = 0 holds, whence
〈x|y〉a = trq/p
(
x · yq − xq · y
β2q − β2
)
= 0,
as claimed.
Therefore, any self-orthogonal code with respect to the hermitian inner product is self-
orthogonal with respect to the trace-alternating form. In general, the two dual spaces D⊥h
and D⊥a are not the same. However, if D happens to be Fq2-linear, then the two dual spaces
coincide.
Lemma III.18. Suppose that D ≤ Fnq2 is Fq2-linear, then D⊥h = D⊥a .
Proof. Let q = pm, p prime. If D is a k-dimensional subspace of Fnq2 , then D⊥h is an
(n−k)-dimensional subspace of Fnq2 . We can also view D as a 2mk-dimensional subspace
of F2mnp , and D⊥a as a 2m(n − k)-dimensional subspace of F2mnp . Since D⊥h ⊆ D⊥a and
the cardinalities of D⊥a and D⊥h are the same, we can conclude that D⊥a = D⊥h .
Corollary III.19 (Hermitian Construction). If there exists an Fq2-linear [n, k, d]q2 code B
such that B⊥h ≤ B, then there exists an [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q quantum code that is pure to d.
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Proof. The hermitian inner product is nondegenerate, so the hermitian dual of the code
D := B⊥h is B. The [n, n − k]q2 code D is Fq2-linear, so D⊥h = D⊥a by Lemma III.18,
and the claim follows from Corollary III.16.
So it suffices to consider hermitian forms in the case of Fq2-linear codes. We have to
use the slightly more cumbersome trace-alternating form in the case of additive codes that
are not linear over Fq2 .
An elegant and surprisingly simple construction of quantum codes was introduced
in 1996 by Calderbank and Shor [36] and by Steane [145]. The CSS code construction
provides perhaps the most direct link to classical coding theory.
Lemma III.20 (CSS Code Construction). Let C1 and C2 denote two classical linear codes
with parameters [n, k1, d1]q and [n, k2, d2]q such thatC⊥2 ≤ C1. Then there exists a [[n, k1+
k2−n, d]]q stabilizer code with minimum distance d = min{wt(c) | c ∈ (C1 \C⊥2 )∪ (C2 \
C⊥1 )} that is pure to min{d1, d2}.
Proof. Let C = C⊥1 × C⊥2 ≤ F2nq . If (c1 | c2) and (c′1 | c′2) are two elements of C, then we
observe that
tr(c2 · c′1 − c′2 · c1) = tr(0− 0) = 0.
Therefore, C ≤ C⊥s . Furthermore, the trace-symplectic dual of C contains C2 × C1,
and a dimensionality argument shows that C⊥s = C2 × C1. Since the cartesian product
C⊥1 × C⊥2 has q2n−(k1+k2) elements, the stabilizer code has dimension qk1+k2−n by Theo-
rem III.13. The claim about the minimum distance and purity of the code is obvious from
the construction.
Corollary III.21 (Euclidean Construction). If C is a classical linear [n, k, d]q code con-
taining its dual, C⊥ ≤ C, then there exists an [[n, 2k−n,≥ d]]q stabilizer code that is pure
to d.
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D. Weight Enumerators
The Shor-Laflamme weight enumerators of an arbitrary ((n,K))q quantum code Q with
orthogonal projector P are defined by the polynomials
n∑
i=0
ASLi z
i, with ASLi =
1
K2
∑
E∈Gn
wt(E)=i
Tr(E†P ) Tr(EP ),
and
n∑
i=0
BSLi z
i, with BSLi =
1
K
∑
E∈Gn
wt(E)=i
Tr(E†PEP ),
see [141] for the binary case. The definition given here differs from the original definition
by Shor and Laflamme by a normalization factor p, which is due to the sums running
over the full error group Gn. The theory of Shor-Laflamme weight enumerators [141]
was considerably extended by Rains in [124, 125, 128, 129]. In this section we give a
simple proof for the relation between these weight enumerators and the symplectic weight
enumerators of the additive codes associated with the stabilizer code.
The weights ASLi and BSLi have a nice combinatorial interpretation in the case of sta-
bilizer codes. Indeed, let C ≤ F2nq denote the additive code associated with the stabi-
lizer code Q. Define the symplectic weights of C and C⊥s respectively by Ai = |{c ∈
C | swt(c) = i}| and Bi = |{c ∈ C⊥s | swt(c) = i}|. The next lemma belongs to the
folklore of stabilizer codes.
Lemma III.22. The Shor-Laflamme weights of an ((n,K))q stabilizer codeQ are multiples
of the symplectic weights of the associated additive codes C and C⊥s; more precisely,
ASLi = pAi and BSLi = pBi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
where p is the characteristic of the field Fq.
45
Proof. Recall that
P =
1
|S|
∑
E∈S
S
for the stabilizer group S of Q. The trace Tr(EP ) is nonzero if and only if E† is an element
of SZ(Gn). If E† ∈ SZ(Gn), then Tr(E†P ) Tr(EP ) = (qn/|S|)2 = K2. Therefore, ASLi
counts the elements in SZ(Gn) of weight i, so ASLi = |Z(Gn)| × |{c ∈ C | swt(c) = i}| =
pAi.
If E commutes with all elements in S, then Tr(E†PEP ) = Tr(P 2) = Tr(P ) = K.
If E does not commute with some element of S, then E is detectable; more precisely, the
proof of Lemma III.11 shows that PEP = 0P , hence Tr(E†PEP ) = 0. Therefore, BSLi
counts the elements in CGn(S) of weight i, hence BSLi = |Z(Gn)| × |{c ∈ C⊥s | swt(c) =
i}| = pBi.
Shor and Laflamme had been aware of the stabilizer case when they introduced their
weight enumerators, so the combinatorial interpretation of the weights does not appear to
be a coincidence. Recall that the Shor-Laflamme enumerators of arbitrary quantum codes
are related by a MacWilliams identity, see [124, 141]. For stabilizer codes, we can directly
relate the symplectic weight enumerators of C and C⊥s ,
A(z) =
n∑
i=0
Aiz
i and B(z) =
n∑
i=0
Biz
i,
using a simple argument that is very much in the spirit of Jessie MacWilliams’ original
proof for euclidean dual codes [106].
Theorem III.23. Let C be an additive subcode of F2nq with symplectic weight enumerator
A(z). Then the symplectic weight enumerator of C⊥s is given by
B(z) =
(1 + (q2 − 1)z)n
|C| A
(
1− z
1 + (q2 − 1)z)
)
.
Proof. Let χ be a nontrivial additive character of Fp. We define for b ∈ F2nq a character χb
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of the additive group C by substituting the trace-symplectic form for the argument of the
character χ, such that
χb(c) = χ(〈c|b〉s).
The character χb is trivial if and only if b is an element of C⊥s . Therefore, we obtain from
the orthogonality relations of characters that
∑
c∈C
χb(c) =


|C| for b ∈ C⊥s ,
0 otherwise.
The following relation for polynomials is an immediate consequence
∑
c∈C
∑
b∈F2nq
χb(c)z
swt(b) =
∑
b∈F2nq
zswt(b)
∑
c∈C
χb(c) = |C|B(z). (3.9)
The right hand side is a multiple of the weight enumerator of the code C⊥s . Let us have
a closer look at the inner sum of the left-hand side. If we express the vector c ∈ C in the
form c = (c1, . . . , cn|d1, . . . , dn), and expand the character and its trace-symplectic form,
then we obtain
∑
b∈F2nq
χb(c)z
swt(b) =
∑
(a1,...,an|b1,...,bn)∈F2nq
z
Pn
k=1 swt(ak|bk)χ
(
n∑
k=1
tr(dkak − bkck)
)
=
∑
(a1,...,an|b1,...,bn)∈F2nq
n∏
k=1
zswt(ak|bk)χ (tr(dkak − bkck))
=
n∏
k=1
∑
(ak|bk)∈F2q
zswt(ak|bk)χ (tr(dkak − bkck)) .
Recall that χ is a nontrivial character of Fp, hence the map (ak|bk) 7→ χ(tr(dkak − bkck))
is a nontrivial character of F2q for all (ck|dk) 6= (0|0). Therefore, we can simplify the inner
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sum to
∑
(ak|bk)∈F2q
zswt(ak|bk)χ (tr(dkak − bkck)) =


1 + (q2 − 1)z if (ck|dk) = (0, 0),
1− z if (ck|dk) 6= (0, 0).
It follows that
∑
b∈F2nq
χb(c)z
swt(b) = (1− z)swt(c)(1 + (q2 − 1)z)n−swt(c).
Substituting this expression into equation (3.9), we find that
B(z) = |C|−1
∑
c∈C
∑
b∈F2nq
χb(c)z
swt(b)
=
(1 + (q2 − 1)z)n
|C|
∑
c∈C
(
1− z
1 + (q2 − 1)z
)swt(c)
=
(1 + (q2 − 1)z)n
|C| A
(
1− z
1 + (q2 − 1)z
)
,
which proves the claim.
The coefficient of zj in (1 + (q2 − 1)z)n−x(1− z)x is given by the Krawtchouk poly-
nomial of degree j in the variable x,
Kj(x) =
j∑
s=0
(−1)s(q2 − 1)j−s
(
x
s
)(
n− x
j − s
)
.
Corollary III.24. Keeping the notation of the previous theorem, we have
Bj =
1
|C|
n∑
x=0
Kj(x)Ax.
Proof. According to the previous theorem, we have
B(z) =
(1 + (q2 − 1)z)n
|C| A
(
1− z
1 + (q2 − 1)z)
)
=
1
|C|
n∑
x=0
Ax(1− z)x(1 + (q2 − 1)z)n−x.
We obtain the result by comparing the coefficients of zj on both sides.
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The weight enumerators turn out to be very useful in establishing the bounds on quan-
tum codes, as we will see in the next section.
E. Bounds
We need some bounds on the achievable minimum distance of a quantum stabilizer code.
The main results in this section are the generalization of the linear programming bounds
[35], alternative proofs for the nonbinary quantum Singleton bound using a generalization
of the methods given in [12], a proof of the validity of the quantum Hamming bound for
single error-correcting (degenerate) quantum codes (which generalizes an earlier result by
Gottesman [61, Chapter 7]), a simpler nonconstructive proof for lower bounds on quantum
codes, and an existence proof of a class of optimal quantum codes.
1. Upper Bounds
We shall derive a series of upper bounds for nonbinary stabilizer codes. The first theorem
yields a bound that is well-suited for computer search.
Theorem III.25. If an ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code with K > 1 exists, then there exists a
solution to the optimization problem: minimize
∑d−1
j=1 Aj subject to the constraints
1. A0 = 1 and Aj ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
2.
n∑
j=0
Aj = q
n/K;
3. Bj =
K
qn
n∑
r=0
Kj(r)Ar holds for all j in the range 0 ≤ j ≤ n;
4. Aj = Bj for all j in 0 ≤ j < d and Aj ≤ Bj for all d ≤ j ≤ n;
5. (p− 1) divides Aj for all j in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
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Proof. If an ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code exists, then the symplectic weight distribution of
the associated additive code C satisfies conditions 1) and 2). For each nonzero codeword
c in C, αc is again in C for all α in F∗p, so 5) holds. Corollary III.24 shows that 3) holds.
Since the quantum code has minimum distance d, it follows that 4) holds.
Remark III.26. If we are interested in bounds for Fq2 linear codes, then we can replace
condition 5) in the previous theorem by q2 − 1 divides Aj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. This will even
help in characteristic 2.
The next bound is more convenient when one wants to find bounds by hand. In par-
ticular, any function f satisfying the constraints of the next theorem will yield a useful
bound on the dimension of a stabilizer code. This approach was introduced by Delsarte for
classical codes [47]. Binary versions of Theorem III.27 and Corollary III.28 were proved
by Ashikhmin and Litsyn [12], see also [15].
Theorem III.27. Let Q be an ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code of dimension K > 1. Suppose
that S is a nonempty subset of {0, . . . , d− 1} and N = {0, . . . , n}. Let
f(x) =
n∑
i=0
fiKi(x)
be a polynomial satisfying the conditions
i) fx > 0 for all x in S, and fx ≥ 0 otherwise;
ii) f(x) ≤ 0 for all x in N \ S.
Then
K ≤ 1
qn
max
x∈S
f(x)
fx
.
Proof. Suppose that C ≤ F2nq is the additive code associated with the stabilizer code Q.
If we apply Corollary III.24 to the trace-symplectic dual code C⊥s of the code C, then we
50
obtain
Ai =
1
|C⊥s |
n∑
x=0
Ki(x)Bx.
Using this relation, we find that
|C⊥s|
∑
i∈S
fiAi ≤ |C⊥s|
n∑
i=0
fiAi
= |C⊥s|
n∑
i=0
fi
(
1
|C⊥s |
n∑
x=0
Ki(x)Bx
)
=
n∑
x=0
Bx
n∑
i=0
fiKi(x).
By assumption, f(x) =
∑n
i=0 fiKi(x); thus, we can simplify the latter inequality and
obtain
|C⊥s|
∑
i∈S
fiAi ≤
n∑
x=0
Bxf(x) ≤
∑
x∈S
Bxf(x) =
∑
x∈S
Axf(x),
where the last equality follows from the fact that the stabilizer code has minimum distance
d, meaning that Ax = Bx holds for all x in the range 0 ≤ x < d. We can conclude that
|C⊥s| ≤
(∑
x∈S
Axf(x)
)/(∑
x∈S
fxAx
)
≤ max
x∈S
f(x)
fx
,
which proves the theorem, since |C⊥s | = qnK.
The previous theorem implies the quantum Singleton bound. In general, linear pro-
gramming yields better bounds, but for short lengths one can actually find codes meeting
the quantum Singleton bound.
Corollary III.28 (Quantum Singleton Bound). An ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code with K > 1
satisfies
K ≤ qn−2d+2.
The binary version of the quantum Singleton bound was first proved by Knill and
Laflamme in [95], see also [12, 15], and later generalized by Rains using weight enumera-
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tors in [126].
A more interesting application of Theorem III.27 is to derive the quantum Hamming
bound. The quantum Hamming bound states that any pure ((n,K, d))q stabilizer code
satisfies
⌊(d−1)/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q2 − 1)i ≤ qn/K, (3.10)
see [55, 59]. Several researchers have tried to find impure stabilizer codes that beat the
quantum Hamming bound. However, Gottesman has shown that impure single and double
error-correcting binary quantum codes cannot beat the quantum Hamming bound [61]. In
the same vein, Theorem III.27 allows us to derive the Hamming bound for arbitrary stabi-
lizer codes, at least when the minimum distance is small. We illustrate the method for single
error-correcting codes, and note that the same approach works for double error-correcting
codes as well.
Corollary III.29 (Quantum Hamming Bound). An ((n,K, 3))q stabilizer code with K > 1
satisfies
K ≤ qn/(n(q2 − 1) + 1).
Proof. Recall that the intersection number pkij of the Hamming association schemeH(n, q2)
is the integer pkij = |{z ∈ Fnq2 | d(x, z) = i, d(y, z) = j}|, where x and y are two vectors in
F
n
q of Hamming distance d(x, y) = k. The intersection numbers are related to Krawtchouk
polynomials by the expression
pkij = q
−2n
n∑
u=0
Kni (u)K
n
j (u)K
n
u (k),
see [20].
After this preparation, we can proceed to derive the Hamming bound as a consequence
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of Theorem III.27. Let
f(x) =
1∑
j,k=0
n∑
i=0
Knj (i)K
n
k (i)K
n
i (x),
= q2n(px00 + p
x
10 + p
x
01 + p
x
11).
The triangle inequality implies that pkij = 0 if one of the three arguments exceeds the sum
of the other two; hence, f(x) = 0 for x > 2. The coefficients of the Krawtchouk expansion
f(x) =
∑n
i=0 fiKi(x) obviously satisfy fi = (K0(i) + K1(i))2 ≥ 0. A straightforward
calculation gives
f(0) = q2n(n(q2 − 1) + 1), f0 = (n(q2 − 1) + 1)2,
f(1) = q2n+2, f1 = ((n− 1)(q2 − 1))2,
f(2) = 2q2n, f2 = ((n− 2)(q2 − 1)− 1)2.
It follows that
max{f(0)/f0, f(1)/f1, f(2)/f2} ≤ q2n/(n(q2 − 1) + 1)
holds for all n ≥ 5. Using Theorem III.27, we obtain the claim for all n ≥ 5. For the
lengths n < 5, we obtain the claim from the quantum Singleton bound.
One real disadvantage of Theorem III.27 is that the number of terms increase with the
minimum distance and this can lead to cumbersome calculations. However, one can derive
more consequences from Theorem III.27; see, for instance, [12, 15, 101, 110].
2. Lower Bounds
Feng and Ma have recently shown a quantum version of the classical lower bounds by
Gilbert and Varshamov [55]. We conclude this section by giving a simple proof for a
weaker version of this result based on a counting argument. It must be remembered that
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these lower bounds are nonconstructive.
Our first lemma generalizes an idea used by Gottesman in his proof of the binary case.
Lemma III.30. An ((n,K,≥ d))q stabilizer code with K > 1 exists provided that
(qnK − qn/K)
d−1∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
(q2 − 1)j < (q2n − 1)(p− 1) (3.11)
holds.
Proof. Let L denote the multiset
L = {C⊥s \ C |C ≤ C⊥s ≤ F2nq with |C| = qn/K}.
The elements of this multiset correspond to stabilizer codes of dimension K. Note that L
is nonempty, since there exists a code C of size qn/K that is generated by elements of the
form (a|0); the form of the generators ensures that C ≤ C⊥s .
All nonzero vectors in F2nq appear in the same number of sets in L. Indeed, the sym-
plectic group Sp(2n,Fq) acts transitively on the set F2nq \ {0}, see [74, Proposition 3.2],
which means that for any nonzero vectors u and v in F2nq there exists τ ∈ Sp(2n,Fq) such
that v = τu. Therefore, u is contained in C⊥s \ C if and only if v is contained in the
element (τC)⊥s \ τC of L.
The transitivity argument shows that any nonzero vector in F2nq occurs in |L|(qnK −
qn/K)/(q2n − 1) elements of L. Furthermore, a nonzero vector and its F×p -multiples are
contained in the exact same sets of L. Thus, if we delete all sets from L that contain a
nonzero vector with symplectic weight less than d, then we remove at most∑d−1
j=1
(
n
j
)
(q2 − 1)j
p− 1 |L|
(qnK − qn/K)
q2n − 1
sets from L. By assumption, this number is less than |L|; hence, there exists an ((n,K,≥
d))q stabilizer code.
54
The Gilbert-Varshamov bound shows the existence of surprisingly good codes, even
for smaller lengths, when the characteristic of the field is not too small. If n ≡ k mod 2,
then we can significantly strengthen the bound.
Lemma III.31. If k ≥ 1, n ≡ k mod 2 and
(qn+k − qn−k)
d−1∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
(q2 − 1)j−1 < (q2n − 1) (3.12)
holds, then there exists an Fq2-linear [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as in the previous lemma, except that we list only
codes C such that φ(C) is linear, meaning that φ(C) is a vector space over Fq2 . We repeat
the previous argument with the multiset
L =

C⊥s \ C
∣∣∣∣∣ C ≤ C
⊥s ≤ F 2nq , |C| = qn−k,
φ(C) is Fq2-linear

 .
It is easy to see that L is not empty. Note that each set φ(C⊥s) \ φ(C) in L contains
now all F×q2-multiples of a nonzero vector, not just the F×p -multiples, which proves the
statement.
Feng and Ma show that one can extend the previous result to even prove the existence
of pure stabilizer codes, but much more delicate counting arguments are needed in that
case, see [55]. We are not aware of short proofs for this stronger result.
The previous lemma allows us to show the existence of good quantum codes, espe-
cially for larger alphabets. We illustrate this fact by proving the existence of MDS stabilizer
codes, see Section C for more details on such codes.
Corollary III.32. If 2 ≤ d ≤ ⌈n/2⌉ and q2 − 1 ≥ (n
d
)
, then there exists a linear [[n, n −
2d+ 2, d]]q stabilizer code.
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Proof. The assumption d ≤ ⌈n/2⌉ implies that (n
1
) ≤ (n
2
) ≤ · · · ≤ (n
d
)
, so the maximum
value of these binomial coefficients is at most q2 − 1. Let k = n− 2d+ 2. It follows from
the assumption that k ≥ 1 and n ≡ k mod 2. It remains to show that (3.12) holds. For the
choice k = n− 2d+ 2, the left hand side of (3.12) equals
(q2n−2d+2−q2d−2)
d−1∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
(q2 − 1)j−1
≤ (q2n−2d+2 − q2d−2)
d−1∑
j=1
(q2 − 1)j
= (q2n−2d+2 − q2d−2)(q
2 − 1)d − (q2 − 1)
q2 − 2 .
We claim that the latter term is less than q2n − 1. To prove this, it suffices to show that
q2n−2d+2
(q2 − 1)d − (q2 − 1)
q2 − 2 ≤ q
2n (3.13)
holds. The latter inequality is equivalent to (q2− 1)d ≤ q2d− 2q2d−2 + q2− 1, and it is not
hard to see that this inequality holds. Indeed, note that
q2d = ((q2 − 1) + 1)d = (q2 − 1)d +
d−1∑
j=0
(
d
j
)
(q2 − 1)j.
Recall that
(
d
j
)
=
(
d−1
j−1
)
+
(
d−1
j
)
; hence,
q2d − 2q2d−2 − (q2 − 1)d
=
d−1∑
j=0
((d
j
)
− 2
(
d− 1
j
))
(q2 − 1)j,
=
d−1∑
j=0
((d− 1
j − 1
)
−
(
d− 1
j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
α(j):=
)
(q2 − 1)j.
We have α(j) = −α(d − j) for 0 ≤ j ≤ d − 1, and α(j) ≥ 0 for j ≥ d/2. This
shows that all negative terms get canceled by larger positive terms and we can conclude
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that q2d−2q2d−2− (q2−1)d ≥ 0 for d ≥ 2; this implies inequality (3.13) and consequently
shows that (3.12) holds.
Example III.33. Recall that there does not exist a [[7, 1, 4]]2 code, see [35]. In contrast,
the existence of a [[7, 1, 4]]q code for all prime powers q ≥ 7 is guaranteed by the preceding
corollary. It also shows that there exist [[6, 2, 3]]q for all prime powers q ≥ 5 and [[7, 3, 3]]q
for all prime powers q ≥ 7, which slightly generalizes [53].
F. Code Constructions
Constructing good quantum codes is a difficult task. We need a quantum code for each
parameter n and k in our tables. In this section we collect some simple facts about the
construction of codes. Lemmas III.34–III.36, (see also Table I), show how to lengthen,
shorten or reduce the dimension of the stabilizer code. These generalize and extend the
constructions for binary quantum codes [35, Theorem 6].
Table I. The existence of a pure [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code implies the existence of codes
with other parameters.
n/k k − 1 k k + 1
n− 1 ≥ d− 1 pure
Lemma III.36
≥ d− 1 pure
Lemma III.36
d− 1 pure
Lemma III.35
n
≥ d pure
Lemma III.36
d pure d− 1 impure
Lemma III.34
n+ 1
≥ d impure
Lemma III.34
d impure
Lemma III.34
Lemma III.34. If an [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists for k > 0, then there exists an impure
[[n+ 1, k, d]]q stabilizer code.
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Proof. If an [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists, then there exists an additive subcode C ≤ F2nq
such that |C| = qn−k, C ≤ C⊥s , and swt(C⊥s \ C) = d. Define the additive code
C ′ = {(aα|b0) |α ∈ Fq, (a|b) ∈ C}.
We have |C ′| = qn−k+1. The definition ensures that C ′ is self-orthogonal with respect to
the trace-symplectic inner product. Indeed, two arbitrary elements (aα|b0) and (a′α′|b′0)
of C ′ satisfy the orthogonality condition
〈(aα|b0)|(a′α′|b′0)〉s = 〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉s + tr(α · 0− α′ · 0) = 0.
A vector in the trace-symplectic dual of C ′ has to be of the form (aα|b0) with (a|b) ∈ C⊥s
and α ∈ Fq. Furthermore,
swt(C ′⊥s \ C ′) = min{swt(aα|b0) |α ∈ Fq, a, b ∈ C⊥s \ C},
which coincides with swt(C⊥s \ C). Therefore, an [[n + 1, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists
by Theorem III.13. If d > 1, then the code is impure, because C ′⊥s contains the vector
(0α|00) of symplectic weight 1.
Lemma III.35. If a pure [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists with n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2, then there
exists a pure [[n− 1, k + 1, d− 1]]q stabilizer code.
Proof. If a pure [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists, then there exists an additive code D ≤ Fnq2
that is self-orthogonal with respect to the trace-alternating form, so that |D| = qn−k and
wt(D⊥a) = d. Let D⊥a0 denote the code obtained by puncturing the first coordinate of D⊥a .
Since the minimum distance of D⊥a is at least 2, we know that |D⊥a0 | = |D⊥a| = qn+k,
and we note that the minimum distance of D⊥a0 is d − 1. The dual of D⊥a0 consists of all
vectors u in Fn−1q2 such that 0u is contained in D. Furthermore, if u is an element of D0,
then 0u is contained in D; hence, D0 is a self-orthogonal additive code. The code D0 is of
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size q(n−1)−(k+1), because
dimD0 + dimD
⊥a
0 = dimF
n−1
q2
when we view D0 and its dual as Fp–vector spaces. It follows that there exists a pure
[[n− 1, k + 1, d− 1]]q stabilizer code.
Lemma III.36. If a (pure) [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists, with k ≥ 2 (k ≥ 1), then there
exists an [[n, k − 1, d∗]]q stabilizer code (pure to d) such that d∗ ≥ d.
Proof. If an [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code exists, then there exists an additive code D ≤ Fnq2
such that D ≤ D⊥a with wt(D⊥a \D) = d and |D| = qn−k. Choose an additive code Db
of size |Db| = qn−k+1 such that D ≤ Db ≤ D⊥ab ≤ D⊥a . Since D ≤ Db, we have
D⊥ab ≤ D⊥a . The set Σb = D⊥ab \Db is a subset of D⊥a \D, hence the minimum weight
d∗ of Σb is at least d. This proves the existence of an [[n, k − 1, d∗]] code.
If the code is pure, then wt(D⊥a) = d; it follows from D⊥ab ≤ D⊥a that wt(D⊥ab ) ≥ d,
so the smaller code is pure as well.
Corollary III.37. If a pure [[n, k, d]]q stabilizer code with n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2 exists, then
there exists a pure [[n− 1, k,≥ d− 1]]q stabilizer code.
Proof. Combine Lemmas III.35 and III.36.
Lemma III.38. Suppose that an ((n,K, d))q and an ((n′, K ′, d′))q stabilizer code exist.
Then there exists an ((n+ n′, KK ′,min(d, d′))q stabilizer code.
Proof. Suppose that P and P ′ are the orthogonal projectors onto the stabilizer codes for the
((n,K, d))q and ((n′, K ′, d′))q stabilizer codes, respectively. Then P ⊗P ′ is an orthogonal
projector onto a KK ′-dimensional subspace Q∗ of Cd, where d = qn+n′ . Let S and S ′
respectively denote the stabilizer groups of the images of P and P ′. Then S∗ = {E ⊗
E ′ |E ∈ S,E ′ ∈ S ′} is the stabilizer group of Q∗.
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If an element F ⊗ F ∗ of Gn ⊗Gn′ = Gn+n′ is not detectable, then F has to commute
with all elements in S, and F ′ has to commute with all elements in S ′. It is not possible
that both F ∈ Z(Gn)S and F ′ ∈ Z(Gn′)S ′ hold, because this would imply that F ⊗ F ′
is detectable. Therefore, either F or F ′ is not detectable, which shows that the weight of
F ⊗ F ′ is at least min(d, d′).
Lemma III.39. Let Q1 and Q2 be pure stabilizer codes that respectively have parame-
ters [[n, k1, d1]]q and [[n, k2, d2]]. If Q2 ⊆ Q1, then there exists a [[2n, k1 + k2, d]]q pure
stabilizer code with minimum distance d ≥ min{2d2, d1}.
Proof. The hypothesis implies that there exist additive subcodes D1 ≤ D2 of Fnq2 such that
Dm ≤ D⊥am , |Dm| = qn−km , and wt(D⊥am ) = dm for m = 1, 2. The additive code
D = {(u, u+ v) |u ∈ D1, v ∈ D2} ≤ F2nq2
is of size |D| = q2n−(k1+k2). The trace-alternating dual of the code D is D⊥a = {(u′ +
v′, v′) |u′ ∈ D⊥a1 , v′ ∈ D⊥a2 }. Indeed, the vectors on the right hand side are perpendicular
to the vectors in D, because
〈(u, u+ v) | (u′ + v′, v′)〉a = 〈u|u′ + v′〉a + 〈u+ v|v′〉a = 0
holds for all u ∈ D1, v ∈ D2 and u′ ∈ D⊥a1 , v′ ∈ D⊥a2 . We observe that D is self-
orthogonal, D ≤ D⊥a . The weight of a vector (u′ + v′, v′) ∈ D⊥a \ D is at least
min{2d2, d1}; the claim follows.
Lemma III.40. Let q be a power of two. If a pure [[n, k1, d1]]q stabilizer code Q1 exists
that has a pure subcode Q2 ⊆ Q1 with parameters [[n, k2, d2]]q such that k1 > k2, then a
pure [[2n, k1 − k2, d]]q stabilizer code exists such that d ≥ min {2d1, d2}.
Proof. If an [[nm, km, dm]]q stabilizer code exists, then there exists an additive code Dm ≤
F
n
q2 such that Dm ≤ D⊥am , wt(D⊥am ) = d, and |Dm| = qn−km for m = 1, 2. The inclusion
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Q2 ⊆ Q1 implies that D1 ≤ D2. Let D denote the additive code consisting of vectors of
the form (u, u+ v) such that u ∈ D⊥a2 and v ∈ D1.
We claim that D⊥a consists of vectors of the form (u′, u′+ v′) such that u′ ∈ D⊥a1 and
v′ ∈ D2. Indeed, let v1 = (u, u + v) denote a vector in D, and let v2 = (u′, u′ + v′) be a
vector with u′ ∈ D⊥a1 and v′ ∈ D2. We have
〈v1|v2〉a = 〈u|u′〉a + 〈u|u′〉a + 〈u|v′〉a + 〈v|u′〉a + 〈v|v′〉a.
The first two terms on the right hand side cancel because the characteristic of the field
is even; the next two terms vanish since the vectors belong to dual spaces; the last term
vanishes because v and v′ are both contained in D2, and D2 is self-orthogonal. Therefore,
v1 and v2 are orthogonal. The set {(u′, u′+v′) |u′ ∈ D⊥a1 , v′ ∈ D2} ⊆ D⊥a has cardinality
q2n+k1−k2 , so it must be equal to D⊥a by a dimension argument.
The Hamming weight of a vector (u′, u′+v′) in D⊥a is at least min {2d1, d2}, because
u′ ∈ D⊥a1 and v′ ∈ D2 ≤ D⊥a2 .
Lemma III.41. Let q be a power of a prime. If an ((n,K, d))qm stabilizer code exists, then
an ((nm,K,≥ d))q stabilizer code exists. Conversely, if an ((nm,K, d))q stabilizer code
exists, then there exists an ((n,K,≥ ⌊d/m⌋))qm stabilizer code.
This lemma is implicitly contained in the paper by Ashikhmin and Knill [11].
Proof. Let B = {β1, . . . , βm} denote a basis of Fqm/Fq. If a is an element of Fqm , then
we denote by eB(a) the coordinate vector in Fmq given by eB(a) = (a1, . . . , am), where
a =
∑m
i=1 aiβi.
A nondegenerate symmetric form on the Fq-vector space Fqm is given by trqm/q(xy).
It follows that the Gram matrix M = (trqm/q(βiβj))1≤i,j≤m is nonsingular. We have
trqm/q(xy) = eB(x)
tMeB(y) for all x, y in Fqm . We define an Fp–vector space isomor-
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phism ϕB from F2nqm onto F2nmq by
ϕB((a|b)) = ((eB(a1), . . . , eB(an))|(MeB(b1), . . . ,MeB(bn))).
It follows from the fact that trqm/q(trq/p(x)) = trqm/p(x) for all x in Fqm and the definition
of the isomorphism ϕB that (a|b)⊥s (c|d) holds in F2nqm if and only if ϕB((a|b))⊥s ϕB((c|d))
holds in Fq2nm .
If an ((n,K, d))qm exists, then there exists an additive code C ≤ F2nqm of size |C| =
qnm/K such that C ≤ C⊥s , swt(C⊥s \ C) = d if K > 1, and swt(C⊥s) = d if K =
1. Therefore, the code ϕB(C) over the alphabet Fq is of size qnm/K, satisfies ϕB(C) ≤
ϕB(C)
⊥s ≤ F2nmq , and swt(ϕB(C)⊥s \ ϕB(C)) = d if K > 1 and swt(ϕB(C)⊥s) = d if
K = 1. Thus, an ((nm,K, d))q stabilizer code exists.
The existence of an ((nm,K, d))q stabilizer code implies the existence of an ((n,K))qm
stabilizer code; the claim about the minimum distance follows from the fact that ϕ−1B maps
each nonzero block of m symbols to a nonzero symbol in Fqm .
We notice that there exists a basis B such that M is the identity matrix if and only if
either q is even or both q and m are odd, see [139]. In that case, ϕB simply expands each
symbol into coordinates with respect to B.
G. Puncturing Stabilizer Codes
If we delete one coordinate in all codewords of a classical code, then we obtain a shorter
code that is called the punctured code. In general, we cannot proceed in the same way with
stabilizer codes, since the resulting matrices might not commute if we delete one or more
tensor components.
Rains [126] invented an interesting approach that solves the puncturing problem for
linear stabilizer codes and, even better, gives a way to construct stabilizer codes from arbi-
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trary linear codes. The idea is to associate with a classical linear code a so-called puncture
code; if the puncture code contains a codeword of weight r, then a self-orthogonal code
of length r exists and the minimum distance is the same or higher than that of the initial
classical code. Further convenient criteria for puncture codes are given in [71].
In this section, we generalize puncturing to arbitrary stabilizer codes and review some
known facts. Determining a puncture code is a challenging task, and maynot always pos-
sible to find it in closed form. In the next chapter we show how the results of this section
can be applied to puncture quantum BCH codes.
It will be convenient to denote the the pointwise product of two vectors u and v in Fnq
by uv, that is, uv = (uivi)ni=1. Suppose that C ≤ F2nq is an arbitrary additive code. The
associated puncture code Ps(C) ⊆ Fnq is defined as
Ps(C) = {(bka′k − b′kak)nk=1 | (a|b), (a′|b′) ∈ C}⊥ . (3.14)
Theorem III.42. Suppose that C is an arbitrary additive subcode of F2nq of size |C| =
qn/K such that swt(C⊥s \ C) = d. If the puncture code Ps(C) contains a codeword of
Hamming weight r, then there exists an ((r,K∗, d∗))q stabilizer code with K∗ ≥ K/qn−r
that has minimum distance d∗ ≥ d when K∗ > 1. If swt(C⊥s) = d, then the resulting
punctured stabilizer code is pure to d.
Proof. Let x be a codeword of weight r in the Ps(C). Define an additive code Cx ≤ F2nq
by
Cx = {(a|bx) | (a|b) ∈ C}.
If (a|bx) and (a′|b′x) are arbitrary elements of Cx, then
〈(a|bx) | (a′|b′x)〉s = tr
(
n∑
k=1
(bka
′
k − b′kak)xk
)
= 0 (3.15)
by definition of Ps(C); thus, Cx ≤ (Cx)⊥s .
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Let CRx = {(ak|bk)k∈S|(a|b) ∈ Cx} denote the restriction of Cx to the support S of the
vector x. Since equation (3.15) depends only on the nonzero coefficients of the vector x, it
follows that CRx ≤ (CRx )⊥s holds.
We note that |C| ≥ |CRx |; hence, the dimension K∗ of the punctured quantum code is
bounded by
K∗ ≥ qr/|CRx | ≥ qr/|C| = qr/(qn/K) = K/qn−r.
It remains to show that swt((CRx )⊥s \ CRx ) ≥ d. Seeking a contradiction, we suppose
that uRx is a vector in (CRx )⊥s \CRx such that swt(uRx ) < d. Let ux = (a|b) denote the vector
in (Cx)⊥s that is zero outside the support of x and coincides with uRx when restricted to the
support of x. It follows that (ax|b) is contained in C⊥s . However swt(ax|b) < d, so (ax|b)
must be an element of C, since swt(C⊥s \C) = d. This implies that (ax|bx) is an element
of Cx ≤ (Cx)⊥s . Arguing as before, it follows that (ax2|bx) is in C and (ax2|bx2) is in Cx.
Repeating the process, we obtain that vx = (axq−1|bxq−1) is in Cx, and we note that xq−1 is
the characteristic vector of the support of x. Restricting vx in Cx to the support of x yields
uRx ∈ CRx , contradicting the assumption that uRx ∈ (CRx )⊥s \ CRx .
Finally, the last statement concerning the purity is easy to prove (a direct generaliza-
tion of the argument given in [71] for pure linear codes).
If the code C is a direct product, as in the case of CSS codes, then the expression for
the puncture code simplifies somewhat.
Lemma III.43. If C1 and C2 are two additive subcodes of Fnq , then
Ps(C1 × C2) = {ab | a ∈ C1, b ∈ C2}⊥ ≤ Fnq .
Proof. Since 〈ab | a ∈ C1, b ∈ C2〉 = 〈(ba′ − b′a) | a, a′ ∈ C1, b, b′ ∈ C2〉, the claim about
the orthogonal complements of these sets is obvious.
Since many quantum codes are constructed from self-orthogonal codes C ≤ C⊥, we
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write
Pe(C) = Ps(C × C) = {ab | a, b ∈ C}⊥. (3.16)
H. Conclusions
In this chapter we have further developed the theory of nonbinary stabilizer codes. After
reviewing the basic theory of nonbinary stabilizer codes over finite fields, we introduced
Galois-theoretic methods to clarify the relation between these and more general quantum
codes. We showed the most general class of codes over quadratic extension fields that can
be used to construct quantum codes are those that are self-orthogonal with respect to the
trace alternating product.
We gave simpler proofs for the existence of nonbinary quantum codes. We also gen-
eralized the linear programming bounds for the nonbinary codes. Following Gottesman’s
lead [61], we were able to show that single and double error-correcting nonbinary stabilizer
codes cannot beat the quantum Hamming bound. We conjecture that no quantum stabilizer
code can exceed the quantum Hamming bound, but a proof is still elusive. We also gave
methods to obtain new quantum codes from existing quantum codes. In particular, we
developed the theory of puncture codes.
There are open questions that the work in this chapter suggests. We could for instance
start with a different choice of error basis [93], and one can develop a similar theory for
such stabilizer codes. For example, one choice leads to self-orthogonal additive subcodes
of Znq×Znq instead of subcodes of Fnq×Fnq . It would be interesting to know how the stabilizer
codes with respect to different error bases compare. To the best of our knowledge, such a
comparison has not been made.
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CHAPTER IV
CLASSES OF STABILIZER CODES∗
In this chapter we shall take a constructive approach to our study of stabilizer codes giv-
ing explicit constructions for many classes of codes. Much of the theory we developed in
Chapter III will be brought to bearing with additional simplifications for the classes of lin-
ear codes. In case of linear codes, our main methods of constructions will be the Hermitian
construction and the CSS construction (Lemmas III.19–III.21). Hence, we need to look
for classical codes that are self-orthogonal with respect to the Hermitian or the Euclidean
product or families of nested codes like the BCH codes. Additionally, we investigate the
structural properties of nontrivial codes that meet the quantum Singleton bound and estab-
lish bounds on the maximal length of such codes. We provide a concrete illustration of the
theory of puncture codes developed in the last chapter by puncturing the quantum BCH
codes.
A. Quantum Cyclic Codes
Cyclic codes are an interesting class of codes which have simple encoding and efficient
decoding algorithms. Consequently, quantum cyclic codes have also generated interest.
Before we construct quantum cyclic codes we need the following results for identifying
cyclic codes that contain their duals. We have not been able to trace the references that
first proved these results, but we note that these conditions have been established in various
forms earlier, especially for codes over F2 and F4; see [76, Chapter 4] for general results
concerning classical codes and [35, 70] for results concerning binary quantum codes. We
∗ c©2006 IEEE. Reprinted in part, with permission, from A. Ketkar, A. Klappenecker,
S. Kumar and P. K. Sarvepalli, “Nonbinary stabilizer codes over finite fields”. IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, vol. 52, no. 11, pp. 4892–4914, 2006.
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provide a convenient and unified treatment while giving the nonbinary equivalents.
Recall that a classical cyclic code with parameters [n, k]q is a principal ideal in the ring
Fq[x]/(x
n − 1) and can be succinctly described by its generator polynomial or its defining
set. The polynomial xn − 1 of Fq[x] has simple roots if and only if n and q are coprime. If
the latter condition is satisfied, then there exists a positive integer m such that the field Fqm
contains a primitive nth root of unity β. In that case, one can describe a cyclic code with
generator polynomial g(x) in terms of its defining set Z = {k | g(βk) = 0 for 0 ≤ k < n}.
Further details on cyclic codes can be found in any standard textbook on coding theory,
see [76] or [107].
In the case of cyclic codes, identifying the self-orthogonal codes can be translated into
equivalent conditions on the generator polynomial of the code or its defining set. First we
shall consider codes over Fq2 . Let σ denote the automorphism of the field Fq2 given by
σ(x) = xq. We can define an action of σ on the polynomial ring Fq2 [x] by
h(x) =
n∑
k=0
hkx
k 7−→ hσ(x) =
n∑
k=0
σ(hk)x
k.
Lemma IV.1. Suppose that B is a classical cyclic [n, k, d]q2 code with generator polyno-
mial g(x) and check polynomial h(x) = (xn−1)/g(x). If g(x) divides σ(h0)−1xkhσ(1/x),
then B⊥h ⊆ B, and there exists an [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q stabilizer code that is pure to d.
Proof. If h(x) is the check polynomial of B, then hσ(x) is the check polynomial of σ(B).
The generator polynomial of the dual code σ(B)⊥ = B⊥h is given by σ(h0)−1xkhσ(1/x),
the normalized reciprocal polynomial of hσ(x). Therefore, the condition that the poly-
nomial g(x) divides σ(h0)−1xkhσ(1/x) is equivalent to the condition B⊥h ⊆ B. The
stabilizer code follows from Corollary III.19.
The following Lemma summarizes various equivalent conditions on dual containing
codes in terms of the generator polynomial g(x) and the defining set Z.
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Lemma IV.2. Let gcd(n, q2) = 1 and C be a classical cyclic [n, k, d]q2 code whose gener-
ator polynomial is g(x) and defining set is Z. Suppose that any of the following equivalent
conditions are satisfied
(i) xn − 1 ≡ 0 mod g(x)g∗(x) where g∗(x) = xn−kgσ(1/x);
(ii) Z ⊆ {−qz | z ∈ N \ Z};
(iii) Z ∩ Z−q = ∅, where Z−q = {−qz | z ∈ Z}.
Then C⊥h ⊆ C and there exists an [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q stabilizer code that is pure to d.
Proof. Let h(x) = (xn − 1)/g(x) be the check polynomial of C. Then hσ(x) = σ((xn −
1)/g(x)) = (xn − 1)/gσ(x). From Lemma IV.1 we know that C contains its Hermitian
dual if g(x) divides σ(h0)−1xkhσ(1/x) viz. g(x)|σ(h0)−1(1 − xn)/(xn−kgσ(1/x)), which
implies xn − 1 ≡ 0 mod g(x)g∗(x) which proves (i).
The generator polynomial g(x) of C is given by g(x) =
∏
z∈Z(x − βz), hence its
check polynomial is of the form
h(x) = (xn − 1)/g(x) =
∏
z∈N\Z
(x− βz).
Applying the automorphism σ yields hσ(x) =
∏
z∈N\Z(x− βqz). Therefore, the generator
polynomial of C⊥h is given by
hσ(0)−1xkhσ(1/x) = hσ(0)−1
∏
z∈N\Z(1− βqzx)
=
∏
z∈N\Z(x− β−qz);
in the last equality, we have used the fact that hσ(0)−1 =
∏
z∈N\Z(−β−qz). By Lemma IV.1,
B⊥h ⊆ B if and only if the generator polynomial g(x) divides hσ(0)−1xkhσ(1/x). The lat-
ter condition is equivalent to the fact that Z is a subset of {−qz | z ∈ N \ Z} and (ii)
follows. From (ii) we know that C⊥h ⊆ C if and only if Z ⊆ {−qz | z ∈ N \Z}. In other
words Z−q ⊆ N \ Z. Hence Z ∩ Z−q = ∅. An [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q stabilizer code follows
from Corollary III.19.
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Cyclic codes that contain their Euclidean duals can also be nicely characterized in
terms of their generator polynomials and defining sets. The following Lemma is a very
straight forward extension of the binary case and summarizes some of the known results
in the nonbinary case as well, but we include it because of its usefulness in constructing
cyclic quantum codes.
Lemma IV.3. Let C be an [n, k, d]q cyclic code such that gcd(n, q) = 1. Let its defining set
Z and generator polynomial g(x) be such that any of the following equivalent conditions
are satisfied
(i) xn − 1 ≡ 0 mod g(x)g†(x), where g†(x) = xn−kg(1/x);
(ii) Z ⊆ {−z | z ∈ N \ Z};
(iii) Z ∩ Z−1 = ∅ where Z−1 = {−z mod n | z ∈ Z}.
Then C⊥ ⊆ C and there exists an [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q stabilizer code that is pure to d.
Proof. The check polynomial of C is given by h(x) = (xn − 1)/g(x), from which we
obtain the (un-normalized) generator polynomial of C⊥ as h†(x) = xkh(x−1) = (1 −
xn)/(xn−kg(x−1)) = −(xn − 1)/g†(x). If C⊥ ⊆ C, then g(x) | h†(x); this means that
g(x) divides (xn − 1)/g†(x). In other words xn − 1 ≡ 0 mod g(x)g†(x).
The defining set ofC⊥ is given by {−z mod n | z ∈ N\Z}, whereN = {0, 1, . . . , n−
1}. Thus C⊥ ⊆ C implies Z ⊆ {−z mod n | N \ Z}. Since this means that the inverses
of elements in Z are present in N \ Z, this condition can also be written as Z ∩ Z−1 = ∅.
The existence of quantum code [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q follows from Corollary III.21.
Although we have considered purely cyclic codes, a larger class of cyclic quantum
codes can be derived by considering constacyclic or conjucyclic codes as in [35], [154].
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1. Cyclic Hamming Codes
Binary quantum Hamming codes have been studied by various authors; see for instance
[35, 54, 59]. We now derive stabilizer codes from nonbinary classical cyclic Hamming
codes. Let m > 1 be an integer such that gcd(q − 1,m) = 1. A classical cyclic Hamming
code Hq(m) has parameters [n, n−m, 3]q with length n = (qm− 1)/(q− 1). Let β denote
a primitive nth root of unity in Fqm . The generator polynomial of Hq(m) is given by
g(x) =
m−1∏
i=0
(
x− βqi), (4.1)
an element of Fq[x]. Thus, the code Hq(m) is defined by the cyclotomic coset C1 =
{qi mod n | i ∈ Z}.
Lemma IV.4. The Hamming codeHq2(m) contains its Hermitian dual, that is,Hq2(m)⊥h ≤
Hq2(m).
Proof. The statement Hq2(m)⊥h ≤ Hq2(m) is equivalent to the fact that the cyclotomic
coset C1 satisfies C1 ⊆ N1 = {−qz mod n | z ∈ N \ C1}, where N = {0, . . . , n− 1} and
n = (q2m − 1)/(q2 − 1). We note that C1 can be expressed in the form
C1 =
{
(1− n)q2k mod n
∣∣∣ k ∈ Z}
=
{
−qzq2k mod n
∣∣∣ k ∈ Z} , (4.2)
where z = q(q2m−2 − 1)/(q2 − 1). Therefore, the condition C1 ⊆ N1 holds if and only if
Cz ⊆ N \ C1 holds, where Cz = {zq2j mod n | j ∈ Z}.
Seeking a contradiction, we assume that the two cyclotomic cosets C1 and Cz have an
element in common, hence are the same. This means that there must exist a positive integer
k such that q2k = q(q2m−2− 1)/(q2− 1). This implies that q2k−1 divides q2m−2− 1, which
is absurd. Thus, the sets C1 and Cz are disjoint, hence Cz ⊆ N \ C1, which proves the
claim.
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Theorem IV.5. For each integer m ≥ 2 such that gcd(m, q2 − 1) = 1, there exists a pure
[[n, n− 2m, 3]]q stabilizer code of length n = (q2m − 1)/(q2 − 1).
Proof. If gcd(m, q2 − 1) = 1, then there exists a classical [n, n −m, 3]q2 Hamming code
Hq2(m). By Lemma IV.4, we have Hq2(m)⊥h ≤ Hq2(m), hence there exists a pure [[n, n−
2m, 3]]q stabilizer code by Corollary III.19. The purity is due to the fact that the Hq2(m)⊥h
has minimum distance q2m−2 ≥ 3 for m ≥ 2 [76, Theorem 1.8.3].
These quantum Hamming codes are optimal since they attain the quantum Hamming
bound, see Corollary III.29. A different approach that allows construction of noncyclic
perfect quantum codes can be found in [28]. It is also possible to construct quantum codes
from Hamming codes that contain their Euclidean duals, however these codes do not meet
the quantum Hamming bound.
Lemma IV.6. If gcd(m, q − 1) = 1 and m ≥ 2, then there exists a pure [[n, n − 2m, 3]]q
quantum code, where n = (qm − 1)/(q − 1).
Proof. The generating polynomial of an [n, n − m, 3]q Hamming code, with n=(qm −
1)/(q − 1) is given by equation (4.1) where β is an element of order n. The code ex-
ists only if gcd(m, q−1) = 1. By Lemma IV.3 a cyclic code contains its dual if xn−1 ≡ 0
mod g(x)g†(x), where g†(x) = xn−kg(x−1). If g(x) is not self-reciprocal then g(x)g†(x)
divides xn − 1 [152]. Since the generating polynomial of the Hamming code is not self-
reciprocal, the code contains its Euclidean dual. By Lemma IV.3 we can construct a quan-
tum code with the parameters [[n, n−2m, 3]]q. Once again the purity follows due to the fact
the duals of Hamming codes are simplex codes with weight qm−1 ≥ 3 for m ≥ 2 [76, The-
orem 1.8.3].
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2. Quantum Quadratic Residue Codes
Another well known family of classical codes are the quadratic residue codes. Rains con-
structed quadratic residue codes for prime alphabet in [126]. In this section we will con-
struct two series of quantum codes based on the classical quadratic residue codes over an
arbitrary field using elementary methods.
Let α denote a primitive nth root of unity from some extension field of Fq. We denote
by R = {r2 mod n | r ∈ Z such that 1 ≤ r ≤ (n − 1)/2} the set of quadratic residues
modulo n and by N = {1, . . . , n− 1} \R the set of quadratic non-residues modulo n.
Let CR and CN denote the cyclic codes of length n that are respectively generated by
the polynomials qR(x) and qN(x), where
qR(x) =
∏
r∈R
(x− αr) and qN(x) =
∏
r∈N
(x− αr).
Both codes have parameters [n, (n + 1)/2, d]q with d2 ≥ n, see [27, pp. 114-119] or [76].
The codes with generator polynomials (x − 1)qR(x) and (x − 1)qN(x) are the even-like
subcodes ofCR andCN respectively and have the parameters [n, (n−1)/2, d′]q with d′ ≥ d.
The relevance of these codes will become apparent in the following theorems.
Theorem IV.7. Let n be a prime of the form n ≡ 3 mod 4, and let q be a power of a
prime that is not divisible by n. If q is a quadratic residue modulo n, then there exists a
pure [[n, 1, d]]q stabilizer code with minimum distance d satisfying d2 − d+ 1 ≥ n.
Proof. The code CR has parameters [n, (n + 1)/2, d]q and if n ≡ 3 mod 4, the dual code
C⊥R of CR is given by the cyclic code generated by (x− 1)qR(x), the even-like subcode of
CR. The minimum distance d is bounded by d2−d+1 ≥ n, see, for instance, [27, pp. 114-
119]. Further wt(CR \ C⊥R ) = wt(CR) = d by [76, Theorem 6.6.22]. We can deduce from
Corollary III.21 that there exists a pure [[n, (n+ 1)− n, d]]q stabilizer code.
For example, the prime p = 3 is a quadratic residue modulo n = 23. The previous
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proposition guarantees the existence of a [[23, 1, d]]3 stabilizer code with minimum distance
d ≥ 6.
If n is an odd prime of the form n ≡ 1 mod 4, then we can also construct quadratic
residue codes, but now we need to employ Lemma III.20, because CR does not contain its
dual.
Theorem IV.8. Let n be a prime of the form n ≡ 1 mod 4. Let q be a power of a prime
that is not divisible by n. If q is a quadratic residue modulo n, then there exists a pure
[[n, 1, d]]q stabilizer code with minimum distance d bounded from below by d ≥ √n.
Proof. The dual code of CR is given by the even-like subcode of CN ; in other words, C⊥R
is a cyclic code of length n over Fq that is generated by the polynomial (x − 1)qN(x); in
particular, C⊥R ≤ CN . Moreover wt(CR \C⊥N) = wt(CN \C⊥R ) = wt(CR) = wt(CN) = d
by [76, Theorem 6.6.22]. Therefore, we obtain a pure [[n, (n+ 1)/2 + (n+ 1)/2− n, d]]q
code by Lemma III.20.
B. Quantum BCH Codes
In this section we consider a popular family of classical codes, the BCH codes, and con-
struct the associated nonbinary quantum stabilizer codes. Binary quantum BCH codes were
studied in [35,43,68,146]. The CSS construction turns out to be especially useful, because
BCH codes form a naturally nested family of codes. In case of primitive BCH codes over
prime fields, the distance of the dual is lower bounded by the generalized Carlitz-Uchiyama
bound, and this allows us to derive bounds on the minimum distance of the resulting quan-
tum codes.
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1. BCH Codes.
Let q be a power of a prime and n a positive integer that is coprime to q. Recall that a BCH
code C of length n and designed distance δ over Fq is a cyclic code whose defining set Z
is given by a union of δ − 1 subsequent cyclotomic cosets,
Z =
b+δ−2⋃
x=b
Cx, where Cx = {xqr mod n | r ∈ Z, r ≥ 0}.
The generator polynomial of the code is of the form
g(x) =
∏
z∈Z
(x− βz),
where β is a primitive n-th root of unity of some extension field of Fq. The definition
ensures that g(x) generates a cyclic [n, k, d]q code of dimension k = n−|Z| and minimum
distance d ≥ δ. If b = 1, then the code C is called a narrow-sense BCH code, and if
n = qm − 1 for some m ≥ 1, then the code is called primitive. More precise statements
can be made about the structure of primitive, narrow-sense codes than the other classes of
BCH codes and we will restrict our attention to these in this paper. More details on BCH
codes can be found in [76, 107].
2. Generalized Carlitz-Uchiyama Bound.
Our first construction derives stabilizer codes from BCH codes over prime fields. We use
the Knuth-Iverson bracket [statement] in the formulation of the Carlitz-Uchiyama bound
that evaluates to 1 if statement is true and 0 otherwise.
Lemma IV.9 (Generalized Carlitz-Uchiyama Bound). Let p be a prime. Let C denote a
narrow-sense BCH code of length n = pm − 1 over Fp, of designed distance δ = 2t + 1.
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Then the minimum distance d⊥ of its Euclidean dual code C⊥ is bounded by
d⊥ ≥
(
1− 1
p
)(
pm − δ − 2− [δ − 1 ≡ 0 mod p]
2
⌊
2pm/2
⌋)
. (4.3)
Proof. See [149, Theorem 7]; for further background, see [107, page 280].
Theorem IV.10. Let p be a prime. Let C be a [pm − 1, k,≥ δ]p narrow-sense BCH code
of designed distance δ = 2t + 1 and C∗ a [pm − 1, k∗, d∗]p BCH code such that C ⊆ C∗.
Then there exists a [[pm − 1, k∗ − k,≥ min{d∗, d⊥}]]p stabilizer code, where d⊥ is given
by (4.3).
Proof. The result follows from applying Lemma IV.9 to C and Lemma III.20 to the codes
C and C∗.
Remark IV.11. (i) The Carlitz-Uchiyama bound becomes trivial for larger design dis-
tances. (ii) In [111, Corollary 2] it was shown that for binary BCH codes of design dis-
tance d, the lower bound in equation (4.3) is attained when n = 22ab − 1, where a is the
smallest integer such that d − 2 | 2a + 1 and b is odd. (iii) For a further tightening of the
Carlitz-Uchiyama bound see [112, Theorem 2].
3. Primitive BCH Codes Containing Their Duals.
We can extend the results of the previous section to BCH codes over finite fields that are
not necessarily prime. In fact, if we restrict ourselves to smaller designed distances, then
we can even achieve significantly sharper results. We will just review the results and refer
the reader to our companion paper [4] for the proofs. A generalization of the following
results is given in Chapter IX, with a view to demonstrate the fact that study of quantum
codes can lead to interesting insights into classical coding theory.
In the BCH code construction, it is in general not obvious how large the cyclotomic
cosets will be. However, if the designed distance is small, then one can show that the
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cyclotomic cosets all have maximal size.
Lemma IV.12. A narrow-sense, primitive BCH code with design distance 2 ≤ δ ≤ q⌈m/2⌉+
1 has parameters [qm − 1, qm − 1−m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]q.
Proof. See [4, Theorem 7]; the binary case was already established by Steane [146].
In the case of small designed distances, primitive, narrow-sense BCH codes contain
their Euclidean duals.
Lemma IV.13. A narrow-sense, primitive BCH code over Fnq contains its Euclidean dual
if and only if its design distance satisfies 2 ≤ δ ≤ q⌈m/2⌉ − 1 − (q − 2)[m odd], where
n = qm − 1 and m ≥ 2.
Proof. See [4, Theorem 2].
A simple consequence is the following theorem:
Theorem IV.14. If C is a narrow-sense primitive BCH code over Fq with design distance
2 ≤ δ ≤ q⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (q − 2)[m odd] and m ≥ 2, then there exists an [[qm − 1, qm − 1−
2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]]q stabilizer code that is pure to δ.
Proof. If we combine Lemmas IV.12 and IV.13 and apply the CSS construction, then we
obtain the claim. See [4] for details about purity.
One can argue in a similar way for Hermitian duals of primitive, narrow-sense BCH
codes.
Theorem IV.15. If C is a narrow-sense primitive BCH code over Fnq2 with design distance
2 ≤ δ ≤ qm − 1, then there exists an [[q2m − 1, q2m − 1− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q2)⌉,≥ δ]]q
stabilizer code that is pure to δ.
Proof. See [4] for details.
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When m = 1, the BCH codes are the same as the Reed Solomon codes and this case
has been dealt with in [71]. An alternate perspective using Reed-Muller codes is considered
in [134].
4. Extending Quantum BCH Codes
It is not always possible to extend a stabilizer code, because the corresponding classical
codes are required to be self-orthogonal. We now show that it is possible to extend narrow-
sense BCH codes of certain lengths.
Lemma IV.16. Let Fq2 be a finite field of characteristic p. If C is a narrow-sense [n, k,≥
d]q2 BCH code such that C⊥h ⊆ C and n ≡ −1 mod p, then there exists an [[n, 2k−n,≥
d]]q stabilizer code that is pure to dwhich can be extended to an [[n+1, 2k−n−1,≥ d+1]]q
stabilizer code that is pure to d+ 1.
Proof. Since C⊥h ⊆ C, Corollary III.19 implies the existence of an [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q
quantum code that is pure to d and being narrow-sense the parity check matrix of C has the
form
H =


1 α α2 · · · α(n−1)
1 α2 α2(2) · · · α2(n−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αd−1 α2(d−1) · · · α(n−1)(d−1)


,
where α is a primitive nth root of unity. This can be extended to give an [n + 1, k, d + 1]
77
code Ce, whose parity check matrix is given as
He =


1 1 1 · · · 1 1
1 α α2 · · · α(n−1) 0
1 α2 α2(2) · · · α2(n−1) 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αd−1 α2(d−1) · · · α(n−1)(d−1) 0


.
We show that C⊥he is self-orthogonal. Let Ri be the ith row in He. For 2 ≤ i ≤ d the
self-orthogonality of H implies that 〈Ri|Rj〉h = 0. We need to show that 〈Ri|1〉h = 0,
1 ≤ i ≤ d. For 2 ≤ i ≤ d we have 〈Ri|1〉h =
∑n−1
j=0 α
ij = (αin − 1)/(αi − 1) = 0, as
αn = 1 and αi 6= 1. For i = 1 we have 〈1|1〉h = n+1 mod p, which vanishes because of
the assumption n ≡ −1 mod p.
Now we show that the rank of He is d, thus Ce has a minimum distance of at least
d + 1. Any d columns of He excluding the last column form a d × d vandermonde matrix
which is nonsingular, indicating that the d columns are linearly independent. If we consider
any set of d columns that includes the last column, we can find the determinant of the
corresponding matrix by expanding by the last column. This gives us a d − 1 × d − 1
vandermonde matrix with nonzero determinant. Thus any d columns of He are independent
and the minimum distance of Ce is at least d + 1. Therefore Ce is an [n + 1, k,≥ d + 1]q2
extended cyclic code such that C⊥he ⊆ Ce. By Corollary III.19 it defines an [[n + 1, 2k −
n− 1,≥ d+ 1]]q quantum code pure to d+ 1.
Corollary IV.17. For all prime powers q, integers m ≥ 1 and all δ in the range 2 ≤ δ ≤
qm − 1 there exists an
[[q2m, q2m − 2− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q2)⌉,≥ δ + 1]]q
stabilizer code pure to δ + 1.
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Proof. The stabilizer codes from Theorem IV.15 are derived from primitive, narrow-sense
BCH codes. If p denotes the characteristic of Fq2 , then q2m − 1 ≡ −1 mod p, so the
stabilizer codes given in Theorem IV.15 can be extended by Lemma IV.16.
A result similar to Lemma IV.16 can be developed for BCH codes that contain their
Euclidean duals.
5. Puncturing BCH Codes.
In this section, let BCHmq (δ) denote a primitive, narrow-sense q-ary BCH code of length
n = qm − 1 and designed distance δ. We illustrate the theory of puncture codes developed
in Chapter III by puncturing such BCH codes. Some knowledge about the puncture code
is necessary for this task, and we show in Theorem IV.19 that a cyclic generalized Reed-
Muller code is contained in the puncture code.
First, let us recall some basic facts about cyclic generalized Reed-Muller codes, see [16,
17,80,117] for details. LetLm(ν) denote the subspace of Fq[x1, . . . , xm] consisting of poly-
nomials of degree≤ ν, and let (P0, . . . , Pn−1) be an enumeration of the points in Fmq where
P0 = 0. The q-ary cyclic generalized Reed-Muller code R∗q(ν,m) of order ν and length
n = qm − 1 is defined as
R∗q(ν,m) = {ev f | f ∈ Lm(ν)},
where the codewords are evaluations of the polynomials in all but P0 defined by ev f =
(f(P1), . . . , f(Pn−1)). The dimension k∗(ν) of the code R∗q(ν,m) is given by the formula
k∗(ν) =
∑m
j=0(−1)j
(
m
j
)(
m+ν−jq
ν−jq
)
and its minimum distance d∗(ν) = (R+1)qQ−1, where
m(q − 1) − ν = (q − 1)Q + R with 0 ≤ R < q − 1. The dual code of R∗q(ν,m) can be
characterized by
R∗q(ν,m)⊥ = {ev f | f ∈ L∗m(ν⊥)}, (4.4)
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where ν⊥ = m(q − 1)− ν − 1 and L∗m(ν) is the subspace of all nonconstant polynomials
in Lm(ν);
It is well-known that a primitive, narrow-sense BCH code contains a cyclic generalized
Reed-Muller code, see [80, Theorem 5], and we determine the largest such subcode in our
next lemma.
Lemma IV.18. Let ν = (m−Q)(q−1)−R, withQ = ⌊logq(δ+1)⌋ andR = ⌈(δ+1)/qQ⌉−
1, thenR∗q(ν,m) ⊆ BCHmq (δ). Also for all orders ν ′ > ν, we haveR∗q(ν ′,m) 6⊆ BCHmq (δ).
Proof. First, we show that R∗q(ν,m) ⊆ BCHmq (δ). Recall that the minimum distance
d∗(ν) = (R + 1)qQ − 1, where m(q − 1) − ν = (q − 1)Q + R with 0 ≤ R < q − 1.
By [80, Theorem 5], we have R∗q(ν,m) ⊆ BCHmq ((R + 1)qQ − 1). Notice that (R +
1)qQ − 1 = ⌈(δ + 1)/qQ⌉qQ − 1 ≥ δ, so BCHmq ((R+ 1)qQ − 1) ⊆ BCHmq (δ). Therefore,
R∗q(ν,m) ⊆ BCHmq (δ), as claimed.
For the second claim, it suffices to show that R∗q(ν + 1,m) is not a subcode of
BCHmq (δ). We prove this by showing that the minimum distance d∗(ν + 1) < δ. No-
tice that
m(q − 1)− (ν + 1) =


(q − 1)Q+R− 1, R ≥ 1,
(q − 1)(Q− 1) + q − 2, R = 0
with R and Q as given in the hypothesis. Therefore, the distance d∗(ν+1) ofR∗q(ν+1,m)
is given by
d∗(ν + 1) =


(⌈(δ + 1)/qQ⌉ − 1)qQ − 1 for R ≥ 1,
(q − 1)qQ−1 − 1 for R = 0.
In both cases, it is straightforward to verify that d∗(ν + 1) < δ.
Explicitly determining the puncture code is a challenging task. For the duals of BCH
codes, we are able to determine large subcodes of the puncture code.
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Theorem IV.19. If δ < q⌊m/2⌋ − 1, then R∗q(µ,m) ⊆ Pe(BCHmq (δ)⊥) for all orders µ
in the range 0 ≤ µ ≤ m(q − 1) − 2(R + (q − 1)Q) + 1 with Q = ⌊logq(δ + 1)⌋ and
R = ⌈(δ + 1)/qQ⌉ − 1.
Proof. By Lemma IV.18, we have R∗q(ν,m) ⊆ BCHmq (δ) for ν = (m − Q)(q − 1) − R;
hence, BCHmq (δ)⊥ ⊆ R∗q(ν,m)⊥. It follows from the definition of the puncture code that
Pe(BCH
m
q (δ)
⊥) ⊇ Pe(R∗q(ν,m)⊥). However,
Pe(R∗q(ν,m)⊥) = {evf · ev g | f, g ∈ L∗m(ν⊥)}⊥,
⊇ {evf | f ∈ L∗m(2ν⊥)}⊥,
= R∗q((2ν⊥)⊥,m),
where the last equality follows from equation (4.4). This is meaningful only if (2ν⊥)⊥ ≥ 0
or, equivalently, if ν ≥ (m(q − 1) − 1)/2. Since δ < q⌊m/2⌋ − 1, it follows that Q ≤
⌊m/2⌋ − 1, and the order ν satisfies
ν = (m−Q)(q − 1)−R ≥ ⌈m/2 + 1⌉(q − 1)−R
≥ ⌈m/2⌉(q − 1) + 1 ≥ (m(q − 1)− 1)/2,
as required. SinceR∗q(µ,m) ⊆ R∗q((2ν⊥)⊥,m) for 0 ≤ µ ≤ (2ν⊥)⊥, we haveR∗q(µ,m) ⊆
Pe(BCH
m
q (δ)
⊥).
Unfortunately, the weight distribution of generalized cyclic Reed-Muller codes is not
known, see [38]. However, we know that the puncture code of BCHmq (δ)⊥ contains the
codes R∗q(0,m) ⊆ R∗q(1,m) ⊆ · · · ⊆ R∗q(m(q− 1)− 2(R+ (q− 1)Q) + 1,m), so it must
contain codewords of the respective minimum distances.
Corollary IV.20. If δ and µ are integers in the range 2 ≤ δ < q⌊m/2⌋ − 1 and 0 ≤ µ ≤
m(q − 1) − 2(R + (q − 1)Q) + 1, where Q = ⌊logq(δ + 1)⌋ and R = ⌈(δ + 1)/qQ⌉ − 1,
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then there exists a
[[d∗(µ),≥ d∗(µ)− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]]q
stabilizer code of length d∗(µ) = (ρ+ 1)qσ − 1, where σ and ρ satisfy the relations m(q −
1)− µ = (q − 1)σ + ρ and 0 ≤ ρ < q − 1.
Proof. If 2 ≤ δ < q⌊m/2⌋ − 1, then from Theorem IV.14 we know that there exists an
[[qm − 1, qm − 1 − 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1 − 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]]q quantum code. From Lemma IV.19 we
know that Pe(BCHmq (δ)⊥) ⊇ R∗q(µ,m), where 0 ≤ µ ≤ m(q−1)−2(q−1)Q−2R+1. By
Theorem III.42, if there exists a vector of weight r in Pe(BCHmq (δ)⊥), the corresponding
quantum code can be punctured to give [[r,≥ r − 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1 − 1/q)⌉), d ≥ δ]]q. The
minimum distance ofR∗q(µ,m) is d∗(µ) = (ρ+1)qσ−1, where 0 ≤ ρ < q−1 [80, Theorem
5]. Hence, it is always possible to puncture the quantum code to [[d∗(µ),≥ d∗(µ)−2m⌈(δ−
1)(1− 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]]q.
It is also possible to puncture quantum codes constructed via classical codes self-
orthogonal with respect to the Hermitian inner product. Examples of such puncturing can
be found in [71] and [134].
C. MDS Codes
A quantum code that attains the quantum Singleton bound is called a quantum Maximum
Distance Separable code or quantum MDS code for short. These codes have received
much attention, but many aspects have not yet been explored in the quantum case (but
see [71, 126]). In this section we study the maximal length of MDS stabilizer codes.
An interesting result concerning the purity of quantum MDS codes was derived by
Rains [126, Theorem 2]:
Lemma IV.21 (Rains). An [[n, k, d]]q quantum MDS code with k ≥ 1 is pure up to n−d+2.
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Corollary IV.22. All quantum MDS codes are pure.
Proof. An [[n, k, d]]q quantum MDS code with k = 0 is pure by definition; if k ≥ 1 then
it is pure up to n − d + 2. By the quantum Singleton bound n − 2d + 2 = k ≥ 0; thus,
n− d+ 2 ≥ d, which means that the code is pure.
Lemma IV.23. For any [[n, n−2d+2, d]]q quantum MDS stabilizer code with n−2d+2 >
0, the corresponding classical codes C ⊆ C⊥a are also MDS.
Proof. If an [[n, n − 2d + 2, d]]q stabilizer code exists, then Theorem III.15 implies the
existence of an additive [n, d−1]q2 code C such that C ⊆ C⊥a . Corollary IV.22 shows that
C⊥a has minimum distance d, so C⊥a is an [n, n−d+1, d]q2 MDS code. By Lemma IV.21,
the minimum distance of C is≥ n−d+2, so C is an [n, d−1, n−d+2]q2 MDS code.
A classical [n, k, d]q MDS code is said to be trivial if k ≤ 1 or k ≥ n − 1. A trivial
MDS code can have arbitrary length, but a nontrivial one cannot. The next lemma is a
straightforward generalization from linear to additive MDS codes.
Lemma IV.24. Assume that there exists a classical additive (n, qk, d)q MDS code C.
(i) If the code is trivial, then it can have arbitrary length.
(ii) If the code is nontrivial, then its code parameters must be in the range 2 ≤ k ≤
min{n− 2, q − 1} and n ≤ q + k − 1 ≤ 2q − 2.
Proof. The first statement is obvious. For (ii), we note that the weight distribution of the
code C and its dual are related by the MacWilliams relations. The proof given in [107,
p. 320-321] for linear codes applies without change, and one finds that the number of
codewords of weight n− k + 2 in C is given by
An−k+2 =
(
n
k − 2
)
(q − 1)(q − n+ k − 1).
Since An−k+2 must be a nonnegative number, we obtain the claim.
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We say that a quantum [[n, k, d]]q MDS code is trivial if and only if its minimum
distance d ≤ 2. The length of trivial quantum MDS codes is not bounded, but the length of
nontrivial ones is, as the next lemma shows.
Theorem IV.25 (Maximal Length of MDS Stabilizer Codes). A nontrivial [[n, k, d]]q MDS
stabilizer code satisfies the following constraints:
i) its length n is in the range 4 ≤ n ≤ q2 + d− 2 ≤ 2q2 − 2;
ii) its minimum distance satisfies max{3, n− q2 + 2} ≤ d ≤ min{n− 1, q2}.
Proof. By definition, a quantum MDS code attains the Singleton bound, so n − 2d + 2 =
k ≥ 0; hence, n ≥ 2d − 2. Therefore, a nontrivial quantum MDS code satisfies n ≥
2d− 2 ≥ 4.
By Lemma IV.23, the existence of an [[n, n − 2d + 2, d]]q stabilizer code implies
the existence of classical MDS codes C and C⊥a with parameters [n, d − 1, n − d + 2]q2
and [n, n − d + 1, d]q2 , respectively. If the quantum code is a nontrivial MDS code, then
the associated classical codes are nontrivial classical MDS codes. Indeed, for n ≥ 4 the
quantum Singleton bound implies d ≤ (n+2)/2 ≤ (2n−2)/2 = n−1, so C is a nontrivial
classical MDS code.
By Lemma IV.24, the dimension of C satisfies the constraints 2 ≤ d− 1 ≤ min{n−
2, q2 − 1}, or equivalently 3 ≤ d ≤ min{n − 1, q2}. Similarly, the length n of C satisfies
n ≤ q2+(d−1)−1 ≤ 2q2−2. If we combine these inequalities then we get our claim.
Example IV.26. The length of a nontrivial binary MDS stabilizer code cannot exceed 2q2−
2 = 6. In [35] the nontrivial MDS stabilizer codes for q = 2 were found to be [[5, 1, 3]]2
and [[6, 0, 4]]2, so there cannot exist further nontrivial MDS stabilizer codes.
In [71], the question of the maximal length of MDS codes was raised. All MDS
stabilizer codes provided in that reference had a length of q2 or less; this prompted us
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to look at the following famous conjecture for classical codes (cf. [76, Theorem 7.4.5]
or [107, pages 327-328]).
MDS Conjecture. If there is a nontrivial [n, k]q MDS code, then n ≤ q + 1 except when
q is even and k = 3 or k = q − 1 in which case n ≤ q + 2.
If the MDS conjecture is true (and much supporting evidence is known), then we can
improve upon the result of Theorem IV.25.
Corollary IV.27. If the classical MDS conjecture holds, then there are no nontrivial MDS
stabilizer codes of lengths exceeding q2 + 1 except when q is even and d = 4 or d = q2 in
which case n ≤ q2 + 2.
D. Conclusions
In this chapter we applied the theory developed in Chapter III to derive classes of quantum
codes. This work has also led to the construction of many more families of codes. The
interested reader can find the details in [8]. Table II gives an overview and summarizes
the main parameters of these families. We also illustrated the theory of puncture codes
by deriving new codes from quantum BCH codes. One central theme in quantum error-
correction is the construction of codes that have a large minimum distance. We were able
to show that the length of an MDS stabilizer code over Fq cannot exceed q2+1, except in a
few sporadic cases, assuming that the classical MDS conjecture holds. An open problem is
whether the length n of a q-ary quantum MDS code is bounded by q2+1 for all but finitely
many n. Another related problem is to construct analytically quantum MDS codes between
lengths q and q2. Currently, constructions are known only for a few lengths in this range.
85
Table II. A compilation of known families of quantum codes
Family [[n, k, d]]q Purity Parameter Ranges and References
Short MDS [[n, n− 2d+ 2, d]]q pure 2 ≤ d ≤ ⌈n/2⌉, q2 − 1 ≥
(
n
d
)
Hermitian Hamming [[n, n− 2m, 3]]q pure m ≥ 2, gcd(m, q2 − 1) = 1, n = (q2m − 1)/(q2 − 1)
Euclidean Hamming [[n, n− 2m, 3]]q pure m ≥ 2, gcd(m, q − 1) = 1, n = (qm − 1)/(q − 1)
Quadratic Residue I [[n, 1, d]]q pure n prime, n ≡ 3 mod 4, q 6≡ 0 mod n
q is a quadratic residue modulo n, d2 − d+ 1 ≥ n
Quadratic Residue II [[n, 1, d]]q pure n prime, n ≡ 1 mod 4, q 6≡ 0 mod n
q is a quadratic residue modulo n, d ≥ √n
Melas [[n, n− 4m,≥ 3]]q pure q even, n = q2m − 1, Pure to 3
Euclidean BCH [[n, n− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]]q pure 2 ≤ δ ≤ q⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (q − 2)[m odd]
to δ n = qm − 1 and m ≥ 2
Punctured BCH [[d∗(µ),≥ d∗(µ)− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌋,≥ δ]]q pure? δ < q⌊m/2⌉ − 1, See Corollary IV.20
Hermitian BCH [[n, n− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q2)⌉,≥ δ]]q pure 2 ≤ δ ≤ qm − 1, n = q2m − 1, Pure to δ
Extended BCH [[n+ 1, n− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q2)⌉ − 1,≥ δ + 1]]q pure Pure to δ + 1
Trivial MDS [[n, n− 2, 2]]q pure n ≡ 0 mod p
[[n, n, 1]]q pure n ≥ 1
Character [[n, k(r2)− k(r1),min{2m−r2 , 2r1+1}]]q pure n = 2m, q odd, 0 ≤ r1 < r2 ≤ m, k(r) =
∑r
j=0
(
m
j
)
CSS GRM [[qm, k(ν2)− k(ν1),min{d(ν2), d(ν⊥1 )}]]q pure k(ν) =
∑m
j=0(−1)j
(
m
j
)(
m+ν−jq
ν−jq
)
, ν⊥ = m(q − 1)− ν − 1
0 ≤ ν1 ≤ ν2 ≤ m(q − 1)− 1 ν⊥ + 1 = (q − 1)Q+R, d(ν) = (R+ 1)qQ
Punctured GRM [[d(µ),≥ k(ν2)− k(ν1)− (n− d(µ)),≥ d]]q pure? d ≥ min{d(ν2), d(ν⊥1 )}, 0 ≤ µ ≤ ν2 − ν1; [134]
Hermitian GRM [[q2m, q2m − 2k(ν), d(ν⊥)]]q pure k(ν) =
∑m
j=0(−1)j
(
m
j
)(m+ν−jq2
ν−jq2
)
, ν⊥ = m(q2 − 1)− ν − 1
0 ≤ ν ≤ m(q − 1)− 1 ν⊥ + 1 = (q2 − 1)Q+R, d(ν) = (R+ 1)q2Q
Punctured GRM [[d(µ⊥),≥ d(µ⊥)− 2k(ν),≥ d(ν⊥)]]q pure? (ν + 1)q ≤ µ ≤ m(q2 − 1)− 1; [134]
Punctured MDS [[q2 − qα, q2 − qα− 2ν − 2, ν + 2]]q pure 0 ≤ ν ≤ q − 2, 0 ≤ α ≤ q − ν − 1; [134]
Euclidean MDS [[n, n− 2d+ 2, d]]q pure 3 ≤ n ≤ q, 1 ≤ d ≤ n/2 + 1; [73]
Hermitian MDS [[q2 − s, q2 − s− 2d+ 2, d]]q pure 1 ≤ d ≤ q, s = 0, 1; [73]
Twisted [[q2 + 1, q2 − 3, 3]]q pure? [28]
Extended Twisted [[qr, qr − r − 2, 3]]q pure r ≥ 2; [28]
[[n, n− r − 2, 3]]q pure n = (qr+2 − q3)/(q2 − 1), r ≥ 1, r odd; [28]
Perfect [[n, n− r − 2, 3]]q pure n = (qr+2 − 1)/(q2 − 1), r ≥ 2, r even; [28]
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CHAPTER V
SUBSYSTEM CODES – BEYOND STABILIZER CODES∗
In this chapter we study a recent generalization of quantum codes that unifies many ap-
parently disparate notions of quantum error correction. This generalization called operator
quantum error correction gathers within its framework both passive and active error correc-
tion schemes, among them decoherence free subspaces (DFS), noiseless subsystems (NS),
and standard quantum error-correcting codes (including stabilizer codes which formed the
main theme of the last two chapters). Our main contribution in this chapter is to provide
a natural construction of such codes in terms of Clifford codes, an elegant generalization
of stabilizer codes due to Knill. Character-theoretic methods are used to derive a simple
method to construct operator quantum error-correcting codes from any classical additive
code over a finite field, which obviates the need for self-orthogonal codes. In view of
its importance and also to better appreciate our contribution we shall spend a little time
reviewing operator quantum error correction. The following review summarizes the key
points of [99, 100] relevant for our discussion. A quick word about the nomenclature.
These codes were originally studied in the context of operator algebras and hence, were
named operator quantum error correcting codes. We shall often use the descriptive term
subsystem codes in view of brevity. Both will be used interchangeably.
Notation. If N is a group, then Z(N) denotes the center of N . We denote by Irr(N) the set of
irreducible characters ofN . If χ andψ are characters ofN , then (χ, ψ)N = |N |−1
∑
n∈N χ(n)ψ(n
−1)
defines a scalar product on the vector space of class functions on N , and Irr(N) is an orthonor-
mal basis of this space. We denote by supp(χ) = {n ∈ N |χ(n) 6= 0}. If χ ∈ Irr(N), then
Z(χ) = {n ∈ N |χ(1) = |χ(n)|} denotes the quasikernel of χ. Suppose that G is a group that
∗Part of the material in this chapter has been submitted to IEEE and currently under
review. Copyright may be transferred to IEEE.
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contains N as a subgroup. If φ ∈ Irr(G), then φN denotes the restriction of this character to N .
If x, y ∈ N , then [x, y] = x−1y−1xy is the commutator. If A and B are subgroups of a group,
then [A,B] = 〈[a, b] | a,∈ A and b ∈ B〉 is the commutator subgroup of A and B. In particular,
N ′ = [N,N ] denotes the derived subgroup of N . The reader can find background material on finite
groups in [131] and on character theory in [78]. As usual let H be the system Hilbert space under
consideration. Let B(H) denote bounded linear operators on H.
A. Review of Operator Quantum Error Correction
The class of codes which we considered in the last two chapters come within the framework
of a model often called the standard model. Mathematically, this model is defined as a triple
(R, E , C), where E is the quantum channel, C a subspace of H and R a recovery operation.
Additionally, we define a projector P onto the codespace C, thus C = PH. For any density
operator ρ supported by C i.e. ρ in B(C) or equivalently ρ = PρP , the triple satisfies the
following relation:
(R ◦ E)(ρ) = ρ for all ρ = PρP. (5.1)
As we can see the standard model assumes a recovery operation R. In general R is
nontrivial which in turn implies some form of active monitoring of the encoded quantum
information in order to detect and correct the errors that occur. An alternative approach is
to rely on passive error correction mechanisms, exemplified by decoherence free subspaces
and noiseless subsystems.
If we want to avoid performing active error correction, we are naturally led to the idea
that the encoded states should not be affected by the channel. In other words, we must
encode into Fix(E), the fixed points of E where
Fix(E) = {ρ ∈ B(H) | E(ρ) = ρ}.
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These fixed points can be nicely characterized for a certain class of quantum channels.
Given a quantum channel E , we can write the channel in terms of its Kraus operators as
follows
E(ρ) =
∑
i
EiρE
†
i . (5.2)
Because of this decomposition we often write the channel E = {Ei, E†i }. When the quan-
tum channels satisfy the condition
∑
i
EiE
†
i = I, (5.3)
we have a convenient way to characterize the fixed points. Channels satisfying equa-
tion (5.3) are called unital channels. Let ρEi = Eiρ for any Ei. Then under the unital
assumption all such ρ are fixed points of E as
E(ρ) =
∑
i
EiρE
†
i = ρ
∑
i
EiE
†
i = ρ. (5.4)
We denote by A, the matrix polynomials generated by {Ei, E†i } i.e., the algebra generated
by {Ei, E†i }. This is called the interaction algebra in the literature. The noise communtant
A′ is defined as
A′ =
{
ρ ∈ B(H) | ρE = Eρ for any E ∈ {Ei, E†i }
}
. (5.5)
From equation (5.4), it follows that A′ ⊆ Fix(E). In fact, for unital channels it was shown
that Fix(E) = A′. Using results on C∗ algebras, Kribs et al., showed that the interaction
algebra has a representation of the form
A ∼=
⊕
j
IKj ⊗ B(HBj ) ∼=
⊕
j
IKj ⊗MRj , (5.6)
where MRj is Rj-dimensional matrix algebra (over C). This representation induces the
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following structure on H
H ∼=
⊕
j
HAj ⊗HBj , (5.7)
where dimHAj = Kj and dimHBj = Rj . Since E (and A) act trivially on HAj , the subsys-
tems HAj are called noiseless subsystems. To simplify matters we usually encode into only
one subsystem, which gives us the following decomposition
H = C ⊕ C⊥ = (HA ⊗HB)⊕ C⊥, (5.8)
where C⊥ is the complement of C. Let dimHA = K and dimHB = R. Then dim C = KR
and dim C⊥ = dimH − KR. Let us denote operators in B(HA) and B(HB) as ρA and
ρB respectively. The (standard) noiseless subsystem given by C consists of operators in
B(HA ⊗ HB) that are of the form B(HA) ⊗ IR in other words ρA ⊗ IR. In this case
the co-subsystem B is in the maximally mixed state. The codespace C is an algebra of
operators. Decoherence free subspaces are noiseless subsystems with the dimension of the
co-subsystem equal to one. In this case the codespace C is a subspace of H.
One of the insights of [99] was that we can relax the constraint that the co-subsystem
B should be in the maximally mixed state. This led to the idea of generalized noiseless
subsystems. In this case the noiseless subsystem code is given by the operators in B(H)
that are of the form (ρA ⊗ ρB). Comparing with equation (5.6) we can see that in this case
we are not always encoding into the fixed points of E . The codespace instead of being
an algebra of operators is now a monoid† of operators of the form ρA ⊗ ρB. Given a
decomposition ofH = HA⊗HB⊕C⊥ and orthonormal bases {|αi〉}ni=1, and {|βj〉}mj=1 for
†In [99], they refer to C as a semigroup even though C is equipped with identity.
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HA and HB respectively, we define a projector onto C = HA ⊗HB = PH as
P = 1AB = 1A ⊗ 1B = (
∑
i
|αi〉 〈αi|)⊗ (
∑
j
|βj〉 〈βj|). (5.9)
The action of P on ρ is defined as PρP . Then a generalized noiseless subsystem is defined
as follows, see [99, Lemma 2].
Lemma V.1 (Generalized noiseless subsystems [99]). Given a fixed decomposition ofH =
HA ⊗ HB ⊕ C⊥ and a CPTP map E , define C = {ρ ∈ B(H) | ρ = ρA ⊗ ρB}. Then the
following conditions are equivalent and define a generalized noiseless subsystem HA.
i) E(ρA ⊗ ρB) = ρA ⊗ σB, for all ρA ⊗ ρB ∈ C and some σB.
ii) E(ρA ⊗ IB) = ρA ⊗ σB , for all ρA ⊗ IB ∈ C and some σB .
iii) (TrA ◦P ◦ E)(ρ) = TrA(ρ), for all ρ ∈ C.
Kribs et al., [99, 100] generalized these ideas further by incorporating active error
correction also on the subsystem A. As in the standard model we now define a recovery
operation R, that restores the subsystem B after the error. The definition is as follows.
Lemma V.2 (Operator quantum error correcting codes [99]). Given a fixed decomposition
of H = HA ⊗HB ⊕K and a CPTP map E , define C = {ρ ∈ B(H) | ρ = ρA ⊗ ρB}. Then
the following conditions are equivalent and define an operator quantum error correcting
code C with recovery operation R.
i) R ◦ E(ρA ⊗ ρB) = ρA ⊗ σB , for all ρA ⊗ ρB ∈ C and some σB
ii) R ◦ E(ρA ⊗ IB) = ρA ⊗ σB, for all ρA ⊗ IB ∈ C and some σB
iii) (TrA ◦P ◦ R ◦ E)(ρ) = TrA(ρ), for all ρ ∈ C.
We are often more interested in a simple condition that identifies correctable errors for
a given channel E = {Ea, E†a} or equivalently, the detectable errors for a given subspace in
H. Recall that if a code corrects the set of errors in Σ = {Ea}, it detects all the errors in
the algebra ΣD = {E†aEb | Ea, Eb ∈ Σ}.
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Theorem V.3 ( [99, 115]). Let H = HA ⊗ HB ⊕ K and P = 1A ⊗ 1B be a projector
onto C = HA ⊗HB = PH. Then an error E is detectable by the operator quantum error
correcting code C if and only if
PEP = 1A ⊗ ρBE for some ρBE ∈ B(HB). (5.10)
Now that we have reviewed the salient ideas of operator quantum error correction,
we will address a very important question – how do we systematically construct these
codes? Two important contributions in this direction were the introduction of a stabilizer
formalism and the notion of a gauge group by Poulin [120], and construction of a class
of subsystem codes capable of encoding one qubit by Bacon [18]. However the bigger
question of systematic construction of good subsystem codes still remained open. Our
work addresses this problem in more detail. Subsequent to the publication of this work,
Bacon and Cassacino independently proposed a class of subsystem codes [19]; these codes
can be viewed as a special case of the codes constructed in this chapter. More details on
these codes will be given in Chapter VI.
Our approach is based on an elegant formalism to construct quantum error-correcting
codes that has been introduced in 1996 by Knill as a generalization of the stabilizer code
concept. At the heart of this quantum code construction is a famous theorem by Clifford
concerning the restriction of irreducible representations of finite groups to normal sub-
groups, so these codes were termed as “Clifford codes” in [88, 89], although “Knill codes”
is perhaps a more appropriate name. Unexpectedly, it turned out that Clifford codes are in
many cases stabilizer codes, so this construction did not become as widely known.
In our approach, we construct a Clifford code C and give conditions that ensure that
this code decomposes into a tensor product C = A ⊗ B. The Clifford codes allow us to
control the dimensions of A and B, and we get a simple characterization of the detectable
errors of the operator quantum error-correcting code. Since there may exist many different
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ways to construct the same Clifford code C, we should note that these constructions can
lead to different tensor product decompositions. In fact, even if one is just interested in the
tensor decomposition of a stabilizer code C, then the Clifford codes can provide a natural
way to induce an operator quantum error-correcting code on C.
B. A Detour Through Clifford Codes
As we have seen in the previous sections and in Chapter III, the study of quantum codes
is related to the operators acting on the system Hilbert space. To simplify matters we can
restrict our attention to a basis of these operators and the group generated by that basis,
called the error group. In the binary case we deal with the familiar Pauli matrices and the
group generated by them on n qubits. Knill generalized this concept by introducing the
notion of nice error bases and abstract error groups which generalize the Pauli error group.
We have already seen one application of this generalization in Chapter III, where we dealt
with the generalization of the Pauli group to nonbinary alphabet. The benefit of the abstract
approach is that it will free us from having to deal with cumbersome matrix operators but
instead work with groups. The representations of the groups (in H) will bring us back
to the concrete world of operators. In this chapter, we shall pursue this abstract approach
permitting different error groups other than the Pauli error group. We say that a finite group
E is an abstract error group if it has a faithful irreducible unitary representation ρ of degree
d = |E : Z(E)|1/2. The irreducibility of the representation ensures that one can express
any error acting on Cd as a linear combination of the matrices ρ(g), with g ∈ E. The fact
that the representation is faithful and has the largest possible degree ensures that the set of
matrices {ρ(g) | g ∈ T}, where T is a set of representatives of E/Z(E), forms a basis of
the vector space of d× d matrices.
A Clifford code is constructed with the help of a normal subgroup N of the error group
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E and an irreducible character χ ofN . Let φ denote the irreducible character corresponding
to the representation ρ of the group E, that is, φ(g) = Tr ρ(g) for g ∈ E. Suppose that N is
a normal subgroup of E and that χ is an irreducible character of N such that (χ, φN)N > 0.
Definition V.4 (Clifford codes). A Clifford code C corresponding to (E, ρ,N, χ) is defined
as the image of the orthogonal projector
P =
χ(1)
|N |
∑
n∈N
χ(n−1)ρ(n),
see [88, Theorem 1].
We emphasize that if we refer to a Clifford code with data (E, ρ,N, χ), then it is
assumed that (χ, φN) > 0, as this condition ensures that dimC > 0. Recall that an error
e in E is detectable by the (Clifford) quantum code C if and only if Pρ(e)P = λeP holds
for some λe ∈ C.
The image of P is the homogeneous component that consists of the direct sum of all
irreducible CN -submodules with character χ that are contained in the restriction of ρ to N .
The elements e in E that satisfy ρ(e)C = C form a group known as the inertia group
IE(χ) = {g ∈ E |χ(gxg−1) = χ(x) for all x ∈ N}. We note that C is an irreducible
C[IE(χ)]-module. Let ϑ be the irreducible character corresponding to this module.
Fact V.5. Let C be a Clifford code with data (E, ρ,N, χ). Then the dimension of the code
is given by dimC = |Z(E) ∩N ||E : Z(E)|1/2χ(1)2/|N |. An error e in E can be detected
by C if and only if e is in E − (IE(χ)− Z(ϑ)).
For a proof of this fact see [88] and for more background on Clifford codes see [89]
and the seminal papers [92, 93].
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C. Constructing Operator Quantum Error-Correcting Codes
We are now concerned with the construction of a decomposition of the Hilbert space H in
the form
H = (A⊗B)⊕ C⊥.
Put differently, we seek a decomposition of the Clifford code C as a tensor product A⊗B.
The next theorem gives a construction of operator quantum error-correcting codes
when one can express the inertia group IE(χ) as a central product IE(χ) = LN , where L
is a subgroup of E such that [L,N ] = 1.
Theorem V.6. Suppose that C is a Clifford code with data (E, ρ,N, χ). If the inertia group
IE(χ) is of the form IE(χ) = LN , where L is a subgroup of E such that [L,N ] = 1, then
C is an operator quantum error-correcting code C = A⊗B such that
i) dimA = |Z(E) ∩N ||E : Z(E)|1/2χ(1)/|N |,
ii) dimB = χ(1).
The subsystem A is an irreducible CL-module with character χA ∈ Irr(L). An error e in E
is detectable by subsystem A if and only if e is contained in the set E− (IE(χ)−Z(χA)N).
Proof. Since the Clifford codeC is an irreducible C[IE(χ)]-module and IE(χ) = LN , with
[L,N ] = 1, there exists an irreducible CL-module A and an irreducible CN -module B
such that C ∼= A⊗B, see [57, Proposition 9.14]. If χA ∈ Irr(L) is the character associated
with the module A, χB ∈ Irr(N) the character associated with B, and ϑ ∈ Irr(IE(χ)) the
character associated with C, then ϑ is of the form ϑ(ℓn) = χA(ℓ)χB(n) with ℓ ∈ L and
n ∈ N .
As the restriction of C to a CN -module contains an irreducible CN -module W with
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character χ, we must have
(ϑN , χ)N =
1
|N |
∑
n∈N
ϑ(1, n−1)χ(n) =
1
|N |
∑
n∈N
χA(1)χB(n
−1)χ(n)
= χA(1)(χB, χ)N > 0.
Since Irr(N) forms an orthonormal basis with respect to ( · , · )N , we can conclude that the
irreducible character χB must be equal to χ. It follows that C ∼= A⊗W .
The dimension of W ∼= B is χ(1), and by Fact V.5 the dimension of C is given by
TrP = |Z(E) ∩N ||E : Z(E)|1/2χ(1)2/|N |.
The dimension of B follows from the formula dimC = dimA dimB.
Note that the projector for C acts as 1AB = 1A ⊗ 1B on C. By [88, Theorem 1],
an error e ∈ E − IE(χ) maps C to an orthogonal complement, so eP and P project onto
orthogonal subspaces and we have PeP = 0; by equation (5.10) the error e is detectable‡
An error e in Z(χA)N acts by scalar multiplication on A and arbitrarily on B, so eP =
1A ⊗ ρB for some ρB ∈ B(B). Thus PeP = 1A ⊗ B(B); again by equation (5.10)
these errors are detectable (harmless would be a better word). Therefore, all errors in
E − (IE(χ)−Z(χA)N) are detectable. Conversely, an error e in IE(χ)−Z(χA)N cannot
be detectable, since e does not act by scalar multiplication on A. We have eP 6= 1A ⊗ ρB .
Therefore PeP 6= 1A ⊗ ρB and thus e is an undetectable error.
The data given in the previous theorem can be easily computed, especially with the
help of a computer algebra system such as GAP or MAGMA.
We will now consider some important special cases. Recall that most abstract error
groups that are used in the literature satisfy the constraint E ′ ⊆ Z(E) (put differently, the
‡Alternatively by Fact V.5, the error e is detectable when we view C as a Clifford code.
When viewed as an operator quantum error correcting code, we encode only into a subspace
of C, therefore e still remains detectable.
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quotient group E/Z(E) is abelian). In that case, we are able to obtain a characterization of
the resulting operator quantum error-correcting codes that does not depend on the choice
of the character χ.
Theorem V.7. Suppose that E is an abstract error group such that E ′ ⊆ Z(E). Suppose
that C is a Clifford code with data (E, ρ,N, χ). In this case, the inertia group is given by
IE(χ) = CE(Z(N)). If CE(Z(N)) = LN for some subgroup L of E such that [L,N ] = 1,
then C is an operator quantum error-correcting code C = A⊗B such that
i) dimA = |Z(E) ∩N ||E : Z(E)|1/2|N : Z(N)|1/2/|N |,
ii) dimB = |N : Z(N)|1/2.
An error e in E is detectable by subsystem A if and only if e is contained in the set E −
(CE(Z(N))− Z(L)N).
Proof. Since the abstract error groupE satisfies the conditionE ′ ⊆ Z(E), the inertia group
of the character χ in E can be fully determined; it is given by T := IE(χ) = CE(Z(N)),
see [88, Lemma 5].
Suppose that
P1 =
χ(1)
|N |
∑
n∈N
χ(n−1)ρ(n)
is the orthogonal projector onto C. The assumption E ′ ⊆ Z(E) implies that there exists a
linear character ϕ of Irr(Z(N)) such that
P2 =
1
|Z(N)|
∑
n∈Z(N)
ϕ(n−1)ρ(n)
satisfies P1 = P2, see [88, Theorem 6].
Let φ be the character of the representation ρ, that is, φ(g) = Tr ρ(g) for g ∈ E. We
have TrP1 = χ(1)2φ(1)|N ∩ Z(E)|/|N | and TrP2 = φ(1)|N ∩ Z(E)|/|Z(N)|. Since
P1 = P2 project onto the codespace C, and dimC > 0, we have TrP1/TrP2 = 1, which
implies χ(1)2 = |N : Z(N)|. Therefore, the claims i) and ii) follow from Theorem V.6.
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Let ϑ ∈ Irr(T ) be the character associated with the C[T ]-module C; put differently,
ϑ is the unique character in Irr(T ) that satisfies (ϑN , χ)N > 0 and (φT , ϑ)T > 0. Since
Z(E) ≤ T and (φT , ϑ)T > 0, it follows from Lemma V.18 that supp(ϑ) = Z(T ).
Since the inertia group T is a central product given by T = LN with [L,N ] = 1,
there exist characters χA ∈ Irr(L) and χB = χ ∈ Irr(N) such that ϑ(ℓn) = χA(ℓ)χ(n)
for ℓ ∈ L and n ∈ N . By Lemma V.19, we have Z(T ) = Z(L)Z(N); thus, supp(ϑ) =
Z(L)Z(N). This implies that supp(χA) = L ∩ Z(L)Z(N) = Z(L); hence Z(χA) =
Z(L). The characterization of the detectable errors is obtained by substituting these facts
in Theorem V.6.
In the previous theorem, we still need to check whether CE(Z(N)) decomposes into
a central product of N and some group L. In the case of extraspecial p-groups (which is
arguably the most popular choice of abstract error groups) the decomposition of the inertia
group into a central product is always guaranteed, as we will show next.
Recall that a finite group E whose order is a power of a prime p is called extraspecial
if its derived subgroup E ′ and its center Z(E) coincide and have order p. An extraspecial
p-group is an abstract error group. The quotient group E = E/Z(E) is the direct product
of two isomorphic elementary abelian p-groups. Therefore, one can regard E as a vector
space F2np over the finite field Fp.
Let ζ be a fixed generator of the cyclic group Z(E). As the commutator [x, y] depends
only on the cosets x = xZ(E) and y = yZ(E), one can determine a well-defined function
s : E×E → Fp by [x, y] = ζs(x,y). The function s is a nondegenerate symplectic form. We
note that two elements x and y in E commute if and only if s(x, y) = 0. We write x⊥s y if
and only if s(x, y) = 0.
For a subgroup G of E, we will use G to denote G/Z(E).
Lemma V.8. IfE is an extraspecial p-group andN a normal subgroup ofE, thenCE(Z(N)) =
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NCE(N).
Proof. Since Z(E) ≤ NCE(N) ≤ CE(Z(N)), it suffices to show that the dimensions of
the Fp-linear vector spaces
NCE(N) and CE(Z(N))
are the same. Suppose that z = dimZ(N) and k = dimN . Then
dimNCE(N) = dim(N +N
⊥s
) = dimN + dimN
⊥s − dim(N ∩N⊥s)
= dimN + dimN
⊥s − dim(Z(N))
= k + (2n− k)− z = 2n− z,
which coincides with dimCE(Z(N)) = dimZ(N)
⊥s
= 2n− z, and this proves our claim.
The next theorem shows that it suffices to choose a normal subgroup N of the ex-
traspecial p-group E, and this choice determines the parameters of an operator quantum
error-correcting code provided by a Clifford code C.
Theorem V.9. Suppose that E is an extraspecial p-group. If C is a Clifford code with data
(E, ρ,N, χ), with N 6= 1, then C is an operator quantum error-correcting code C = A⊗B
such that
i) dimA = |Z(E) ∩N ||E : Z(E)|1/2|N : Z(N)|1/2/|N |,
ii) dimB = |N : Z(N)|1/2.
An error e in E is detectable by subsystem A if and only if e is contained in the set E −
(NCE(N)−N).
Proof. The inertia group Iχ(E) = CE(Z(N)), since E ′ ⊆ Z(E), see [88, Lemma 5].
By Lemma V.8, we have IE(χ) = LN = NL with L = CE(N). Thus, C is an opera-
tor quantum error-correcting code and the statements i) and ii) follow from Theorem V.7.
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Furthermore, Theorem V.7 shows that an error e in E is detectable if and only if e ∈
E − (NCE(N) − Z(L)N). Since E is a p-group and N 6= 1, we have N ∩ Z(E) 6= 1;
hence Z(E) ≤ N . We note that Z(L) ⊆ L ∩ L⊥s = N⊥s ∩ N ⊆ N ; therefore,
N ⊆ Z(L)N ⊆ Z(N)N = N , forcing Z(L)N = N .
The normal subgroup N used in the construction of subsystem codes will henceforth
be called as the gauge group. This definition coincides with the definition of the gauge
group in [120].
D. Subsystem Codes from Classical Codes
We conclude this chapter by showing how the previous results can be related to classical
coding theory. Let a and b be elements of the finite field Fq of characteristic p. Recall that
in Section 1 we defined the unitary operators X(a) and Z(b) on Cq by
X(a) |x〉 = |x+ a〉 , Z(b) |x〉 = ωtr(bx) |x〉 ,
where tr denotes the trace operation from the extension field Fq to the prime field Fp, and
ω = exp(2πi/p) is a primitive pth root of unity. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Fnq . We write
X(a) = X(a1)⊗ · · · ⊗X(an) and Z(a) = Z(a1)⊗ · · · ⊗ Z(an) for the tensor products
of n error operators. One readily checks that the group
E = 〈X(a), Z(b) | a, b ∈ Fnq 〉
is an extraspecial p-group of order pq2n. As a representation ρ, we can take the identity
map on E. We have E/Z(E) ∼= F2nq .
We need to introduce a notion of weights of errors. Recall that an error in E can be
expressed in the form αX(a)Z(b) for some nonzero scalar α. The weight of αX(a)Z(b)
is defined as |{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai 6= 0 or bi 6= 0}|, that is, as the number of quantum systems
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that are affected by the error. Similarly, we can introduce a weight on vectors of F2nq by
swt(a|b) = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ai 6= 0 or bi 6= 0}|
for a, b ∈ Fnq .
Theorem V.9 suggests the following approach to construct operator quantum error-
correcting codes.
Theorem V.10. Let X be a classical additive subcode of F2nq such that X 6= {0} and let
Y denote its subcode Y = X ∩X⊥s . If x = |X| and y = |Y |, then there exists an operator
quantum error-correcting code C = A⊗B such that
i) dimA = qn/(xy)1/2,
ii) dimB = (x/y)1/2.
The minimum distance of subsystem A is given by d = swt((X+X⊥s)−X) = swt(Y ⊥s−
X). Thus, the subsystem A can detect all errors in E of weight less than d, and can correct
all errors in E of weight ≤ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋.
Proof. Let E be the extraspecial p-group of order pq2n, and let N be the full preimage of
N = X in E under the canonical quotient map. Therefore, we can apply Theorem V.9. The
remainder of the proof justifies how the parameters given in Theorem V.9 can be expressed
in terms of the code sizes x and y.
ThenZ(N) = X∩X⊥s = Y . By definition, N containsZ(E); hence, Z(E) ≤ Z(N).
It follows that |N : Z(N)| = |N : Z(N)| = x/y, so ii) follows from Theorem V.9. For
the claim i), we remark that x = |X| = |N |/p, which implies that dimA = (p/|N |)|E :
Z(E)|1/2|N : Z(N)|1/2 = qn(x/y)1/2/x.
The minimum distance of subsystem A is the weight of the smallest nondetectable
error, so it is the minimum weight of an error in the set NCE(N) − N = CE(Z(N)) −
N . Since the quotient map E → E maps an error e of weight w onto a vector e such
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that w = swt e, the claim about the minimum distance follows from the observations that
NCE(N)−N = (X +X⊥s)−X and CE(Z(N))−N = Y ⊥s −X .
Remark V.11. As in the case of stabilizer codes, the most general symplectic form we can
choose is 〈u|v〉s = trq/p(a′ · b − a · b′), where u = (a|b) and v = (a′|b′) are in F2nq . We
define the trace symplectic dual as C⊥s = {x ∈ F2nq | 〈x|y〉s = 0, for all y ∈ C}. In
case of Fq-linear codes, the trace symplectic form 〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉s vanishes if and only if
a′ · b− a · b′ vanishes. The trace symplectic dual for an Fq-linear code therefore coincides
with its symplectic dual. So when dealing with Fq-linear codes we indulge in an abuse of
notation and denote a′ · b− a · b′ also by 〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉s and the duals with respect to both
forms as C⊥s .
In the above the theorem we had been able to define the distance in terms of the
classical codes. Having made choice of the error group we can also go back and recast the
distance in terms of the gauge group as as wt(CE(Z(N)) − N). In addition, we can also
extend the notion of purity to subsystem codes also in a straightforward manner.
Definition V.12 (Pure and impure subsystem codes). Let N be the gauge group of a sub-
system code Q with distance d = wt(CE(Z(N))−N). We say that Q is pure to d′ if there
is no error of weight less than d′ in N . The code is said to be exactly pure to d′ if wt(N)
is d′ and it is said to pure if d′ ≥ d . The code is said to be impure if it is exactly pure to
d′ < d.
This refinement to the notion of purity was made in recognition of certain subtleties
that had to addressed when constructing other subsystem codes from existing subsystem
codes, see [6] for details.
An operator quantum error-correcting code with parameters ((n,K,R, d))q is a sub-
space C = A ⊗ B of a qn-dimensional Hilbert space H such that K = dimA, R =
dimB, and the subsystem A has minimum distance d. The above theorem constructs
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an ((n, qn/(xy)1/2, (x/y)1/2, d))q operator quantum error-correcting code given a classi-
cal (n, x)q code X and its (n, y)q subcode Y = X ∩ X⊥s . We write [[n, k, r, d]]q for an
((n, qk, qr, d))q operator quantum error-correcting code.
A further simplification of the above construction is possible which takes any pair of
classical codes to give a subsystem code.
Corollary V.13 (Euclidean Construction). Let Xi ⊆ Fnq , be [n, ki]q linear codes where
i ∈ {1, 2}. Then there exists an [[n, k, r, d]]q Clifford subsystem code with
• k = n− (k1 + k2 + k′)/2,
• r = (k1 + k2 − k′)/2, and
• d = min{wt((X⊥1 ∩X2)⊥ \X1),wt((X⊥2 ∩X1)⊥ \X2)},
where k′ = dimFq(X1 ∩X⊥2 )× (X⊥1 ∩X2).
The result follows from Theorem V.9 by defining C = X1 × X2; it follows that
C⊥s = X⊥2 ×X⊥1 and D = C ∩ C⊥s = (X1 ∩X⊥2 )× (X2 ∩X⊥1 ), and the parameters are
easily obtained from these definitions, see [6] for a detailed proof.
The notions of purity can be defined in terms of classical codes as well. LetC be an ad-
ditive subcode of F2nq and D = C ∩C⊥s . By theorem V.9, we can obtain an ((n,K,R, d))q
subsystem code Q from C that has minimum distance d = swt(D⊥s −C). If d′ ≤ swt(C),
then we say that the associated operator quantum error correcting code is pure to d′.
Extending the ideas of purity to subsystem codes is useful because it facilitates the
analysis of the parameters of the subsystem codes, as will become clear when we derive
bounds in the next chapter.
As in the case of stabilizer codes we would like one would like to characterize the min-
imum distance in terms of the familiar Hamming weight. For this purpose, we reformulate
the above result in terms of codes of length n over Fq2 .
Let (β, βq) be a fixed normal basis of Fq2 over Fq. We can define a bijection φ from
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F
2n
q onto F
n
q2 by setting
φ((a|b)) = βa+ βqb for (a|b) ∈ F2nq .
The map is chosen such that a vector (a|b) of symplectic weight x is mapped to a vector
φ((a|b)) of Hamming weight x. Recall the trace-alternating form 〈v|w〉a for vectors v and
w in Fnq2 given in equation (3.7)
〈v|w〉a = trq/p
(
v · wq − vq · w
β2q − βq
)
.
It is easy to show that 〈c|d〉s = 〈φ(c)|φ(d)〉a holds for all c, d ∈ F2nq , see Lemma III.14.
Specifically, we have c⊥s d if and only if φ(c)⊥a φ(d). Therefore, the previous theorem
can be reformulated terms of codes of length n over Fq2 as follows:
Theorem V.14. Let X be a classical additive subcode of Fnq2 such that X 6= {0} and let Y
denote its subcode Y = X ∩X⊥a . If x = |X| and y = |Y |, then there exists an operator
quantum error-correcting code C = A⊗B such that
i) dimA = qn/(xy)1/2,
ii) dimB = (x/y)1/2.
The minimum distance of subsystem A is given by
d = wt((X +X⊥a)−X) = wt(Y ⊥a −X),
where wt denotes the Hamming weight. Thus, the subsystem A can detect all errors in
E of Hamming weight less than d, and can correct all errors in E of Hamming weight
⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ or less.
Proof. This follows from Theorem V.10 and the definition of the isometry φ.
The above connections of Clifford operator quantum error-correcting codes to classi-
cal codes allow one to explore a plethora of code constructions. Henceforth codes con-
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structed by using Theorems V.10,V.14 will be referred to as Clifford subsystem codes
or just subsystem codes. We shall give an example to illustrate the idea. For simplicity
we shall consider binary codes derived from codes over F4 whose elements are given by
{0, 1, ω, ω2}, where ω2+ω+1 = 0. Further, choosing β = ω, the trace alternating product
simplifies as 〈v|w〉a = v · w2 + v2 · w. Note that if w = (w1, . . . , wn), then we denote
w2 = (w21, . . . , w
2
n).
Example V.15. Let X be the additive code given by the following generator matrix.
GX =


1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
ω 0 ω 0
0 ω 0 ω


Then it can be verified that X⊥a is generated by
GX⊥a =


ω ω 0 0
0 0 ω ω
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1


.
Further, Y = X ∩X⊥a is generated by
GY =

 1 1 1 1
ω ω ω ω

 .
We see that |X| = 24, while |Y | = 22. Thus by Theorem V.14 we have a ((4, K,R, d))2
Clifford subsystem code where K = 24/√24 · 22 = 1 and R =√24/22 = 2. The distance
of the code is 2 because the Y ⊥a \X contains (0, 1, 0, 1) among other weight two elements.
Thus we obtain a ((4, 2, 2, 2))2 i.e. a [[4, 1, 1, 2]]2 code. This code is not a Clifford code.
The associated Clifford code is a [[4, 2, 2]]2 code. Incidentally, this code is the smallest
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error detecting subsystem code with nontrivial dimensions for the subsystems.
Often linear codes are of more interest than the additive codes. So we shall consider a
linear operator quantum error-correcting code. In this case we can look at Hermitian duals
instead of the trace-alternating duals. Let x, y ∈ Fn4 . Then we define the Hermitian inner
product 〈x|y〉h =
∑n
i xiy
2
i . Let C ⊆ Fn4 be an F4-linear code. The Hermitian dual of C is
defined as C⊥h = {x ∈ Fn4 | 〈x|c〉h = 0 for all c ∈ C}. From Lemma III.18, we know that
C⊥a = C⊥h . So we can use Hermitian duals in Theorem V.14.
Example V.16. LetX ⊆ F154 be a narrowsense BCH code of design distance 6. This code is
neither self-orthogonal nor does it contain its (Hermitian) dual. The generator polynomial
of X is given by
g(x) = x7 + x6 + ωx4 + x2 + ω2x+ ω2.
Thus X is an [15, 8,≥ 6]4 code. A generator matrix for this code is obtained as
G =


1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 ω 0 1 ω2 ω2


.
The gauge group is the (full) preimage ofG under the isometry φ. The generator polynomial
of its Hermitian dual is given by
x8 + x7 + ωx6 + x5 + ωx4 + ω2x3 + ωx2 + ωx+ ω.
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The generator polynomial of Y = C ∩ C⊥h is given by
h(x) = x9 + ωx8 + x7 + x5 + ωx4 + ω2x2 + ω2x+ 1.
We see that Y ⊥h is a [15, 9]4 code. Again using Theorem V.14 we can compute the dimen-
sions of the subsystems A and B as 215/√48 · 46 = 2 and √48/46 = 4 respectively. The
code Y ⊥h has minimum weight 5 (computed using MAGMA). Since wt(X) ≥ 6, it follows
that wt(Y ⊥h \X) = 5. Thus, X defines a ((15, 2, 4, 5))2 code. But note that the associated
Clifford code has the parameters ((15, 8, 5))2.
Further simplifications of Theorem V.14 for constructing operator quantum error-
correcting codes can be found in [6]. The reader can also find examples of Clifford sub-
sytem codes derived from BCH codes, Reed-Solomon codes therein. Interested readers can
also refer to [19] for a novel method to construct subsystem codes from a pair of classical
codes.
E. Conclusions
We have introduced a method for constructing operator quantum error-correcting codes.
We have seen that a Clifford codes C offers naturally a tensor-product decomposition C =
A⊗B, where the dimensions of the subsystems are controlled by the choice of the normal
subgroup N and its character χ.
Our construction in terms of classical codes is fairly simple: Any classical (additive)
code over a finite field can be used to construct an operator quantum error-correcting code.
In particular, we do not require any self-orthogonality conditions as in the case of stabilizer
code constructions.
The most prominent open problem concerning operator quantum error-correcting codes
is whether one can achieve better error correction that by means of a quantum error-
107
correcting code. The construction given in Theorem V.10 allows one to compare the para-
meters of Clifford codes with the parameters of stabilizer codes. One should note that a fair
comparison should be made between [[n− r, k, d]] stabilizer codes and [[n, k, r, d]] Clifford
subsystem codes. In subsequent chapters we shall establish bounds on the parameters of
subsystem codes and make a fair comparison of the subsystem codes and stabilizer codes.
Additionally, we shall also look into other aspects which we have not considered here such
as encoding subsystem codes, the gains in encoding and decoding.
F. Appendix
In this appendix, we prove some simple technical results on groups and characters.
Lemma V.17. Let E be a finite group such that E ′ ⊆ Z(E), and let H be a subgroup of
E. If χ ∈ Irr(H) satisfies Z(E) ∩ kerχ = {1}, then suppχ = Z(H).
Proof. Let h ∈ supp(χ). Seeking a contradiction, we assume that h ∈ H − Z(H). Since
E ′ ⊆ Z(E), there exists an element g ∈ H such that ghg−1 = zh with z ∈ Z(E) such that
z 6= 1. Since zh ∈ H and h ∈ H , we have z ∈ H ∩Z(E). As χ is irreducible, the element
z ∈ H ∩ Z(E) is represented by ωI for some ω ∈ C by Schur’s lemma; furthermore,
ω 6= 1, since Z(E) ∩ kerχ = {1}. We note that χ(h) = χ(ghg−1) = χ(zh) = ωχ(h),
with ω 6= 1, forcing χ(h) = 0, contradiction.
The elements of Z(H) belong to the support of χ, since they are represented by scalar
invertible matrices.
Lemma V.18. Let E be a finite group such that E ′ ⊆ Z(E), and let φ ∈ Irr(E) be a
faithful character of degree φ(1) = |E : Z(E)|1/2. Let T be a subgroup of E such that
Z(E) ≤ T . If ϑ ∈ Irr(T ) and (φT , ϑ)T > 0, then supp(ϑ) = Z(T ).
Proof. Let Z = Z(E). We have supp(φ) = Z by [78, Lemma 2.29]. Since the support of
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φ equals Z, it follows from the definitions that
0 < (φT , ϑ)T =
1
|T : Z|(φZ , ϑZ)Z .
Clearly, φZ = φ(1)ϕ and ϑZ = ϑ(1)θ for some linear characters ϕ and θ of Z. As
(φZ , ϑZ)Z = φ(1)ϑ(1)(ϕ, θ)Z > 0, we must have θ = ϕ. Since φ is faithful, it follows that
ϕ = θ is faithful; hence, kerϑ ∩ Z(E) = {1}. Thus, suppϑ = Z(T ) by Lemma V.17.
Lemma V.19. Suppose that T is a group with subgroups L and N such that T = LN and
[L,N ] = 1. Then Z(T ) = Z(L)Z(N).
Proof. Since T = LN , an arbitrary element z of Z(T ) can be expressed in the form z = ln
for some l ∈ L and n ∈ N . For n′ in N , we have lnn′ = n′ln = ln′n, where the
latter equality follows from [L,N ] = 1. Consequently, nn′ = n′n for all n′ in N , so n
is an element of Z(N). Similarly, l must be an element of Z(L). It follows that Z(T ) =
Z(L)Z(N).
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CHAPTER VI
SUBSYSTEM CODES – BOUNDS AND CONSTRUCTIONS∗
In this chapter we extend the theory of subsystem codes. One of our goals is to clarify
the benefits that can be gained from the use of subsystem codes with respect to stabilizer
codes. In this context we derive bounds on the parameters of subsystem codes. These
bounds help in comparing the performance of subsystem codes with respect to stabilizer
codes. Of course subsystem codes subsume stabilizer and in that sense every stabilizer
code is a subsystem code. However, we use the term subsystem code to mean a code
with nontrivial dimension of the gauge subsystem. We generalize the quantum Singleton
bound to Fq-linear subsystem codes. It follows that no subsystem code over a prime field
can beat the quantum Singleton bound. On the other hand, we show the remarkable fact that
there exist impure subsystem codes beating the quantum Hamming bound. A number of
open problems concern the comparison in performance of stabilizer and subsystem codes.
One of the open problems suggested by Poulin’s work asks whether a subsystem code can
use fewer syndrome measurements than an optimal Fq-linear MDS stabilizer code while
encoding the same number of qudits and having the same distance. We prove that linear
subsystem codes cannot offer such an improvement under complete decoding.
One of the promises of subsystem codes is their potential for simplifying error recov-
ery. Perhaps the benefits of subsystem codes are best understood by an example. Consider
the first quantum error correcting code proposed by [142], which encodes one qubit into
nine qubits. This code which is capable of correcting a single error on any of the qubits
requires the measurement of eight syndrome qubits. The Bacon-Shor subsystem code [18]
∗ c©2007. Part of the material in this chapter is reprinted from A. Klappenecker and P.
K. Sarvepalli, “On subsystem codes beating the quantum Hamming or Singleton bound”,
Proc. Royal Society London A, vol 463, pp. 2887-2905, 2007.
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on the other hand, also encodes one qubit into nine but it requires only four syndrome
measurements, giving a simpler error recovery scheme.
In this context it becomes crucial to identify when subsystem codes provide gains
over the stabilizer codes. It also becomes necessary to compare the stabilizer codes and
the subsystem codes fairly and with meaningful criteria. For instance, once again consider
the [[9, 1, 3]]2 Shor code requiring n − k = 9 − 1 = 8 syndrome measurements. The
[[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 Bacon-Shor code on the other hand requires n − k − r = 9 − 1 − 4 = 4
syndrome measurements. Clearly, this code is better than the Shor’s code. But the optimal
single error correcting binary quantum code that encodes one qubit is the [[5, 1, 3]]2 code,
which also requires only 5− 1 = 4 syndrome measurements. So it is apparent that while a
given subsystem code can be superior to some stabilizer codes, it is not at all obvious that
it is better than the best stabilizer code for the same function, viz., encoding k qubits with a
distance d.
The first part of our chapter seeks to address this issue for Fq-linear Clifford subsystem
codes which might perhaps be the most useful class of subsystem codes. In this chapter we
generalize the quantum Singleton bound to Fq-linear Clifford subsystem codes. It follows
that no Clifford subsystem code over a prime field can beat the quantum Singleton bound.
We then show how the quantum Singleton bound can be applied to make the comparison
between stabilizer and subsystem codes (focusing on stabilizer codes that are optimal in
the sense that they meet the quantum Singleton bound). This bound makes it possible to
quantify the gains that subsystem codes can provide in error recovery. In particular, our
results show that these gains involve a trade off between the distance of the subsystem
code and the number of information and the gauge qudits. We show that if there exists
an Fq-linear MDS stabilizer code, i.e., a code meeting the quantum Singleton bound, then
no Fq-linear subsystem code can outperform it in the sense of requiring fewer syndrome
measurements for error correction.
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Then we shift our attention to a class of subsystem codes on lattices. Bacon and Casac-
cino [19] obtain a subsystem code from two classical codes. We show that this method is a
special case of the Euclidean construction for subsystem codes proposed in [6] and give a
coding theoretic analysis of these codes.
Since the early works on quantum error-correcting codes, it has been suspected that
impure codes should somehow perform better than the pure codes. However, it was shown
that the quantum Singleton bound holds true for both pure and impure stabilizer codes. But
it was not so clear with respect to the quantum Hamming bound. In fact, it was often con-
jectured that there might exist impure quantum error-correcting codes beating the quantum
Hamming bound, but a proof remained elusive. At least in the case of binary stabilizer
codes there exists some evidence that the conjecture might not be true, as [12] showed
that asymptotically the quantum Hamming bound was obeyed by impure codes as well,
and [61] showed that no single error correcting binary stabilizer code can beat the quan-
tum Hamming bound. In this context it is not surprising that questions were raised [18] if
subsystem codes are any different. In [6] we proved the quantum Hamming bound for pure
subsystem codes. We show here that impure subsystem codes can indeed beat the quantum
Hamming bound for pure subsystem codes. For example, we demonstrate that the lattice
subsystem codes can provide examples of impure subsystem codes that beat the quantum
Hamming bound.
The chapter is structured as follows. We assume that the reader is familiar with the
notion of subsystem code introduced in the last chapter. We prove the quantum Singleton
bound for subsystem codes in Section A. The lattice subsystem codes are focus of attention
in Section C and Section D, wherein it is shown that there exist impure subsystem codes that
beat the quantum Hamming bound. We conclude with a few open questions on subsystem
codes.
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A. Quantum Singleton Bound for Fq-linear Subsystem Codes
Recall that the quantum Singleton bound states that an [[n, k, d]]q quantum code satisfies
2d ≤ n− k + 2, [95, 126]. In this context it is natural to ask if subsystem codes also obey
a similar relation. The usefulness of such a bound is obvious. Apart from establishing
the bounds for optimal subsystem codes, they also make it possible to compare stabilizer
and subsystem codes, as we shall see subsequently. We prove that the Fq-linear subsystem
codes with the parameters [[n, k, r, d]]q satisfy a quantum Singleton like bound viz., k+r ≤
n− 2d+2. It will be seen that this reduces to the quantum Singleton bound if r = 0. More
interestingly, this reveals that there is a trade off in the size of subsystem A and the gauge
subsystem. One pays a price for the gains in error recovery. The cost is the reduction in the
information to be stored.
Our proof for this result is quite straightforward, though the intermediate details are a
little involved. First we show that a linear [[n, k, r > 0, d]]q subsystem code that is exactly
pure to 1 can be punctured to an [[n − 1, k, r − 1, d]]q code which retains the relationship
between n, k, r, d. If d = 2 by repeated puncturing we either arrive at a pure code or
a stabilizer code, both of which have upper bounds. For d > 2, two cases can arise, if
the code is exactly pure to 1, we simply puncture it to get a smaller code as in d = 2
case. Otherwise, we puncture it to get an [[n − 1, k, r + 1, d − 1]]q code. By repeatedly
shortening we either get a stabilizer code or a distance 2 code both of which have an upper
bound. Keeping track of the change in the parameters will give us an upper bound on the
parameters of the original code.
Let w = (a1, a2, . . . , an|b1, b2, . . . , bn) ∈ F2nq . We denote by ρ(w) ∈ F2n−2q , the vector
obtained by deleting the first and the n+ 1th coordinates of w. Thus we have
ρ(w) = (a2, . . . , an|b2, . . . , bn) ∈ F2n−2q .
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Similarly, given a classical code C ⊆ F2nq we denote the puncturing of a codeword or code
in the first and n+ 1 coordinates by ρ(C).
In Theorem V.10 subsystem codes are constructed using a trace symplectic prod-
uct. Following Remark V.11 for Fq-linear codes instead of considering the trace sym-
plectic inner product we can consider the relatively simpler symplectic product. Recall
that the symplectic product of u = (a|b) and v = (a′|b′) in F2nq is defined as 〈u|v〉s =
〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉s = a′ · b − a · b′. The symplectic dual of a code C ⊆ F2nq is defined as
C⊥s = {x ∈ F2nq | 〈x|y〉s = 0, for all y ∈ C}. As we shall be concerned with Fq-linear
codes in this chapter, we will focus only on the symplectic inner product in the rest of the
chapter.
Lemma VI.1. Let C ⊆ F2nq be an Fq-linear code. Then C has an Fq-linear basis of the
form
B = {z1, . . . , zk, zk+1, xk+1, zk+2, xk+2, . . . , zk+r, xk+r}
where 〈xi|xj〉s = 0 = 〈zi|zj〉s and 〈xi|zj〉s = δi,j .
Proof. First we choose a basis B = {z1, . . . , zk, zk+1, . . . , zk+r} for a maximal isotropic
subspace C0 of C. If C0 6= C, then we can choose a codeword xk+1 in C that is orthog-
onal to all of the zi except one, say zk+1 (renumbering if necessary). We can scale xk+1
by an element in F×q so that 〈zk+1|xk+1〉s = 1. If 〈C0, xk+1〉 6= C, then we repeat the
process by choosing another codeword xk+i that is orthogonal to all the previously chosen
{xk+1, . . . , xk+i−1} and all zi except zk+i, until we have a basis of the desired form.
For the remainder of the section, we fix the following notation. By Theorem V.10, we
can associate with an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d]]q subsystem code two classical Fq-linear codes
C,D ⊆ F2nq such that D = C ∩C⊥s , |C| = qn−k+r, |D| = qn−k−r and swt(D⊥s \C) = d.
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By lemma VI.1, we can also assume that C is generated by
C = 〈z1, . . . , zs, zs+1, xs+1, . . . , zs+r, xs+r〉,
where s = n−k−r and the vectors xi, zi in F2nq satisfy the relations 〈xi|xj〉s = 0 = 〈zi|zj〉s
and 〈xi|zj〉s = δi,j . These relations on xi, zi imply that
C⊥s = 〈z1, . . . , zs, zs+r+1, xs+r+1, . . . , zs+r+k, xs+r+k〉,
D = C ∩ C⊥s = 〈z1, . . . , zs〉,
D⊥s = 〈z1, . . . , zs, zs+1, xs+1, . . . , zn, xn〉.
Lemma VI.2. An Fq-linear [[n, k, r > 0, d ≥ 2]]q Clifford subsystem code exactly pure to
1 can be punctured to an Fq-linear [[n− 1, k, r − 1,≥ d]]q code.
Proof. As mentioned above, we can associate to the subsystem code two classical codes
C,D ⊆ F2nq . Two cases arise depending on swt(D).
a) If swt(D) = 1, then without loss of generality we can assume that swt(z1) = 1. Further,
z1 can be taken to be of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0|a, 0, . . . , 0). And for i 6= 1, because of Fq-
linearity of the codes we can pick all xi, zi to be of the form (0, a2, . . . , an|b1, b2, . . . , bn).
Further, as xi, zi must satisfy the orthogonality relations with z1 viz., 〈z1|zi〉s = 0 =
〈z1|xi〉s, for i > 1 we can choose xi, zi to be of the form (0, a2, . . . , an|0, b2, . . . , bn). It
follows that because of the form of xi and zi puncturing the first and n+ 1th coordinate
will not alter these orthogonality relations, in particular 〈ρ(xi)|ρ(zi)〉s 6= 0 for s+ 1 ≤
i ≤ n.
Letting ρ(xi) = x′i, ρ(zi) = z′i and observing that ρ(z1) = (0, . . . , 0|0, . . . , 0), we
see that the code ρ(C) = 〈z′2, . . . , z′s, z′s+1, x′s+1, . . . , z′s+r, x′s+r〉. Denoting by Dp =
ρ(C) ∩ ρ(C)⊥s it is immediate that Dp is generated by {z′2, . . . , z′s} while D⊥sp =
〈z′2, . . . , z′s, z′s+1, x′s+1, . . . , z′n, x′n〉. Hence ρ(C) defines an [[n−1, k, r, swt(D⊥sp \ρ(C))]]q
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code.
Next we show that swt(D⊥sp \ ρ(C)) ≥ d. Let u = (a2, . . . , an|b2, . . . , bn) be in D⊥sp \
ρ(C), then we can easily verify that (0, a2, . . . , an|0, b2, . . . , bn) is orthogonal to all zi,
1 ≤ i ≤ s and hence it is in D⊥s . It cannot be in C as that would imply that u is in ρ(C).
But swt(D⊥s \C) ≥ d. Therefore swt(u) ≥ d. and ρ(C) defines an [[n− 1, k, r,≥ d]]q
code. By choosing C ′ = 〈z′2, . . . , z′s, z′s+1, z′s+2, x′s+2, . . . , z′s+r, x′s+r〉 we can conclude
that there exists an [[n−, k, r − 1, d]]q code. Alternatively, apply Theorem 16 in [6].
b) If swt(D) > 1, then we can assume that swt(zs+1) = 1 and form the code C ′ =
〈z1, . . . , zs, zs+1, zs+2, xs+2, . . . , zs+r, xs+r〉. It is clear that C ′ defines an [[n, k, r −
1, d]]q code that is pure to 1 with swt(C ′ ∩ C ′⊥s) = 1. But this is just the previous
case, from which we can conclude that there exists an [[n− 1, k, r − 1,≥ d]]q code.
Lemma VI.2 allows us to establish a bound for distance 2 codes which can then be
used to prove the bound for arbitrary distances.
Lemma VI.3. An impure Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d = 2]]q Clifford subsystem code satisfies
k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d = 2]]q impure subsystem code such
that k + r > n− 2d+ 2; in particular, this code must be pure to 1. By Lemma VI.2 it can
be punctured to give an [[n − 1, k, r − 1,≥ d]]2 subsystem code. If this code is pure, then
k+ r−1 ≤ n−1−2d+2 holds, contradicting our assumption k+ r > n−2d+2; hence,
the resulting code is once again impure and pure to 1.
Now we repeatedly apply Lemma VI.2 to puncture the shortened codes until we get
an [[n − r, k, 0,≥ d]]q subsystem code. But this is a stabilizer code which must obey the
Singleton bound k ≤ n−r−2d+2, contradicting our initial assumption k+r > n−2d+2.
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Therefore, we can conclude that k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2.
If the codes are of distance greater than 2, then we puncture the code until it either
has distance 2 or it is a pure code. The following result tells us how the parameters of the
subsystem codes vary on puncturing.
Lemma VI.4. An impure Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d ≥ 3]]q Clifford subsystem code exactly pure
to d′ ≥ 2 implies the existence of an Fq-linear [[n− 1, k, r+ 1,≥ d− 1]]q subsystem code.
Proof. Recall that the existence of an [[n, k, r, d ≥ 3]]q subsystem code implies the exis-
tence of Fq-linear codes C and D such that
C = 〈z1, . . . , zs, zs+1, xs+1, . . . , zs+r, xs+r〉,
with s = n− k − r, and D = C ∩ C⊥s , see above.
The stabilizer code defined by D satisfies k+r = n−s ≤ n−2d′+2, or equivalently
s ≥ 2d − 2; it follows that s ≥ 2, since d′ ≥ 2. Without loss of generality, we can
take z1 to be of the form (1, a2, . . . , an|b1, b2 . . . , bn) for if no such codeword exists in D,
then (0, 0, . . . , 0|1, 0, . . . , 0) is contained in D⊥s , contradicting the fact that swt(D⊥s) ≥ 2.
Consequently, we can choose z2 in D to be of the form (0, c2, . . . , cn|1, d2, . . . , dn), and we
may further assume that b1 = 0 in z1. The form of z1 and z2 allows us to assume that any
remaining generator of C is of the form (0, u2, . . . , un|0, v2, . . . , vn).
Let ρ be the map defined by puncturing the first and (n+1)th coordinate of a vector in
C. Define for all i the punctured vectors x′i = ρ(xi) and z′i = ρ(zi). Then one easily checks
that 〈ρ(xi) | ρ(xj)〉s = 0 = 〈ρ(zi) | ρ(zj)〉s for all indices i and j, and 〈ρ(xi) | ρ(zj)〉s =
δi,j if i ≥ s+ 1 or j ≥ 3, and that 〈ρ(z1) | ρ(z2)〉s = −1.
Let us look at the punctured code ρ(C),
ρ(C) = 〈z′3, . . . , z′s, z′s+1, x′s+1, . . . , z′s+r, x′s+r, z′1, z′2〉.
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Since 〈ρ(z1) | ρ(z2)〉s = −1 we have Dp = ρ(C) ∩ ρ(C)⊥s = 〈z′3, . . . , z′s〉, whence
|Dp| = |D|/q2. As swt(C) ≥ 2, it follows that |ρ(C)| = |C|. Thus ρ(C) defines an
[[n− 1, k, r + 1, swt(D⊥sp \ ρ(C))]]q subsystem code.
Recall that the code D is generated by s ≥ 2 vectors; we will show next that our
assumptions actually force s ≥ 3. Indeed, if s = 2, then |D| = q2 and |D⊥s| = q2n−2.
Under the assumption swt(D⊥s) ≥ 2, it follows that |ρ(D⊥s)| = |D⊥s | = q2n−2. But as
ρ(D⊥s) ⊆ F2n−2q this implies that ρ(D⊥s) = F2n−2q . Since F2n−2q has 2n − 2 independent
codewords of symplectic weight one, D⊥s must have 2n − 2 independent codewords of
symplectic weight two. However, this contradicts our assumptions on the minimum dis-
tance of the subsystem code:
(a) If C is a proper subspace of D⊥s , then the minimum distance d is given by d =
swt(D⊥s \ C) ≥ 3; thus, the weight 2 vectors must all be contained in C, which
shows that |C| = q2n−2 = |D|, contradicting |C| < |D⊥s |.
(b) If C = D⊥s , then the minimum distance is given by d = swt(D⊥s) = 2, contradicting
our assumption that d ≥ 3.
Thus, from now on, we can assume that s ≥ 3.
Before bounding the minimum distance of the punctured subsystem code, we are go-
ing to show that D⊥sp = ρ(D⊥s). Let w = (u1, u2, . . . , un|v1, v2, . . . , vn) be a vector in
D⊥s . For 3 ≤ i ≤ s, the vectors zi are of the form (0, a2, . . . , an|0, b2, . . . , bn); thus,
it follows from 〈w|zi〉s = 0 that 〈ρ(w)|z′i〉s = 0. Hence ρ(w) is in D⊥sp , which implies
ρ(D⊥s) ⊆ D⊥sp . We have |D⊥sp | = q2n−2/|Dp| = q2n/|D| = |D⊥s|, and we note that
|D⊥s | = |ρ(D⊥s)|, because swt(D⊥s) ≥ 2; hence, D⊥sp = ρ(D⊥s).
Let w′ = (u2, . . . , un|v2, . . . , vn) be an arbitrary vector in ρ(D⊥s) \ ρ(C). It follows
that there exist some α, β in Fq such that w = (α, u2, . . . , un|β, v2, . . . , vn) is in D⊥s ; it is
clear that w cannot be in C, since then ρ(w) = w′ would be in ρ(C); hence, swt(w) ≥ d. It
immediately follows that swt(D⊥sp \ρ(C)) ≥ d−1. Hence ρ(C) defines an [[n−1, k, r+1,≥
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d− 1]]q subsystem code.
Now we are ready the prove the upper bound for an arbitrary subsystem code. Essen-
tially we reduce it to a pure code or distance two code by repeated puncturing and bound
the parameters by carefully tracing the changes.
Theorem VI.5. An Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d ≥ 2]]q Clifford subsystem code satisfies
k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2. (6.1)
Proof. The bound holds for all pure codes, see [6]. So assume that the code is impure. If
d = 2, then the relation holds by Lemma VI.3; so let d ≥ 3. If the code is exactly pure to
1, then it can be punctured using Lemma VI.2 to give an [[n − 1, k, r − 1, d′ = d]]q code,
otherwise it can be punctured using Lemma VI.4 to obtain an [[n−1, k, r+1, d′ ≥ d−1]]q
code. If the punctured code is pure, then it follows that either k+ r−1 ≤ n−1−2d+2 or
k+ r+1 ≤ n− 1− 2d′+2 ≤ n− 1− 2(d− 1)+ 2 holds; in both cases, these inequalities
imply that k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2.
If the resulting code is impure, then if it is exactly pure to 1 we puncture the code
again using Lemma VI.2, if not we puncture using Lemma VI.4, until we get a pure code
or a code with distance two. Assume that we punctured i times using Lemma VI.2 and j
times using Lemma VI.4, then the resulting code is an [[n− i− j, k, r+ j− i, d′ ≥ d− j]]q
subsystem code. Since pure subsystem codes and distance 2 subsystem codes satisfy
k + r + j − i ≤ n− i− j − 2d′ + 2 ≤ n− i− j − 2(d− j) + 2,
it follows that k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2 holds.
When the subsystem codes are over a prime alphabet, this bound holds for all codes
over that alphabet. In the more general case where the code is not linear, numerical evidence
indicates that it is unlikely that the additive subsystem codes have a different bound. We
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have shown that a large class of impure codes already satisfy this bound. This prompts the
following conjecture.
Conjecture VI.6. Any [[n, k, r, d]]q Clifford subsystem code satisfies k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2.
B. Comparing Subsystem Codes with Stabilizer Codes
In this section, we compare stabilizer codes with subsystem codes. We first need to es-
tablish the criteria for the comparison, since subsystem codes cannot be universally better
than stabilizer codes. For example, it is known that a subsystem code can be converted to
a stabilizer code [100, 120]. See also Lemma 10 in [6] for a simple proof to convert an
[[n, k, r, d]]q code to an [[n, k, d]]q code. This implies that no [[n, k, r, d]]q subsystem code
can beat an optimal [[n, k, d′]]q stabilizer code in terms of minimum distance, as d′ ≥ d.
One of the attractive features of subsystem codes is a potential reduction of the number of
syndrome measurements, and we use this criterion as the basis for our comparison.
First, we must highlight a subtle point on the required number of syndrome bits for an
Fq-linear [n, k, d]q code. A complete decoder, will require n− k syndrome bits. Complete
decoders are also optimal decoders. A bounded distance decoder on the other hand can
potentially decode with fewer syndrome bits. Bounded distance decoders typically decode
up to ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋. However, to the best of our knowledge, except for the lookup table
decoding method, all bounded distance decoders also require n− k syndrome bits. As the
complexity of decoding using a lookup table increases exponentially in n − k it is highly
impractical for long lengths. We therefore assume that for practical purposes, that we need
n− k syndrome bits.
Similarly, for an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d]]q subsystem code, a complete decoder will re-
quire n−k−r syndrome measurements, as is shown in E. We are not aware of any quantum
code, stabilizer or subsystem, for which there exists a bounded distance decoder that uses
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less than n − k − r syndrome measurements to perform bounded distance decoding. The
work by Poulin [120] prompts the following question: Given an optimal [[k+2d−2, k, d]]q
MDS stabilizer code, is it possible to find an [[n, k, r, d]]q subsystem code that uses fewer
syndrome measurements?
There exist numerous known examples of subsystem codes that improve upon nonop-
timal stabilizer codes. The fact that the stabilizer code is assumed to be optimal makes this
question interesting. The Singleton bound k + r ≤ n− 2d+ 2 of an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d]]q
subsystem code implies that the number n− k − r of syndrome measurements is bounded
by n−k− r ≥ 2d− 2; thus, for fixed minimum distance d, there exists a trade off between
the dimension k and the difference n− r between length and number of gauge qudits.
Corollary VI.7. Under complete decoding an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d ≥ 2]]q Clifford subsys-
tem code cannot use fewer syndrome measurements than an Fq-linear [[k + 2d− 2, k, d]]q
stabilizer code.
Proof. Seeking a contradiction, we assume that there exists an [[n, k, r, d]]q subsystem code
that requires fewer syndrome measurements that the optimal [[k + 2d − 2, k, d]]q MDS
stabilizer code. In other words, the number of syndrome measurement yield the inequality
k+2d− 2− k > n− k− r, which is equivalent to k+ r > n− 2d+2, but this contradicts
the Singleton bound.
Poulin [120] showed by exhaustive computer search that there does not exist an [[5, 1, r >
0, 3]]2 subsystem code. The above result confirms his computer search and shows fur-
ther that not even allowing longer lengths and more gauge qudits can help in reducing the
number of syndrome measurements. In fact, we conjecture that corollary VI.7 holds for
bounded distance decoders also.
We wish to caution the reader that gains in error recovery cannot be quantified purely
by the number of syndrome measurements. In practice, more complex measures such as
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the simplicity of the decoding algorithm or the resulting threshold in fault-tolerant quantum
computing are more relevant. The drawback is that the comparison of large classes of codes
becomes unwieldy when such complex criteria are used.
C. Subsystem Codes on a Lattice
Bacon gave the first family of subsystem codes generalizing the ideas of Shor’s [[9, 1, 3]]2
code [18]. Recently, he and Casaccino gave another construction which generalizes this
further by considering a pair of classical codes [19]. We show that this method is a special
case of Theorem V.13. Since this construction is not limited to binary codes and our proofs
remain essentially the same, we will immediately discuss a generalization to nonbinary
alphabets.
Theorem VI.8. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Ci ⊆ Fniq be Fq-linear codes with the parameters
[ni, ki, di]q. Then there exists a Clifford subsystem code with the parameters
[[n1n2, k1k2, (n1 − k1)(n2 − k2),min{d1, d2}]]q
that is pure to dp = min{d⊥1 , d⊥2 }, where d⊥i denotes the minimum distance of C⊥i .
Proof. Let C be the classical linear code given by C = (Fn1q ⊗ C⊥2 ) × (C⊥1 ⊗ Fn2q ). Then
dimC = n1(n2 − k2) + n2(n1 − k1) and swt(C \ {0}) ≥ min{d⊥1 , d⊥2 }. The symplectic
dual of C is given by
C⊥s = (C⊥1 ⊗ Fn2q )⊥ × (Fn1q ⊗ C⊥2 )⊥
= (C1 ⊗ Fn2q )× (Fn1q ⊗ C2).
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We have dimC⊥s = k1n2 + n1k2. The code D = C ∩ C⊥s is given by
D =
(
(Fn1q ⊗ C⊥2 )× (C⊥1 ⊗ Fn2q )
) ∩ ((C1 ⊗ Fn2q )× (Fn1q ⊗ C2))
=
(
(Fn1q ⊗ C⊥2 ) ∩ (C1 ⊗ Fn2q )
)× ((C⊥1 ⊗ Fn2q ) ∩ (Fn1q ⊗ C2))
= (C1 ⊗ C⊥2 )× (C⊥1 ⊗ C2),
and dimD = k1(n2−k2)+k2(n1−k1). It follows that dimC−dimD = 2(n1−k1)(n2−k2)
and dimC⊥s − dimD = 2k1k2. Using corollary V.13, we can get a subsystem code with
the parameters
[[n1n2, k1k2, (n1 − k1)(n2 − k2), d = swt(D⊥s \ C)]]q
that is pure to dp = min{d⊥1 , d⊥2 }. It remains to show that d = min{d1, d2}.
Since D = (C1 ⊗ C⊥2 )× (C⊥1 ⊗ C2), we have
D⊥s = (C⊥1 ⊗ C2)⊥ × (C1 ⊗ C⊥2 )⊥
=
(
(C1 ⊗ Fn2q ) + (Fn1q ⊗ C⊥2 )
)× ((Fn1q ⊗ C2) + (C⊥1 ⊗ Fn2q )) .
In the last equality, we used the fact that vectors u1 ⊗ u2 and v1 ⊗ v2 are orthogonal if and
only if u1 ⊥ v1 or u2 ⊥ v2.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, let Gi and Hi respectively denote the generator and parity check matrix
of the code Ci. Without loss of generality, we may assume that these matrices are in
standard form
Hi =
[
Ini−ki Pi
]
and Gi =
[
−P ti Iki
]
,
where P ti is the transpose of Pi. Let Hci =
[
0 Iki
]
. Using these notations, the generator
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matrices of C and D⊥s can be written as
GC =

 In1 ⊗H2 0
0 H1 ⊗ In2

 and GD⊥s =


G1 ⊗Hc2 0
In1 ⊗H2 0
0 Hc1 ⊗G2
0 H1 ⊗ In2


.
It follows that the minimum distance d is given by
swt(D⊥s \ C) = min

wt


〈
G1 ⊗Hc2
In1 ⊗H2
〉
\
〈
In1 ⊗H2
〉 ,
wt


〈
Hc1 ⊗G2
H1 ⊗ In2
〉
\
〈
H1 ⊗ In2
〉

 .
Let us compute
wt


〈
Hc1 ⊗G2
H1 ⊗ In2
〉
\
〈
H1 ⊗ In2
〉 .
If minimum weight codeword is present in D⊥s \ C, it must be expressed as linear combi-
nation of at least one row from [Hc1 ⊗G2] otherwise the codeword is entirely in C. Recall
that H1 = [ In1−k1 P1 ] and H
c
1 = [ 0 Ik1 ]. Letting P1 = (pij), we can write

 Hc1 ⊗G2
H1 ⊗ In2

 =


0 0 . . . 0 G2 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 G2 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . . . . G2
In2 0 . . . 0 p11In2 . . . . . . p1k1In2
0 In2 . . . . . . p21In2 . . . . . . p2k1In2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . In2 p(n1−k1)1In2 . . . . . . p(n1−k1)k1In2


.
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Now observe that any row below the line in the above matrix can has a weight of only one
in each of the last k1 blocks of size n2. And any linear combination of them involving less
than d2 and at least one generator from the rows above must have a weight ≥ d2. If on the
other hand there are more than d2 rows involved, then the first n2(n1 − k1) columns will
have a weight ≥ d2. Thus in either case the weight of an element that involves a generator
from [Hc1 ⊗G2] must have a weight ≥ d2. On the other hand, the minimum weight of the
span of [Hc1 ⊗G2] is wt(C2) = d2, from which we can conclude that
wt


〈
Hc1 ⊗G2
H1 ⊗ In2
〉
\
〈
H1 ⊗ In2
〉 = d2.
Because of the symmetry in the code we can argue that
wt


〈
G1 ⊗Hc2
In1 ⊗H2
〉
\
〈
In1 ⊗H2
〉 = d1
and consequently d = min{d1, d2}, which proves the theorem.
1. Bacon-Shor Codes
Bacon [18] proposed one of the first families of subsystem codes based on square lattices.
A trivial modification using rectangular lattices instead of square ones gives the following
codes, see also [19]. The relevance of these codes will be seen later in Section D. Using
the same notation as in Theorem VI.8, let Gi = [1, . . . , 1]1×i and Hi be the matrix defined
125
as
Hi =


1 1
1 1
.
.
.
1 1
1 1


i−1×i
and C, the additive code generated by the following matrix.
G =

 In1 ⊗Hn2 0
0 Hn1 ⊗ In2

 .
Observe that Gi generates an [i, 1, i]q code with distance i. By Theorem VI.8, Gn1 and Gn2
will give us the following family of codes
Corollary VI.9. There exist [[n1n2, 1, (n1− 1)(n2− 1),min{n1, n2}]]q Clifford subsystem
codes.
D. Subsystem Codes and Packing
We investigate whether subsystem codes lead to better codes because of the decomposition
of the code space. Since the early days of quantum codes, it has recognized that the degen-
eracy of quantum codes could lead to a more efficient quantum code and allow for a much
more compact packing of the subspaces in the Hilbert space. But so far it has not been
shown for stabilizer codes. We can derive similar bound for subsystem codes. [6] showed
the following theorem for pure subsystem codes.
Theorem VI.10. A pure ((n,K,R, d))q Clifford subsystem code satisfies
⌊(d−1)/2⌋∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(q2 − 1)j ≤ qn/KR. (6.2)
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It is natural to ask if impure subsystem codes also satisfy this bound. We show that
they do not by giving an explicit counterexample. This counter example comes from the
codes proposed by [18]. Recall the Bacon-Shor codes are [[n2, 1, (n − 1)2, n]]2 subsystem
codes. The [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 is an interesting code. We can check that it satisfies the Singleton
bound for subsystem codes as
k + r = 1 + 4 = n− 2d+ 2 = 9− 6 + 2.
So it is an optimal code. More interestingly, substituting the parameters of the [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2
Bacon-Shor code in the above inequality we get
1∑
j=0
(
9
j
)
3j = 28 > 29−5 = 16.
Therefore the [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 Bacon-Shor code beats the quantum Hamming bound for the
pure subsystem codes proving the following result.
Theorem VI.11. There exist impure ((n,K,R, d))q Clifford subsystem codes that do not
satisfy
⌊(d−1)/2⌋∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(q2 − 1)j ≤ qn/KR.
An obvious question is why impure codes can potentially pack more efficiently than
the pure codes. Let us understand this by looking at the [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 code a little more
closely. This code encodes information into a subspace, Q where dimQ = 2k+r = 25.
As it is a subsystem code Q can be decomposed as Q = A ⊗ B, with dimA = 2k = 2
and dimB = 2r = 24. In a pure single error correcting code all single errors must take
the code space into orthogonal subspaces. In an impure code this is not required two or
more distinct errors can take the code space to the same orthogonal space. In the Bacon-
Shor code a phase flip error on any of the first three qubits will take the code space to
same orthogonal subspace and because of this we cannot distinguish between these errors.
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However, it is not a problem because we can restore the code space with respect to A even
though we cannot restore B. Thus instead of requiring 9 orthogonal subspaces as in a pure
code, we only require 3 orthogonal subspaces to correct for any single phase flip error.
Considering the bit flip errors and the combinations we need only 9 orthogonal subspaces.
Thus with the original code space this means we need to pack ten 25-dimensional subspaces
in the 2n = 29 dimensional ambient space, which is achievable as 10 · 25 < 29.
More generally, in a sense degeneracy allows distinct errors to share the same orthog-
onal subspace and thus pack more efficiently. It must be pointed out though that this better
packing is attained at the cost of r gauge qudits compared to a stabilizer code.
In fact there exists another code among the Bacon-Shor codes which also beats the
Hamming bound for the subsystem codes. This is the [[25, 1, 16, 5]]2 code. The family of
codes given in corollary VI.9 provides us with [[12, 1, 6, 3]]2, yet another example of a code
that beats the quantum Hamming bound like the [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 code. We can check that
1∑
j=0
(
12
j
)
3j = 37 > 212−1−6 = 25 = 32.
But note that unlike [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 this code does not meet the Singleton bound for pure
subsystem codes as 6 + 1 < 12 − 6 + 2. Naturally we can ask if there is a systematic
method to construct codes that beat the quantum Hamming bound. Ashikhmin and Litsyn
showed that all binary stabilizer codes – pure or impure – of sufficiently large length obey
the quantum Hamming bound, ruling out the possibility that impure codes of large length
can outperform pure codes with respect to sphere packing. In contrast we show that impure
subsystem codes do not obey the quantum Hamming bound for pure subsystem codes,
not even asymptotically. We show that there exist arbitrarily long Bacon-Shor codes that
violate the quantum Hamming bound.
Degenerate quantum error-correcting codes pose many interesting questions in the
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theory of quantum error-correction. The early discovery of the phenomenon of degeneracy
raised the question whether degenerate quantum codes can perform better than nondegen-
erate quantum codes. One of the unresolved questions to this day in the theory of stabilizer
codes is whether the bounds that hold for nondegenerate codes also hold for degenerate
codes. Some bounds like the quantum Singleton bound do. But for others, like quantum
Hamming bound, an answer remains elusive. Partial answers were provided by Gottes-
man [61] for single error-correcting and double error-correcting codes. Ashikhmin and
Litsyn [12] showed that asymptotically degenerate codes cannot beat the quantum Ham-
ming bound. This leaves only a small range of degenerate binary stabilizer codes of mod-
erate length that can potentially beat the quantum Hamming bound, but we conjecture that
no such examples can be found.
We show that the situation is markedly different in the case of subsystem codes (also
known as operator quantum error-correcting codes [94, 99, 100]). The quantum Hamming
for pure subsystem codes was derived in [6]. We have already shown that there exist
impure subsystem codes that beat the quantum Hamming bound for pure subsystem codes.
Now we address the question whether impure subsystem codes asymptotically obey the
quantum Hamming bound, as in the case of binary stabilizer codes. We show that there
exist impure subsystem codes of arbitrarily large length that beat the quantum Hamming
(or sphere-packing) bound.
For the binary cases the quantum Hamming bound for subsystem codes states that a
pure [[n, k, r, d]] subsystem code satisfies
2n−k−r ≥
⌊(d−1)/2⌋∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
3j. (6.3)
We claim that all the Bacon-Shor codes [18,19] of odd lengths i.e., [[(2t+1)2, 1, 4t2, 2t+1]]
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violate the quantum Hamming bound, namely that
2(2t+1)
2−1−4t2 = 24t 6≥
t∑
j=0
(
(2t+ 1)2
j
)
3j
holds for all positive integers t. It suffices to show that
24t <
(
(2t+ 1)2
t
)
3t (6.4)
holds for all positive integers t. Since 0 < 4(t− 1/6)2 + 8/9 = 4t2 − 4t/3 + 1, we have
16t
3
< 4t2 + 1 + 4t
for all t > 0. Multiplying both sides by 3/t and raising to the tth power yields
24t <
3t(2t+ 1)2t
tt
,
which proves the inequality (6.4), as (n
k
) ≥ ntk−t. Thus, we can conclude that the Bacon-
Shor codes of odd length do not obey the quantum Hamming bound.
Theorem VI.12. Asymptotically, the quantum Hamming bound (6.3) does not hold for
impure subsystem codes.
It is remarkable that there exist such families of subsystem codes that can pack more
densely than any pure subsystem code. Further examples of such densely packing sub-
system codes can be found among the family with parameters [[n1n2, 1, (n1 − 1)(n2 −
1),min{n1, n2}]], which contains for instance a [[12, 1, 6, 3]] subsystem code.
E. Conclusions
We have proved that any Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d]]q Clifford subsystem code obeys the Single-
ton bound k + r ≤ n − 2d + 2. Furthermore, we have shown earlier that pure Clifford
subsystem codes satisfy this bound as well. Our results provide much evidence for the
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conjecture that the Singleton bound holds for arbitrary subsystem codes. Proving this for
all additive subsystem codes will be an interesting problem.
Pure Clifford subsystem codes obey the Hamming (or sphere packing) bound. In
this chapter, we have shown the amazing fact that there exist impure Clifford subsystem
codes beating the Hamming bound. This is the first illustration of a case when impure
codes pack more efficiently than their pure counterparts. One example of a code beating
the Hamming bound is provided by the [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 Bacon-Shor code; this remarkable
example also illustrates the following noteworthy facts:
a) The [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 code requires 9 − 1 − 4 = 4 syndrome measurements just like the
perfect [[5, 1, 3]]2 code.
b) Since k + r ≤ n − 2d + 2 for all prime alphabet codes, [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 code is also an
optimal subsystem code. This is interesting because the underlying classical codes are
not MDS. In MDS stabilizer codes, the underlying classical codes are required to be
MDS codes.
c) The Bacon-Shor code is also impure. So unlike MDS stabilizer codes which must be
pure, MDS subsystem codes can be impure.
d) The maximal length of a q-ary stabilizer MDS code is 2q2 − 2, see Theorem IV.25
whereas for subsystem codes it is larger as the [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 code indicates.
The implication of b)–d) is that optimal subsystem codes can be derived from suboptimal
classical codes, unlike stabilizer codes. It would be an interesting problem to determine
what are the conditions under which a non-MDS classical code will lead to an MDS sub-
system code.
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CHAPTER VII
ENCODING AND DECODING OF SUBSYSTEM CODES
A. Introduction
In this chapter we investigate encoding and to some extent decoding of subsystem codes.
Our main result is that encoding of a subsystem code can be reduced to the encoding of
a related stabilizer code, thereby making use of the previous theory on encoding stabilizer
codes [42,61,73]. We shall prove this in two steps. First, we shall show that Clifford codes
can be encoded using the same methods used for stabilizer codes. Secondly, we shall show
how these methods can be adapted to encode Clifford subsystem codes. Since subsys-
tem codes subsume stabilizer codes, noiseless subsystems and decoherence free subspaces,
these results imply that we can essentially use the same methods to encode all these codes.
In fact, while the exact details were not provided it was suggested in [121] that encoding
of subsystem codes can be achieved by Clifford unitaries. Our treatment is comprehensive
and gives proofs for all the claims.
Subsystem codes can potentially lead to simpler error recovery schemes. In a similar
vein, they can also simplify the encoding process, though perhaps not as dramatically∗.
These simplifications have not been investigated thoroughly, neither have the gains in en-
coding been fully characterized. Essentially, these gains are in two forms. In the encoded
state there need not exist a one to one correspondence between the gauge qubits and the
physical qubits. However, prior to encoding such a correspondence exists. We can exploit
this identification between the virtual qubits and the physical qubits before encoding to
tolerate errors on the gauge qubits, a fact which was recognized in [121]. Alternatively,
∗In general, decoding is usually of greater complexity than encoding and for this reason
it is often neglected in comparison. This parallels the classical case where also the decoding
is studied much more extensively than encoding.
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we can optimize the encoding circuits by eliminating certain encoding operations. The en-
coding operations that are saved correspond to the encoded operators on the gauge qubits.
This is a slightly subtle point and will be elaborated at length subsequently. We argue that
optimizing the encoding circuit for the latter is much more beneficial than simply allowing
for random initialization of gauge qubits.
Notation. The inner product of two characters of a group N , say χ and θ, is defined
as (χ, θ)N = 1/|N |
∑
n∈N χ(n)θ(n
−1). We shall denote the center of a group N by Z(N).
Given a subgroup N ≤ E, we shall denote the centralizer of N in E by CE(N). Given a
matrixA, we consider another matrixB obtained fromA by column permutation π as being
equivalent and denote this by B =pi A. Often we shall represent the basis of a group by the
rows of a matrix. In this case we will regard another basis obtained by any row operations
or permutations as being equivalent and by a slight abuse of notation continue to denote
B =pi A. The commutator of two operatorsA, B is defined as [A,B] = AB−BA. This can
potentially conflict with our definition of commutator in Chapter V as [x, y] = xyx−1y−1.
However, in this chapter we will not have occasion to use this definition.
B. Encoding Stabilizer Codes – A Review
Recall the Pauli matrix operators†,
X =

 0 1
1 0

 , Z =

 1 0
0 −1

 , Y =

 0 −1
1 0

 = XZ. (7.1)
Let Pn be the Pauli group on n qubits. An element element e = (−1)cXa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
XanZbn in Pn, can be mapped to F2n2 by τ : Pn → F2n2 as
τ(e) = (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn). (7.2)
†We consider the real version of the Pauli group in this chapter.
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Given an [[n, k, d]]2 code with stabilizer S, we can associate to S (and therefore the
code), a matrix in F(n−k)×2n2 obtained by taking the image of any set of its generators under
the mapping τ . We shall refer to this matrix as the stabilizer matrix. We shall refer to
the stabilizer as well as any set of generators as the stabilizer. Additionally, because of
the mapping τ , we shall refer to the stabilizer matrix or any matrix obtained from it by
row reduction or column permutations also as the stabilizer. The stabilizer matrix can be
put in the so-called “standard form”, see [42, 61]. This form also allows us to compute
the encoded operators for the stabilizer code. Recall that the encoded operators allow us
to perform computations on the encoded data without having to decode the data and then
compute.
Definition VII.1 (Encoded operators). Given a [[n, k, d]]2 stabilizer code with stabilizer S,
let X i, Zi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k be a set of 2k linearly independent operators in CPn(S)\SZ(Pn).
The operators X i, Zi are said to be encoded operators for the code if they satisfy the
following requirements.
i) [X i, Xj] = 0
ii) [Zi, Zj] = 0
iii) [X i, Zj] = 2δijX iZi
The operators X i and Zj are referred to as encoded or logical X and Z operators
on the ith and jth logical qubits, respectively. The choice of which of the 2k linearly
independent elements of CPn(S) \ SZ(Pn) we choose to call encoded X operators and Z
operators is arbitrary; as long as the generators satisfy the conditions above, any choice
is valid. Different choices lead to different sets of encoded logical states; alternatively, a
different orthonormal basis for the codespace.
Lemma VII.2 (Standard form of stabilizer matrix [42, 61]). Up to a permutation π, the
134
stabilizer matrix of an [[n, k, d]]2 code can be put in the following form,
S =pi

 Is′ A1 A2 B 0 C
0 0 0 D In−k−s′ E

 , (7.3)
while the associated encoded operators can be derived as
 Z
X

 =pi

 0 0 0 At2 0 Ik
0 Et Ik C
t 0 0

 . (7.4)
Remark VII.3. Encoding using essentially same ideas is possible even if the identity ma-
trices Is′ in the stabilizer matrix or Ik in the encoded operators are replaced by upper
triangular matrices.
The standard form of the stabilizer matrix prompts us to distinguish between two types
of the generators for the stabilizer as they affect the encoding in different ways (although it
can be shown that they are of equivalent complexity).
Definition VII.4 (Primary generators). A generator Gi = (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) with at
least one nonzero ai is called a primary generator.
In other words, primary generators contain at least oneX or Y operator on some qubit.
The primary generators determine to a large extent the complexity of the encoding circuit
along with the encoded X operators. The operators X are also called seed generators and
they also figure in the encoding circuit. The encoded Z operators do not.
Definition VII.5 (Secondary generators). A generator of the form (0, . . . , 0|b1, . . . , bn) is
called secondary generator.
In the standard form encoding, the complexity of the encoded X operators is deter-
mined by the secondary generators. Therefore they indirectly contribute‡ to the complexity
‡Indirect because the submatrix E, figures in both the secondary generators, see equa-
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of encoding. We mentioned earlier that different choices of the encoded operators
amounts to choosing different orthonormal basis for the codespace. However, the choice in
Lemma VII.2 is particularly suitable for encoding. We can represent our input in the form
|0〉⊗n−k |α1 . . . αk〉 which allows us to make the identification that |0〉⊗
n
is mapped to
∣∣0〉,
the logical all zero code word. This state is precisely the state stabilized by the stabilizer
generators and logical Z operators, (which in Lemma VII.2 can be seen to be consisting
of only Z operators). Given the stabilizer matrix in the standard form and the encoded
operators as in Lemma VII.2, the encoding circuit is given as follows.
Lemma VII.6 (Standard form encoding stabilizer codes [42, 61]). Let S be the stabilizer
matrix of an [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code in the standard form i.e., as in equation (7.3). Let
Gi denote the ith primary generator of S and Xj denote the jth encoded X operator as in
equation (7.4). Then these operators are in the form§
Gi = (0, 0, . . . , 1, ai+1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bs′ , 0, . . . , 0, bn−k+1, . . . , bn),
Xj = (0, . . . , 0, cs′+1, . . . , cn−k0, . . . , 0, 1 = cn−k+j, 0, . . . , 0|d1, . . . , ds′ , 0, . . . , 0).
To encode the stabilizer code we implement the following circuits corresponding to each of
the primary generators and the encoded operators. The generator Gi is implemented after
Gi+1. The encoded operators precede the primary generators in their implementation but
tion (7.3), and also the encoded X operators, see equation (7.4).
§We allow some freedom in the primary generators, in that instead of Is′ in equa-
tion (7.3), we allow it be an upper triangular matrix also.
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we can implement Xj before or after Xj+1.
|0〉1 . . .
.
.
.
. . .
|0〉i . . . H •
|0〉i+1 . . . Xai+1Zbi+1
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
|0〉s′ . . . Xas′Zbs′
|0〉s′+1 Xcs′+1 . . . Xas′+1Zbs′+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
|0〉n−k Xcn−k . . . Xan−kZbn−k
|ψ1〉 . . . Xan−k+1Zbn−k+1
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
|ψj〉 • . . . Xan−k+jZbn−k+j
.
.
.
. . . .
.
.
_ _ _ _ _





























_ _ _ _ _
|ψk〉 . . . XanZbn
︸ ︷︷ ︸Xj Gi
To encode a stabilizer code, we first put the stabilizer matrix in the standard form,
then implement the seed generators i.e., the encoded X operators, followed by the primary
generators i = s′ to i = 1 as per Lemma VII.6. The complexity of encoding the ith primary
generator is at most n− i two qubit gates and one H gate. The complexity of encoding an
encoded operator is at most n−k−s′ CNOT gates. This means the complexity of standard
form encoding is upper bounded by (2n− 1−k− s′)s′/2 two qubit gates and s′ Hadamard
gates; O(n(n − k)) gates. A minor modification ( [66]) must be incorporated when Y is
defined as Y = [ 0 −ii 0 ] as the following example illustrates. See [67] for more examples.
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Example VII.7. Consider the [[5, 1, 3]] code with following stabilizer, with Y = [ 0 −ii 0 ].
S =


X I X X X
I X Z X Y
Z I Z Z Z
I Z Y Z X


The associated stabilizer matrix is given by
S =


1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0


Writing S in standard form we get
S =


1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1


=


Y Z I X Z
I X Z X Y
Z Z X I Y
Z I Z Z Z


=


G1
G2
G3
G4


.
The encoded operators for this code are
 Z
X

 =

 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0

 .
In addition to following the procedure described in Lemma VII.6, one must throw in a P
gate, for every Y on the diagonal of the stabilizer (in standard form). The encoding circuit
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is given by
|0〉 H • P
|0〉 H • Z
|0〉 H • Z
|0〉 X X X
|ψ〉 • Y Y Z
X
_ _ _







_ _ _
G3
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C. Encoding Clifford Codes
In this section, we show that a Clifford code can be encoded using its stabilizer and there-
fore the methods used for encoding stabilizer codes are applicable. So that this chapter
can be read independently of Chapter V, we briefly recapitulate some facts about Clifford
subsystem codes. Let E be an abstract error group i.e., it is a finite group with a faithful
irreducible unitary representation ρ of degree |E : Z(E)|1/2. Denote by φ, the irreducible
character afforded by ρ. Let N be a normal subgroup of E. Further, let χ be an irreducible
character χ of N such that (φN , χ)N > 0. Then the Clifford code defined by (E, ρ,N, χ)
is the image of the orthogonal projector
P =
χ(1)
|N |
∑
n∈N
χ(n−1)ρ(n). (7.5)
Under certain conditions we can construct a subsystem code from the Clifford code,
in particular when E is the extraspecial p-group, the Clifford code C has a tensor product
decomposition¶ as C = A⊗B, where B is an irreducible CN -module, A is an irreducible
CL-module and L = CE(N). In this case we can encode information only into the sub-
system A, while the co-subsystem B provides additional protection. When encoded this
way we say C is a Clifford subsystem code. The normal subgroup N consists of all errors
¶Strictly speaking the equality should be replaced by an isomorphism.
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in E that act trivially on A. It is also called the gauge group of the subsystem code. Our
main goal will be to show how to encode into the subsystem A. Therefore, our interest will
center on the projectors for the Clifford code and the subsystem code and not so much on
the parameters of the codes themselves.
An alternate projector for a Clifford code with data (E, ρ,N, χ) can be defined in
terms of Z(N), the center of N . The proof of this can be found in [88, Theorem 6]. This
projector is given as
P ′ =
1
|Z(N)|
∑
n∈Z(N)
ϕ(n−1)ρ(n), (7.6)
where ϕ is an irreducible character of Z(N), that satisfies (χ ↓ Z(N))(x) = χ(1)ϕ(x). In
this case Q can be thought of as a stabilizer code in the sense of [35] i.e.
ρ(m) |ψ〉 = ϕ(m) |ψ〉 for any m in Z(N). (7.7)
In addition to the assumption that the error group is an extraspecial p-group we also assume
that Z(E) ≤ N . The inclusion of the center of E does not change the code but helps in
analysis. Thus we have the following lemma.
Lemma VII.8. Let (E, ρ,N, χ) be the data of a Clifford code and ϕ an irreducible charac-
ter of Z(N), the center of N , satisfying (χ ↓ Z(N))(x) = χ(1)ϕ(x). If E is an extraspe-
cial p-group, then for all n in Z(N), ϕ(n) ∈ {ζk | ζ = ej2pik/p, 0 ≤ k < p}. Further, if
Z(E) ≤ N , then for any n ∈ Z(N), we have ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) ∈ ρ(Z(N)).
Proof. First we note that the irreducibilty of ρ implies that for any z in Z(E) we have
ρ(z) = ωI for some ω ∈ C by Schur’s lemma. The assumption that E is an extraspecial
p-group forces ω ∈ {ζk | 0 ≤ k < p} where ζ = ej2pi/p. This is because |Z(E)| = p for
extraspecial p-groups. Secondly, we observe that ϕ is an irreducible additive character of
Z(N) (an abelian subgroup of an extraspecial p-group) which implies that we must have
140
ϕ(n) = ζ l for some 0 ≤ l < p, [103]. Together these observations imply that we can
assume ϕ(n−1)I = ζ lI = ρ(z) for some 0 ≤ l ≤ p and z ∈ Z(E). Since Z(E) ≤ N , it
follows that Z(E) ≤ Z(N) and ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) is in ρ(Z(N)).
Our goal is to use the stabilizer of Q for encoding and as a first step we will show that
it can be computed from Z(N). The usefulness of such a projector is that it obviates the
need to know the character ϕ. Let S ≤ ρ(E) be the stabilizer of Q. Then we claim that S
is given as
S = {ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) | n ∈ Z(N)}.
We claim that S can be used for encoding the associated Clifford code. Then we will show
how the encoding circuit of the Clifford code is to be modified so that we can encode the
subsystem code derived from the Clifford code.
Theorem VII.9. Let Q be a Clifford code with the data (E, ρ,N, χ) and ϕ a constituent of
the restriction of χ to Z = Z(N). Let E be an extraspecial p-group and Z(E) ≤ N and
S =
{
ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) | n ∈ Z(N)} and P = 1|S|∑
s∈S
s. (7.8)
Then S is the stabilizer of Q and Im P = Q.
Proof. We will show this in a series of steps.
1) First we will show that S ≤ ρ(Z). By Lemma VII.8 we know that ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) is
in ρ(Z), therefore S ⊆ ρ(Z). For any two elements n1, n2 ∈ Z, we have s1 =
ϕ(n−11 )ρ(n1), s2 = ϕ(n
−1
2 )ρ(n2) ∈ S and we can easily verify that s−11 s2 = ϕ(n1)ρ(n−11 )
ϕ(n−12 )ρ(n2) = ϕ(n
−1
2 n1)ρ(n
−1
1 n2) ∈ S, as ρ(n−11 n2) is in ρ(Z). Hence S ≤ ρ(Z).
2) Now we show that S fixes Q. Let s ∈ S and |ψ〉 ∈ Q. Then s = ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) for some
n ∈ Z. The action of s on |ψ〉 is given as s |ψ〉 = ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) |ψ〉 = ϕ(n−1)ϕ(n) |ψ〉 =
|ψ〉, in other words S fixes Q.
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3) Next, we show that |S| = |Z|/|Z(E)|. If two elements n1 and n2 in Z map to the same
element in S, then ϕ(n−11 )ρ(n1) = ϕ(n−12 )ρ(n2), that is ρ(n2) = ϕ(n−11 n2)ρ(n1). From
Lemma VII.8 it follows that ρ(n2) = ζ lρ(n1) for some 0 ≤ l < p. Since ρ(Z(E)) =
{ej2pik/pI | 0 ≤ k < p}, we must have n2 = zn1 for some z ∈ Z(E). Thus, |S| =
|Z|/|Z(E)|.
4) Let T be a traversal of Z(E) in Z, then every element in Z can be written as zt for some
z ∈ Z(E) and t ∈ T . From step 3) we can see that all elements in a coset of Z(E) in Z
map to the same element in S, therefore,
S = {ϕ(t−1)ρ(t) | t ∈ T}.
Recall that a projector for Q is given by
P ′ =
1
|Z|
∑
n∈Z
ϕ(n−1)ρ(n),
=
1
|Z|
∑
t∈T
∑
z∈Z(E)
ϕ((zt)−1)ρ(zt).
But we know from step 3) that if z ∈ Z(E), then ϕ(n−1)ρ(n) = ϕ((zn)−1)ρ(zn). So
we can simplify P ′ as
P ′ =
1
|Z|
∑
t∈T
∑
z∈Z(E)
ϕ(t−1)ρ(t),
=
|Z(E)|
|Z|
∑
t∈T
ϕ(t−1)ρ(t)
=
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
s = P.
Thus the projector defined by S is precisely the same as P ′ and P is also a projector for
Q.
From step 3) it is clear that S ∩ Z(E) = {1} and by Lemma III.10, S is a closed subgroup
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of E. By Lemma III.9, Im P = Q is a stabilizer code. Hence S is the stabilizer of Q.
Corollary VII.10. Let Q be an [[n, k, r, d]] Clifford subsystem code and S its stabilizer.
Let
P =
1
|S|
∑
s∈S
s. (7.9)
Then P is a projector for the subsystem code ı.e. Q = Im P .
Proof. By [90, Theorem 4], we know that an [[n, k, r, d]] Clifford subsystem code is de-
rived from a Clifford code with data (E, ρ,N, χ). This construction assumes that E is an
extraspecial p-group and Z(E) ≤ N E E. Since as subspaces the Clifford code and sub-
system code are identical, by Theorem VII.9 we conclude that the projector defined from
the stabilizer of the subspace is also a projector for the subsystem code.
Theorem VII.9 shows that any Clifford code can be encoded using its stabilizer. As
to a subsystem code, while Corollary VII.10 shows that there exists a projector that can
be defined from its stabilizer, it is not clear how to use it so that one respects the subsys-
tem structure during encoding. More precisely, how do we use the projector defined in
Corollary VII.10 to encode into the information carrying subsystem A and not the gauge
subsystem. This will be the focus of the next section.
D. Encoding Subsystem Codes
For ease of presentation and clarity henceforth we will focus on binary codes, though the
results can be extended to nonbinary alphabet using methods similar to stabilizer codes,
see [73]. Theorem VII.9 shows that in order to encode Clifford codes we can use a projector
derived from the underlying stabilizer to project onto the codespace. But in case of Clifford
subsystem codes we know that Q = A⊗B and the information is to be actually encoded in
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A. Hence, it is not sufficient to merely project onto Q, we must also show that we encode
into A when we encode using the projector defined in Corollary VII.10.
Let us clarify what we mean by encoding the information in A and not in B. Suppose
that P maps |0〉 to |ψ〉A ⊗ |0〉B and |1〉 to |ψ〉A ⊗ |1〉B . Then the information is actually
encoded into B. Since the gauge group acts nontrivially on B, this particular encoding does
not protect information. Of course a subsystem code should not encode (only) into B, but
we have to show that the projector defined by P in equation 7.9 does not do that.
We need the following result on the structure of the gauge group and the encoded
operators of a subsystem code. Poulin [120] proved a useful result on the structure of the
gauge group and the encoded operators of the subsystem code. But first a little notation. A
basis for Pn is Xi, Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where Xi and Zi are given as
Xi =
n⊗
j=1
Xδij and Zi =
n⊗
j=1
Zδij .
They satisfy the relations [Xi, Xj] = 0 = [Zi, Zj]; [Xi, Zj] = 2δijXiZj . However, we can
choose other generating sets {xi, zi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} for Pn that satisfy similar commutation
relations i.e., [xi, xj] = 0 = [zi, zj] and [xi, zj] = 2δijxizj . These operators may act
nontrivially on many qubits. Given an [[n, k, r, d]] code we could view the state space of the
physical n qubits as that of n virtual qubits on which these xi, zi act as X and Z operators.
In particular k of these virtual qubits are the logical qubits and r of them gauge qubits. The
usefulness of these operators is that we can specify the structure of the stabilizer, the gauge
group and the encoded operators. The following lemma makes this specification precise.
Lemma VII.11. Let Q be an [[n, k, r, d]]2 subsystem code with gauge group, G and sta-
bilizer S. Denote the encoded operators by X i, Z i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, where [X i, Xj] = 0 =
[Zi, Zj]; [X i, Zj] = 2δijX iZj . Then there exist operators {xi, zi ∈ Pn | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} such
that
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i) S = 〈z1, z2, . . . , zs〉,
ii) G = 〈S, zs+1, xs+1, . . . , zs+r, xs+r, Z(Pn)〉,
iii) CPn(S) = 〈G,X1, Z1, . . . , . . . , Xk, Zk〉,
iv) X i = xs+r+i and Zi = zs+r+i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
where [zi, zj] = [xi, xj] = 0; [xi, zi] = 2δijxizi. Further, S defines an [[n, k + r]] stabilizer
code encoding into the same space as the subsystem code and its encoded operators are
given by {xs+1, zs+1, . . . , xs+r, zs+r, X1, Z1, . . . , Xk, Zk}
Proof. See [120] for proof on the structure of the groups. Let Q = A⊗B, then dimA = 2k
and dimB = 2r. From Corollary VII.10 we know that the projector defined by S also
projects onto Q (which is 2k+r-dimensional) and therefore it defines an [[n, k+r]] stabilizer
code. From the definition of the operators xi, zi and X i, Z i and the fact that
CPn(S) = 〈S, xs+1, zs+1, . . . , xs+r, zs+rX1, Z1, . . . , Xk, Zk, Z(Pn)〉
we see that xi, zi, for s + 1 ≤ i ≤ r act like encoded operators on the gauge qubits,
while X i, Z i continue to be the encoded operators on the information qubits. Together they
exhaust the set of 2(k + r) encoded operators of the [[n, k + r]] stabilizer code.
We observe that the logical operators of the subsystem code are also logical operators
for the underlying stabilizer code. so if the stabilizer code and the subsystem code have
the same logical all zero state, then Lemma VII.11 suggests that in order to encode the
subsystem code, we can treat it as stabilizer code and use the same techniques to encode.
If the logical all zero code word was the same for both the codes, then because they have
the same logical operators we can encode any given input to the same logical state in both
cases. Using linearity we could then encode any arbitrary state. Encoding the all zero state
seems to be the key. Now, even in the case of the stabilizer codes, there is no unique all
zero logical state. There are many possible choices. The reader can refer to the appendix
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for examples. Given the encoded operators it is easy to define the logical all zero state as
the following definition shows:
Definition VII.12. A logical all zero state of an [[n, k, r, d]] subsystem code is any state
that is fixed by its stabilizer and k logical Z operators.
This definition is valid in case of stabilizer codes also. This definition might appear a
little circular. After all, we seem to have assumed the definition of the logical Z operators.
Actually, this is a legitimate definition because, depending on the choice of our logical op-
erators, we can have many choices of the logical all zero state. In case of the subsystem
codes, this definition implies that the logical all zero state is fixed by n− r operators, con-
sequently it can be any state in that 2r-dimensional subspace. If we consider the [[n, k+ r]]
stabilizer code that is associated to the subsystem code, then its logical zero is additionally
fixed by r more operators. So any logical zero of the stabilizer code is also a logical all zero
state of the subsystem code. It follows that if we know how to encode the stabilizer code’s
logical all zero, we know how to encode the subsystem code. We are interested in more
than merely encoding the subsystem code of course. We also want to leverage the gauge
qubits to simplify and/or make the encoding process more robust. Perhaps a few examples
will clarify the ideas.
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1. Illustrative Examples
Consider the following [[4, 1, 1, 2]]2 subsystem code, with the gauge group G, stabilizer S
and encoded operators given by L.
S =

 X X X X
Z Z Z Z

 =

 z1
z2

 ,
G =


X X X X
Z Z Z Z
I X I X
I I Z Z


=


z1
z2
x3
z3


.
The encoded operators of this code are given by
L =

 I I X X
I Z I Z

 =

 X1
Z1

 .
The associated [[4, 2]] stabilizer code has the following encoded operators.
T =


I X I X
I I X X
I I Z Z
I Z I Z


=


x3
X1
z3
Z1


.
It will be observed that the encoded X operators of [[4, 2]] are in a form convenient for
encoding. We treat the [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code as [[4, 2]] code and encode it as in Figure 1. The
gauge qubits are permitted to be in any state.
Assuming g = a |0〉+ b |1〉, the logical states up to a normalizing constant are
∣∣0〉 = a(|0000〉+ |1111〉) + b(|0101〉+ |1010〉),∣∣1〉 = a(|0011〉+ |1100〉) + b(|0110〉+ |1001〉).
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|0〉 H •
|g〉 • 
|ψ〉 • 
|0〉   
Fig. 1. Encoding the [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code (Gauge qubits can be in any state)
It can be easily verified that S stabilizes the above state and while the gauge group acts
in a nontrivial fashion, the resulting states are still orthogonal. In this example we have
encoded as if we were encoding the [[4, 2]] code. Prior to encoding the gauge qubits can be
identified with physical qubits. After the encoding however such a correspondence between
the physical qubits and gauge qubits does not necessarily exist in a nontrivial subsystem
code. Since the encoded operators of the subsystem code are also encoded operators for
the stabilizer code, we are guaranteed that the information is not encoded into the gauge
subsystem.
As the state of gauge qubits is of no consequence, we can initialize them to any state.
Alternatively, if we initialized them to zero, we can simplify the circuit as shown in Fig-
ure 2.
|0〉 H •
|0〉 
|ψ〉 • 
|0〉  
Fig. 2. Encoding the [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code (Gauge qubits initialized to zero)
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The encoded states in this case are (again, the normalization factors are ignored)
∣∣0〉 = |0000〉+ |1111〉 ,∣∣1〉 = |0011〉+ |1100〉 .
The benefit with respect to the previous version is that at the cost of initializing the gauge
qubits, we have been able to get rid of all the encoded operators associated with them.
This seems to be a better option than randomly initializing the gauge qubits. Because it is
certainly easier to prepare them in a known state like |0〉, rather than implement a series of
controlled gates depending on the encoded operators associated with those qubits.
At this point we might ask if it is possible to get both the benefits of random initial-
ization of the gauge qubits as well as avoid implementing the encoded operators associated
with them. To answer this question let us look a little more closely at the previous two
encoding circuits for the subsystem codes. We can see from them that it will not work in
general. Let us see why. If we initialize the gauge qubit to |1〉 instead of |0〉 in the encoding
given in Figure 2, then the encoded state is
∣∣0〉 = |0100〉+ |1011〉 ,∣∣1〉 = |0111〉+ |1000〉 .
Both these states are not stabilized by S, indicating that these states are not in the code
space.
In general, an encoding circuit where it is simultaneously possible initialize the gauge
qubits to random states and also avoid the encoded operators is likely to be having more
complex primary generators. For instance, let us consider the following [[4, 1, 1, 2]] sub-
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system code:
S =

 X Z Z X
Z X X Z

 =

 z1
z2

 ,
G =


X Z Z X
Z X X Z
Z I X I
I Z Z I


=


z1
z2
x3
z3


.
The encoded operators of this code are given by
L =

 I Z I X
Z I I Z

 =

 X1
Z1

 .
The associated [[4, 2]] stabilizer code has the following encoded operators.
T =


Z I X I
I Z I X
I Z Z I
Z I I Z


=


x3
X1
z3
Z1


.
The encoding circuit for this code is given in Figure 3.
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H • Z
|g〉 X Z
|ψ〉 Z X
Fig. 3. Encoding [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code (Encoded operators for the gauge qubits are trivial and
gauge qubits can be initialized to random states)
In this particular case, the gauge qubits (as well as the information qubits) do not
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require any additional encoding circuitry. In this case we can initialize the gauge qubits to
any state we want. But, the reader would have observed we did not altogether end up with
a simpler circuit. The primary generators are two as against one and the complexity of the
encoded operators has been shifted to them. So even though we were able to get rid of the
encoded operator on the gauge qubit and also get the benefit of initializing it to a random
state, this is still more complex compared to either of encoders in Figures 1 and 2. Our
contention is that it is better to initialize the gague qubits to zero state and not implement
the encoded operators associated to them.
2. Encoding Subsystem Codes by Standard Form Method
The previous two examples might lead us to conclude that we can take the stabilizer of
the given subsystem code and form the encoded operators by reducing the stablizer to its
standard form and encode as if it were a stabilizer code. However, there are certain subtle
points to be kept in mind. When we form the encoded operators we get k + r encoded
operators; we cannot from the stabilizer alone conclude which are the encoded operators
on the information qubits and which on the gauge qubits. Put differently, these operators
belong to the space CPn(S) \ S = GCPn(G) \ SZ(Pn). It is not guaranteed that they
are entirely in CPn(G) i.e., we cannot say if they act as encoded operators on the logical
qubits. This implies that in general all these operators act nontrivially on both A and B.
Consequently, we must be careful in choosing the encoded operators and the gauge group
must be taken into account. We give two slightly different methods for encoding subsystem
codes. The difference between the two methods is subtle. Both methods require the gauge
qubits to be initialized to zero. In the second method (see Algorithm 2) however, we can
avoid the encoded operators associated to them. Under certain circumstances, we can also
permit initialization to random states.
Correctness of Algorithm 1. Since stabilizer SA ≥ S, the space stabilized by SA is a
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Algorithm 1 ENCODING SUBSYSTEM CODES – STANDARD FORM METHOD 1
Require: Gauge group, G = 〈S, xs+1, zs+1, . . . , xs+r, zs+r,±I〉 and stabilizer, S =
〈z1, . . . , zn−k−r〉 of the [[n, k, r, d]] subsystem code.
Ensure: [xi, xj] = [zi, zj] = 0; [xi, zj] = 2xiziδij
1: Form SA = 〈S, zs+1, . . . , zs+r〉, where s = n− k − r
2: Compute the standard form of SA as per Lemma VII.2
SA =pi

 Is′ A1 A2 B 0 C
0 0 0 D Is+r−s′ E


3: Compute the encoded operators X1, . . . , Xk as
 Z
X

 =pi

 0 0 0 At2 0 Ik
0 Et Ik C
t 0 0


4: Encode using the primary generators of SA and X i as encoded operators, see
Lemma VII.6; all the other (n− k) qubits are initialized to |0〉.
subspace of the A ⊗ B, the subspace stabilized by S. As |SA|/|S| = 2r, the dimension of
the subspace stabilized by SA is 2k+r/2r = 2k. Additionally, the generators zs+1, . . . , zs+r
act trivially on A. The encoded operators as computed in the algorithm act nontrivially on
A and give 2k orthogonal states; thus we are assured that the information is encoded into
A.
Let us encode the [[9, 1, 4, 3]] Bacon-Shor code using the method just proposed. The
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stabilizer and the gauge group are given by
S =


X X X I I I X X X
I I I X X X X X X
Z I Z Z I Z Z I Z
I Z Z I Z Z I Z Z


,
G =


X X X I I I X X X
I I I X X X X X X
Z I Z Z I Z Z I Z
I Z Z I Z Z I Z Z
I X I I X I I I I
I I X I I X I I I
I I I I I X I I X
X X X X X X I I I
Z I Z I I I I I I
I I I Z I Z I I I
I Z Z I I I I I I
I I I I Z Z I I I


=


S
Gx
Gz

 .
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Let us form SA by augmenting S with Gz. Then
SA =


X X X I I I X X X
I I I X X X X X X
Z I Z Z I Z Z I Z
I Z Z I Z Z I Z Z
Z I Z I I I I I I
I I I Z I Z I I I
I Z Z I I I I I I
I I I I Z Z I I I


.
The encoded X and Z operators are X7X8X9 and Z1Z4Z7, respectively. After putting SA
in the standard form, and encoder for this code is given in Figure 4.
|0〉 H •
|0〉 
|0〉 
|0〉 H •
|0〉 
|0〉 
|0〉   
|0〉   
|ψ〉 •  
Fig. 4. Encoder for the [[9, 1, 4, 3]] code. This is also an encoder for the [[9, 1, 3]] code.
If on the other hand we had formed SA by adding Gx instead, then SA would have
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been
SA =


X I I I I I X I I
I X I I X I I X I
I I X I I X I I X
I I I X I I X I I
I I I I X I I X I
I I I I I X I I X
Z I Z Z I Z Z I Z
I Z Z I Z Z I Z Z


.
The encoded operators remain the same. In this case the encoding circuit is given in Fig-
ure 5. This circuit has fewer CNOT gates, though the number of single qubit gates has
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H •
|0〉   
|0〉   
|ψ〉 •  
Fig. 5. Encoder for the [[9, 1, 4, 3]] code with fewer CNOT gates.
increased. Since we expect the implementation of the CNOT gate to be more complex than
the H gate, this might be a better choice. In any case, this demonstrates that by exploiting
the gauge qubits one can find ways to reduce the complexity of encoding circuit.
The gauge qubits provide a great degree of freedom in encoding. We consider the
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following variant on standard form encoding, where we try to minimize the the number
of primary generators. This is not guaranteed to reduce the overall complexity, since that
is determined by both the primary generators and the encoded operators. Fewer primary
generators might usually imply encoded operators with larger complexity. In fact we have
already seen, that in the case of [[9, 1, 4, 3]]2 code that a larger number of primary generators
does not necessarily imply higher complexity. However, it has the potential for lower
complexity.
Algorithm 2 ENCODING SUBSYSTEM CODES – STANDARD FORM METHOD 2
Require: Gauge group, G = 〈S, xs+1, zs+1, . . . , xs+r, zs+r,±I〉 and stabilizer, S =
〈z1, . . . , zn−k−r〉 of the [[n, k, r, d]] subsystem code.
Ensure: [xi, xj] = [zi, zj] = 0; [xi, zj] = 2xiziδij
1: Compute the standard form of S as per Lemma VII.2
S =pi1

 Is′ A1 A2 B 0 C
0 0 0 D Is−s′ E


2: Form SA = 〈S, zs+1, . . . , zs+r〉, where s = n− k − r
3: Compute the standard form of SA as per Lemma VII.2
SA =pi2

 Il F1 F2 G1 0 G2
0 0 0 D′ Is+r−l H


4: Compute the encoded operators X1, . . . , Xk as
 Z
X

 =pi2

 0 0 0 F t2 0 Ik
0 H t Ik G
t
2 0 0


5: Encode using the primary generators of S and X i as encoded operators, accounting for
π1 and π2, see Lemma VII.6; all the other (n− k) qubits are initialized to |0〉.
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The main difference in the second method comes in lines 1 and 5. We encode using
the primary generators of the stabilizer of the subsystem code instead of the augmented
stabilizer. The encoded operators however remain the same as before.
Correctness of Algorithm 2. The correctness of this method lies in the observation
we made earlier (see discussion following Definition VII.12), that any logical all zero state
of the stabilizer code is also a logical all zero of the subsystem code and the fact that both
share the encoded operators on the encoded qubits.
The encoded operators are given modulo the elements of the gauge group as in Algo-
rithm 1, which implies that the their action might be nontrivial on the gauge qubits. The
benefit of the second method is when S and SA have different number of primary genera-
tors. The following aspects of both the methods are worth highlighting.
1) The gauge qubits must be initialized to |0〉 in both methods.
2) In Algorithm 1, the number of primary generators of S and SA can be different leading
to a potential increase in complexity compared to encoding with S.
3) In both methods, the encoded operators as computed are modulo SA. Consequently, the
encoded operators might act nontrivially on the gauge qubits.
3. Encoding Subsystem Codes by Conjugation Method
The other benefit of subsystem codes is the random initialization of the gauge qubits. We
now give circuits where we can encode the subsystem codes to realize this benefit. But
instead of using the standard form method we will use the conjugation method proposed by
Grassl et al., [73] for stabilizer codes. After briefly reviewing this method we shall show
how it can be modified for encoding subsystem codes.
The conjugation encoding method can be understood as follows. It is based on the idea
that the Clifford group acts transitively on the Pauli error group. It is possible to transform
the stabilizer matrix of any [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code into the matrix (00|In−k0). For a code
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with this stabilizer matrix the encoding is trivial. We simply map |ψ〉 to |0〉⊗n−k |ψ〉. The
associated encoded X and Z operators are given by (0Ik|00) and (00|0Ik) respectively.
Here we give a sketch of the method for the binary case, the reader can refer to [73] for
details. Assume that the stabilizer matrix is given by S. Then we shall transform it into
(00|In−k0) using the following sequence of operations.
(X|Z) 7→ (In−k0|0) 7→ (00|In−k0). (7.10)
This can be accomplished through the action of H = [ 1 11 −1 ], P = [ 1 00 i ] and CNOT gates on
the Pauli group under conjugation. The action ofH on the ith qubit of (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn)
transforms it as
(a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) Hi7→ (a1, . . . ,bi, . . . , an|b1, . . . , ai, . . . , bn). (7.11)
These modified entries have been highlighted for convenience. The phase gate P on the ith
qubit transforms (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) as
(a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) Pi7→ (a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an|b1, . . . , ai + bi, . . . , bn). (7.12)
We denote the CNOT gate with the control on the ith qubit and the target on the jth qubit
by CNOTi,j . The action of the CNOTi,j gate on (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn) is to transform it to
(a1, . . . , aj−1, aj + ai, aj+1 . . . , an|b1, . . . , bi−1,bi + bj, bi+1, . . . , an). (7.13)
Note that the jth entry is changed in the X part while the ith entry is changed in the Z part.
For example, consider
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0|0, 1, 1, 0, 0) CNOT1,47→ (1, 0, 0,0, 0|0, 1, 1, 0, 0),
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0|0, 1, 1, 1, 0) CNOT1,47→ (1, 0, 0,0, 0|1, 1, 1, 1, 0).
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Based on the action of these three gates we have the following lemmas to transform error
operators.
Lemma VII.13. Assume that we have a error operator of the form (a1, . . . , an|b1, . . . , bn).
Then we apply the following gates on the ith qubit to transform the stabilizer, transforming
(ai, bi) to (α, β) as per the following table.
(ai, bi) Gate (α, β)
(0,0) I (0,0)
(0,1) H (1,0)
(1,0) I (1,0)
(1,1) P (1,0)
Let x¯ denote 1 + x, then the transformation to (a1, . . . , an|0, . . . , 0) is achieved by
n⊗
i=1
H a¯ibiP aibi .
For example, consider the following generator (1, 0, 0, 1, 0|0, 1, 1, 1, 0). This can be
transformed to (1, 1, 1, 1, 0|0, 0, 0, 0, 0) by the application of I ⊗H ⊗H ⊗ P ⊗ I .
Lemma VII.14. Let e be an error operator of the form (a1, . . . , ai = 1, . . . , an|0, . . . , 0).
Then e can be transformed to (0, . . . , 0, ai = 1, 0, . . . , 0|0, . . . , 0) by
n∏
j=1,i6=j
[
CNOTi,j
]aj .
As an example (1, 1, 1, 1, 0|0, 0, 0, 0, 0) can be transformed to (0, 1, 0, 0, 0|0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
by
CNOT2,1 · CNOT2,3 · CNOT2,4.
The first step involves making the Z portion of the stabilizer matrix all zeros. This is
achieved by single qubit operations consisting of H and P performed on each row one by
one.
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Note that we must also modify the other rows of the stabilizer matrix according to the
action of the gates applied.
Once we have a row of stabilizer matrix in the form (a|0), where a is nonozero we can
transform it to the form (0, . . . , 0, ai = 1, 0, . . . , 0|0) by using CNOT gates. Thus it is easy
to transform (X|Z) to (In−k0|0) using CNOT, P and H gates. The final transformation
to (0|In−k0) is achieved by using H gates on the first n − k qubits. At this point the
stabilizer matrix has been transformed to a trivial stabilizer matrix which stabilizes the
state |0〉⊗n−k |ψ〉. The encoded operators are (0Ik|0) and (0|0Ik). Let T be the sequence
of gates applied to transform the stabilizer matrix to the trivial stabilizer matrix. Then T
applied in the reverse order to |0〉⊗n−k |ψ〉 gives the encoding circuit for the stabilizer code.
Now we shall use this method to encode the subsystem codes. The main difference is
that instead of considering just the stabilizer we need to consider the entire gauge group.
Let the gauge group be G = 〈S,GZ , GX〉, where GZ = 〈zs+1, . . . , zs+r〉, and GX =
〈xs+1, . . . , xs+r〉. The idea is to transform the gauge group as follows.
G =


S
GZ
GX

 7→


0 0 0 Is 0 0
0 0 0 0 Ir 0
0 Ir 0 0 0 0

 . (7.14)
At this point the gauge group has been transformed to a group with trivial stabilizer and
trivial encoded operators for the gauge qubits and the encoded qubits. The sequence of
gates required to achieve this transformation in the reverse order will encode the state
|0〉⊗s |φ〉 |ψ〉. The state |φ〉 corresponds to the gauge qubits and it can be initialized to
any state, while |ψ〉 corresponds to the input.
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Algorithm 3 ENCODING SUBSYSTEM CODES – CONJUGATION METHOD
Require: Gauge group, G = 〈S,GZ , GX〉, where GZ = 〈zs+1, . . . , zs+r〉, and GX =
〈xs+1, . . . , xs+r〉 and stabilizer, S = 〈z1, . . . , zn−k−r〉 of the [[n, k, r, d]] subsystem
code.
Ensure: [xi, xj] = [zi, zj] = 0; [xi, zj] = 2xiziδij
1: Assume that G is the following form
G =


S
GZ
GX


2: for all i = 1 to s+ r do
3: Transform zi to z′i = (a1, . . . , an|0, . . . , 0) using Lemma VII.13
4: Transform z′i to (0, . . . , ai = 1, . . . , 0|0) using Lemma VII.14
5: Perform Gaussian elimination on column i for rows j > i
6: end for
7: Apply H gate on each qubit i = 1 to i = s+ r
8: for all i = s+ 1 to s+ r do
9: Transform xi to x′i = (a1, . . . , an|0, . . . , 0) using Lemma VII.13
10: Transform x′i to (0, . . . , ai = 1, . . . , 0|0) using Lemma VII.14
11: Perform Gaussian elimination on column i for rows j > i
12: end for
In the above algorithm, we assume that whenever a row is transformed according to
Lemma VII.13 or VII.14, all the other rows are also transformed according to the transfor-
mation applied.
Correctness of Algorithm 3. The correctness of the algorithm is straightforward. As
G has full rank of n− k + r, for each row of G, we will be able to find some nonzero pair
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(a, b) so that the the transformation in lines 2–6 can be achieved. When S and GZ are in
the form (0|Is+r0), the rows in GX are in the form[
0 A B 0 0 D
]
.
The zero columns of GX are consequence of the requirement to satsify the commutation
relations with (transformed) S and GZ . For instance, The first n−k−r are all zero because
they must commute with (0|Is0), the elements of the transformed stabilizer. The submatrix
A must have rank r, otherwise at this point one of the rows of GX commutes with all the
rows of GZ and the condition that we have there are r hyperbolic pairs is violated. It is
possible therefore to transform A to the form (0Ir0|0). It cannot be any other form because
then we would not have the r hyperbolic pairs. The applied transformations transform G to
the form given in equation (7.14). The encoded operators for this gauge group are clearly
(0Ik|0) and (0|0Ik). We conclude with a simple example that illustrates the process.
Example VII.15. To compare with the standard form method, we consider the [[4, 1, 1, 2]]
code again. Let the gauge group G, stabilizer S and encoded operators given by L.
S =

 X X X X
Z Z Z Z

 =

 z1
z2

 ,
G =


X X X X
Z Z Z Z
I I Z Z
I X I X


=


z1
z2
x3
z3


.
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In matrix form G can be written as
G =


1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0


.
The transformations consisting of T1 = CNOT1,2CNOT1,3CNOT1,4 followed by T2 = I ⊗
H ⊗H ⊗H maps G to
T17→


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0


T27→


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1


.
Now transform the second row using T3 = CNOT2,3CNOT2,4. Then transform using T4 =
CNOT4,3. We get
T37→


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


T47→


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


.
Applying T5 = H ⊗H ⊗ I ⊗H gives us
T57→


0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


.
We could have chosen T5 = H ⊗ H ⊗ I ⊗ I , since the effect of H on the fourth qubit is
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trivial. The complete circuit is given in Figure 6.
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H • H 
|ψ〉   H 
|g〉 H •  H 
Fig. 6. Encoding [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code by conjugation method
By switching the target and control qubits of the CNOT gates in T3 and T4 we can
show that this circuit is equivalent to the circuit shown in Figure 7.
|0〉 H •
|0〉   
|ψ〉 H • • 
|g〉  • 
_ _ _ _ _









_ _ _ _ _
Fig. 7. Encoding [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code by conjugation method
It is instructive to compare this circuit with the one given earlier in Figure 1. The
dotted lines show the additional circuitry. Since the gauge qubit can be initialized to any
state, we can initialize |g〉 to |0〉, which then gives the following logical states for the code.
∣∣0〉 = |0000〉+ |1111〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉 , (7.15)∣∣1〉 = |0000〉+ |1111〉 − |0011〉 − |1100〉 . (7.16)
It will be observed that IIXX acts as the logical Z operator while IZIZ acts as the
logical X operator. We could flip these logical operators by absorbing the H gate into |ψ〉.
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If we additionally initialize |g〉 to |0〉, we will see that the two CNOT gates on the second
qubit can be removed. The simplified circuit is shown in Figure 8.
|0〉 H •
|0〉 
|ψ〉 • 
|0〉  
Fig. 8. Encoding [[4, 1, 1, 2]] code by conjugation method – optimized
This is precisely, the same circuit that we had arrived earlier in Figure 2 using the
standard form method.
The preceding example provides additional evidence in the direction that it is better to
initialize the gauge qubits to zero and avoid the encoding operators on them.
E. Syndrome Measurement for Nonbinary Fq-linear Codes
Decoding of nonbinary quantum codes has not been studied as well as binary codes. En-
coding of Fq-linear nonbinary quantum codes was investigated in [73]. The authors suggest
that the decoder is simply the encoder running backwards. In this context one important
task is that measuring the syndrome so that appropriate error correction maybe performed.
While binary codes have been well studied in this regard similar efforts have not been
invested in the nonbinary case. Here we give a method that allows us to measure the syn-
drome for Fq-linear nonbinary quantum codes. We also show that an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d]]q
code requires n − k − r syndrome measurements. But first we need the definition of the
following nonbinary gates, see [73].
i) X(a) |x〉 = |x+ a〉
ii) Z(b) |x〉 = ωtrq/p(bx) |x〉, ω = ej2pi/p
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iii) M(c) |x〉 = |cx〉 , c ∈ F×q
iv) F |x〉 = 1√
q
∑
y∈Fq ω
trq/p(xy) |y〉
v) A |x〉 |y〉 = |x〉 |x+ y〉
Graphically, these gates are represented below.
X(a) Z(b) c F •

i) ii) iii) iv) v)
Consider the following circuit.
|a〉 • |a〉
|y〉 g−1x  gx |y + agx〉
Alternatively, this circuit maps |a〉 |x〉 to |a〉X(agx) |y〉. Observe that this circuit effectively
applies X(agx) on the second qudit. Using the linearity, we can analyze the following
circuit.
|0〉 F •
|y〉 g−1x  gx
∑
α∈Fq |α〉 |y + αgx〉
The above circuit maps |0〉 |y〉 to ∑α∈Fq |α〉X(αgx) |y〉. Using the fact that FX(b)F † =
Z(b), we can show that the following circuit maps |b〉 |y〉 to |b〉Z(bgz) |y〉.
|b〉 • |b〉
|y〉 F † g−1z  gz F Z(bgz) |y〉
If we wanted to apply a general operator X(agx)Z(agz) to the second qudit conditioned on
the first one, then we can combine the previous circuits as follows.
|a〉 • • |a〉
|y〉 F † g−1z  gz F g−1x  gx X(agx)Z(agz) |y〉
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The above implementation is not optimal in terms of gates, but it will suffice for our pur-
poses. Consider an [[n, k, r, d]]q code. Let E be an error in Gn, (see 3.2). If E is detectable,
then E does not commute with some element(s) in the stabilizer of the code. Let
g = (gx|gz) = (0, . . . , 0, aj, . . . , an|0, . . . , 0, bj, . . . , bn) ∈ F2nq ,
where (aj, bj) 6= (0, 0), be a generator of the stabilizer. Then for all detectable errors
that do not commute with a multiple of g, the following circuit gives a nonzero value on
measurement.
|0〉 F • • F †
NM

|x1〉 . . . . . . . . .
|xj〉 F † b−1j  bj F a−1j  aj
. . . . . . . . .
|xn〉 F † b−1n  bn F a−1n  an
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _



























_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Note that whenever (ai, bi) = (0, 0), then we leave that qudit alone. Similarly if ai or bi
are zero, then we do not implement the corresponding portion. Let the input to the above
circuit be E |ψ〉, where |ψ〉 is an encoded state. It can be easily verified that the above
circuit maps the state |0〉E |ψ〉 to
∑
α∈Fq
F † |α〉X(αgx)Z(αgz)E |ψ〉 .
Let X(gx)Z(gz)E = ωtrq/p(t)EX(gx)Z(gz), where X(gx)Z(gz) is corresponding matrix
representation of g. By Lemma III.5. we have X(αgx)Z(αgz)E = ωtrq/p(αt)EX(gx)Z(gz).
167
Thus we can write
∑
α∈Fq
|α〉X(αgx)Z(αgz)E |ψ〉 =
∑
α∈Fq
|α〉ωtrq/p(αt)EX(αgx)Z(αgz) |ψ〉 ,
=

∑
α∈Fq
|α〉ωtrq/p(αt)

E |ψ〉 ,
where we have made use of the fact that X(αgx)Z(αgz) |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 as X(αgx)Z(αgz) is in
the stabilizer. The final state is given by
∑
α∈Fq
F † |α〉X(αgx)Z(αgz)E |ψ〉 =
∑
α∈Fq
F † |α〉ωtrq/p(αt)E |ψ〉 ,
=
∑
α∈Fq
∑
β∈Fq
ω− trq/p(αβ) |β〉ωtrq/p(αt)E |ψ〉 ,
=
∑
β∈Fq
|β〉
∑
α∈Fq
ωtrq/p(αt−αβ)E |ψ〉 ,
=
∑
β∈Fq
|β〉
∑
α∈Fq
ωtrq/p(αt−αβ)E |ψ〉 ,
= |t〉E |ψ〉 ,
where the last equality follows from the property of the characters of Fq. Next we ob-
serve that the error αE, where α ∈ Fq gives |αt〉 on measurement. Strictly speaking we
refer to the preimage of αE in Gn. Hence the syndrome qudit can take q different values.
Since every detectable error does not commute with some Fq-multiple of a stabilizer gen-
erator, we have the following lemma on the necessary and sufficient number of syndrome
measurements.
Lemma VII.16. Given an Fq-linear [[n, k, r, d]]q Clifford subsystem code, n − k − r syn-
drome measurements are required for decoding it completely.
Proof. Let g be a generator of the stabilizer of the subsystem code. By Theorem V.10 and
Lemma VI.1, for every generator g there exists at least one detectable error that does not
commute with g but commutes with all the other generators. This error can be detected only
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by measuring g. Thus we need to measure all the generators of the stabilizer, equivalently
n− k − r syndrome measurements must be performed.
Every correctable error takes the code space into a qk+r-dimensional orthogonal sub-
space in the qn-dimensional ambient space. Each of these errors will give a distinct syn-
drome. This implies that we can have qn−k−r distinct syndromes. Since each syndrome
measurement can have q possible outcomes and there are n− k− r generators, these mea-
surements are sufficient for performing error correction.
This parallels the classical case where an [n, k, d]q code requires n− k syndrome bits.
A subtle caveat must be issued to the reader. If we choose to perform bounded distance
decoding, then it maybe possible that the set of correctable errors can be distinguished by
a smaller number of syndrome measurements. But even in the case of (classical) bounded
distance decoding it is often the case that we need to measure all the syndrome bits.
F. Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the subsystem codes can be encoded using the
techniques used for stabilizer codes. In particular, we have considered two methods for en-
coding stabilizer codes – the standard form method and the conjugation method. While the
standard form method explored here required us to initialize the gauge qubits to zero, it ad-
mits two two variants and seems to have the potential for lower complexity; the exact gains
being determined by the actual codes under consideration. The conjugation method allows
us to initialize the gauge qubits to any state. The disadvantage seems to be the increased
complexity of encoding. It must be emphasized that the standard form method is equiv-
alent to the conjugation method and it is certainly possible to use this method to encode
subsystem codes so that the gauge qubits can be initialized to arbitrary states. However, it
appears to be a little more cumbersome and for this reason we have not investigated this in
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this chapter. There is yet another method for encoding stabilizer codes based on the tele-
portation due to Knill. We expect that gauge qubits can be exploited even in this method to
reduce its complexity. It would be interesting to investigate fault tolerant encoding schemes
for subsystem codes and how gauge qubits can be used to improve fault tolerant thresholds.
Finally, we mention that it is still open how to leverage the subsystem coding in the one
way quantum computer model.
G. Appendix
The logical states of a stabilizer code. We assume that our basis input states are of the
form |0〉⊗n−k |α1 . . . αk〉, where αi ∈ {0, 1}. Clearly, we have freedom in the choice of the
states into which each of these states are encoded to. Additionally, we have freedom in
the choice of the encoded operators though they are not entirely unrelated. Perhaps, this is
best illustrated through an example. Let us consider Shor’s [[9, 1, 3]]2 code. A choice of the
logical states for this code is
∣∣0〉 = (|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉),∣∣1〉 = (|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉).
For this choice of the encoded states the logical Z operator is X⊗9 and the logical X
operator is Z⊗9 . On the other hand, let us see what happens if we choose the logical states
as follows
∣∣0〉 = |000000000〉+ |000111111〉+ |111000111〉+ |111111000〉 ,∣∣1〉 = |111111111〉+ |111000000〉+ |000111000〉+ |000000111〉 .
In this case the encoded X operator is X⊗9 and encoded Z operator is Z⊗9 ; they are flipped
with respect to the previous choice!
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So it becomes apparent that the assignment of the encoded operators as logical Z or
X is flexible and it seems to depend on the choice of the logical states. But are we free
to choose any basis of the codespace as the encoded logical states. We can show that this
cannot be. For instance let us choose the logical zero state to be a superposition of the
previous two assignments. Then we have
∣∣0〉 = (|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉)
+ |000000000〉+ |000111111〉+ |111000111〉
+ |111111000〉 .
The possibilities for the logical Z operator‖ are ±X⊗9 , ±Z⊗9 , ±X⊗9Z⊗9 . But for
none of these operators we have Z
∣∣0〉 = ∣∣0〉. As these are the only possible encoded
operators (modulo the stabilizer which acts trivially in any case), this is not a valid choice
for
∣∣0〉. This raises the question what are all the possible valid choices for the logical states.
Let us look at yet another choice of logical states.
∣∣0〉 = (|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉)(|000〉 − |111〉),∣∣1〉 = (|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉)(|000〉+ |111〉).
In this case, the encoded Z and X operators are −X⊗9 and Z⊗9 respectively. This gives
us a clue as to the possible logical all zero states for a given stabilizer code. The all zero
logical state is the state in the code space that is fixed by the stabilizer and the logical Z
operators. Assuming that S is the stabilizer and CPn(S), its centralizer, we can can pick
any k independent commuting generators in CPn(S) \ SZ(Pn) as Z operators. Hence, we
have the following lemma.
Lemma VII.17. Let S be the stabilizer of an [[n, k, d]]2 stabilizer code. If L ≤ CPn(S) is
‖Including scalar multiples of i will not change our conclusions.
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any subgroup generated by n commuting generators such that L ∩ Z(Pn) = I and S ≤ L,
then the state stabilized by L is a valid logical all zero state for the stabilizer code defined
by S.
The implicit choice of
∣∣0〉made in Lemma VII.2 (by picking the encoded Z operators,
at least the representatives) is convenient in the sense it allows us to speak of a canonical ∣∣0〉
without ambiguity. This
∣∣0〉 can be conveniently identified with the state P |0〉⊗n , where it
will be recalled that P is the projector for the stabilizer code given as
P =
1
|S|
∑
M∈S
M. (7.17)
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CHAPTER VIII
QUANTUM LDPC CODES FOR ASYMMETRIC CHANNELS∗
Recently, quantum error-correcting codes were proposed that capitalize on the fact that
many physical error models lead to a significant asymmetry between the probabilities for
bit flip and phase flip errors. An example for a channel which exhibits such asymmetry
is the combined amplitude damping and dephasing channel, where the probabilities of bit
flips and phase flips can be related to relaxation and dephasing time, respectively. We give
systematic constructions of asymmetric quantum stabilizer codes that exploit this asymme-
try. Our approach is based on a CSS construction that combines BCH and finite geometry
LDPC codes.
In many quantum mechanical systems the mechanisms for the occurrence of bit flip
and phase flip errors are quite different. In a recent paper Ioffe and Me´zard [77] postulated
that quantum error-correction should take into account this asymmetry. The main argument
given in [77] is that most of the known quantum computing devices have relaxation times
(T1) that are around 1−2 orders of magnitude larger than the corresponding dephasing times
(T2). In general, relaxation leads to both bit flip and phase flip errors, whereas dephasing
only leads to phase flip errors. This large asymmetry between T1 and T2 suggests that
bit flip errors occur less frequently than phase flip errors and a well designed quantum
code would exploit this asymmetry of errors to provide better performance. In fact, this
observation and its consequences for quantum error correction, especially quantum fault
tolerance, have prompted investigations from various other researchers [2, 52, 148].
Our goal will be as in [77] to construct asymmetric quantum codes for quantum mem-
∗ c©2008 IEEE. Reprinted from, P. K. Sarvepalli, M. Ro¨tteler, and A. Klappenecker.
“Asymmetric quantum LDPC codes”. In Proc. 2008 IEEE Intl. Symposium on Inform.
Theory, Toronto, Canada, Jul 6–11, pp. , 2008.
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ories and at present we do not consider the issue of fault tolerance. We first quantitatively
justify how noise processes, characterized in terms of T1 and T2, lead to an asymmetry in
the bit flip and phase flip errors. As a concrete illustration of this we consider the amplitude
damping and dephasing channel. For this channel we can compute the probabilities of bit
flip and phase flips in closed form. In particular, by giving explicit expressions for the ratio
of these probabilities in terms of the ratio T1/T2, we show how the channel asymmetry
arises.
After providing the necessary background, we give two systematic constructions of
asymmetric quantum codes based on BCH and LDPC codes, as an alternative to the ran-
domized construction of [77].
A. Background
Recall that a quantum channel that maps a state ρ to
(1− px − py − pz)ρ+ pxXρX + pyY ρY + pzZρZ, (8.1)
with I = [ 1 00 1 ], X = [ 0 11 0 ], Y = [ 0 −ii 0 ], Z = [ 1 00 −1 ] is called a Pauli channel. For a Pauli
channel, one can respectively determine the probabilities px, py, pz that an input qubit in
state ρ is subjected to a Pauli X , Y , or Z error.
A combined amplitude damping and dephasing channel E with relaxation time T1 and
dephasing time T2 that acts on a qubit with density matrix ρ = (ρij)i,j∈{0,1} for a time t
yields the density matrix
E(ρ) =

 1− ρ11e−t/T1 ρ01e−t/T2
ρ10e
−t/T2 ρ11e−t/T1

 .
This channel is interesting as it models common decoherence processes fairly well. We
would like to determine the probability px, py, and pz such that an X , Y , or Z error occurs
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in a combined amplitude damping and dephasing channel. However, it turns out that this
question is not well-posed, since E is not a Pauli channel, that is, it cannot be written in
the form (8.1). However, we can obtain a Pauli channel ET by a technique called twirling
[45, 50]. In our case, the twirling consists of conjugating the channel E by Pauli matrices
and averaging over the results. The resulting channel ET is called the Pauli-twirl of E and
is explicitly given by
ET (ρ) = 1
4
∑
A∈{I,X,Y,Z}
A†E(AρA†)A.
Theorem VIII.1. Given a combined amplitude damping and dephasing channel E as
above, the associated Pauli-twirled channel is of the form
ET (ρ) = (1− px − py − pz)ρ+ pxXρX + pyY ρY + pzZρZ,
where px = py = (1− e−t/T1)/4 and pz = 1/2− px − 12e−t/T2 . In particular,
pz
px
= 1 + 2
1− et/T1(1−T1/T2)
et/T1 − 1 .
If t≪ T1, then we can approximate this ratio as 2T1/T2 − 1.
Proof. The Kraus operator decomposition [114] of E is
E(ρ) =
2∑
k=0
AkρA
†
k, (8.2)
where A0 =
[
1 0
0
√
1−λ−γ
]
;A1 =
[
0 0
0
√
λ
]
;A2 =
[
0
√
γ
0 0
]
, and
√
1− γ − λ = e−t/T2 , 1− γ =
e−t/T1 . We can rewrite the Kraus operators Ai as
A0 =
1 +
√
1− λ− γ
2
I +
1−√1− λ− γ
2
Z,
A1 =
√
λ
2
I−
√
λ
2
Z, A2 =
√
γ
2
X −
√
γ
2i
Y.
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Rewriting E(ρ) in terms of Pauli matrices yields
E(ρ) = 2− γ + 2
√
1− λ− γ
4
ρ+
γ
4
XρX +
γ
4
Y ρY
+
2− γ − 2√1− λ− γ
4
ZρZ
− γ
4
IρZ − γ
4
ZρI +
γ
4i
XρY − γ
4i
Y ρX. (8.3)
It follows that the Pauli-twirl channel ET is of the claimed form, see [45, Lemma 2]. Com-
puting the ratio pz/px we get
pz
px
=
2− γ − 2√1− λ− γ
γ
=
1 + e−t/T1 − 2e−t/T2
1− e−t/T1 ,
= 1 + 2
e−t/T1 − e−t/T2
1− e−t/T1 = 1 + 2
1− et/T1−t/T2
et/T1 − 1
= 1 + 2
1− et/T1(1−T1/T2)
et/T1 − 1 .
If t≪ T1, then we can approximate the ratio as 2T1/T2 − 1, as claimed.
Thus, an asymmetry in the T1 and T2 times does translate to an asymmetry in the
occurrence of bit flip and phase flip errors. Note that px = py indicating that the Y errors
are as unlikely as the X errors. We shall refer to the ratio pz/px as the channel asymmetry
and denote this parameter by A.
Asymmetric quantum codes use the fact that the phase flip errors are much more likely
than the bit flip errors or the combined bit-phase flip errors. Therefore the code has different
error correcting capability for handling different type of errors. We require the code to
correct many phase flip errors but it is not required to handle the same number of bit flip
errors. If we assume a CSS code [35], then we can meaningfully speak of X-distance and
Z-distance. A CSS stabilizer code that can detect all X errors up to weight dx − 1 is said
to have an X-distance of dx. Similarly if it can detect all Z errors upto weight dz − 1,
then it is said to have a Z-distance of dz. We shall denote such a code by [[n, k, dx/dz]]q
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to indicate it is an asymmetric code, see also [145] who was the first to use a notation
that allowed to distinguish between X- and Z-distances. We could also view this code as
an [[n, k,min{dx, dz}]]q stabilizer code. Further extension of these metrics to an additive
non-CSS code is an interesting problem, but we will not go into the details here.
Recall that in the CSS construction a pair of codes are used, one for correcting the bit
flip errors and the other for correcting the phase flip errors. Our choice of these codes will
be such that the code for correcting the phase flip errors has a larger distance than the code
for correcting the bit flip errors. We restate the CSS construction in a form convenient for
asymmetric stabilizer codes.
Lemma VIII.2 (CSS Construction [35]). Let Cx, Cz be linear codes over Fnq with the para-
meters [n, kx]q, and [n, kz]q respectively. Let C⊥x ⊆ Cz. Then there exists an [[n, kx + kz −
n, dx/dz]]q asymmetric quantum code, where dx = wt(Cx \ C⊥z ) and dz = wt(Cz \ C⊥x ).
If in the above construction dx = wt(Cx) and dz = wt(Cz), then we say that the code
is pure.
In the theorem above and elsewhere in this paper Fq denotes a finite field with q ele-
ments. We also denote a q-ary narrow-sense primitive BCH code of length n = qm− 1 and
design distance δ as BCH(δ).
B. Asymmetric Quantum Codes from LDPC Codes
In [77], Ioffe and Me´zard used a combination of BCH and LDPC codes to construct asym-
metric codes. The intuition being that the stronger LDPC code should be used for correct-
ing the phase flip errors and the BCH code can be used for the infrequent bit flips. This
essentially reduces to finding a good LDPC code such that the dual of the LDPC code is
contained in the BCH code. They solve this problem by randomly choosing codewords in
the BCH code which are of low weight (so that they can be used for the parity check ma-
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trix of the LDPC code). However, this method leaves open how good the resulting LDPC
code is. For instance, the degree profiles of the resulting code are not regular and there is
little control over the final degree profiles of the code. Furthermore, it is not apparent what
ensemble or degree profiles one will use to analyze the code.
We propose an alternate scheme that uses LDPC codes to construct asymmetric stabi-
lizer codes. We propose two families of quantum codes based on LDPC codes. In the first
case we use LDPC codes for both the X and Z channel while in the second construction we
will use a combination of BCH and LDPC codes. But first, we will need the following facts
about generalized Reed-Muller codes, ( [80]) and finite geometry LDPC codes, ( [98,150]).
1. Finite Geometry LDPC Codes
Let us denote by EG(m, ps) the Euclidean finite geometry over Fps consisting of pms points.
For our purposes it suffices to use the fact that this geometry is equivalent to the vector
space Fmps . A µ-dimensional subspace of Fmps or its coset is called a µ-flat. Assume that
0 ≤ µ1 < µ2 ≤ m. Then we denote by NEG(µ2, µ1, s, p) the number of µ1-flats in a µ2-flat
and by AEG(m,µ2, µ1, s, p), the number of µ2-flats that contain a given µ1-flat. These are
given by (see [150])
NEG(µ2, µ1, s, p) = q
(µ2−µ1)
µ1∏
i=1
qµ2−i+1 − 1
qµ1−i+1 − 1 , (8.4)
AEG(m,µ2, µ1, s, p) =
µ2∏
i=µ1+1
qm−i+1 − 1
qµ2−i+1 − 1 , (8.5)
where q = ps. Index all the µ1-flats from i = 1 to n = NEG(m,µ1, s, p) as Fi. Let F be a
µ2-flat in EG(m, ps). Then we can associate an incidence vector to F with respect to the
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µ1 flats as follows.
iF =

ij |
ij = 1 if Fj is contained in F
ij = 0 otherwise.

 .
Index the µ2-flats from j = 1 to J = NEG(m,µ2, s, p). Construct the J × n matrix
H
(1)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p) whose rows are the incidence vectors of all the µ2-flats with respect
to the µ1-flats. This matrix is also referred to as the incidence matrix. Then the type-I
Euclidean geometry code from µ2-flats and µ1-flats is defined to be the null space, i. e.,
Euclidean dual code) of the Fp-linear span of H(1)EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p). This is denoted as
C
(1)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p). Let H
(2)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p) = H
(1)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p)
t. The type-II Euclid-
ean geometry code C(2)EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p) is defined as the null space of H
(2)
EG (m,µ2, µ1, s, p).
Let us now consider the µ2-flats and µ1-flats that do not contain the origin of EG(m, ps).
Now form the incidence matrix of the µ2-flats with respect to the µ1-flats not containing
the origin. The null space of this incidence matrix gives us a quasi-cyclic code in general,
which we denote by C(1)EG,c(m,µ2, µ1, s, p), see [150].
2. Generalized Reed-Muller Codes
Let α be a primitive element in Fqm . The cyclic generalized Reed-Muller code of length
qm− 1 and order ν is defined as the cyclic code with the generator polynomial whose roots
αj satisfy 0 < j ≤ m(q − 1) − ν − 1. The generalized Reed-Muller code is the singly
extended code of length qm. It is denoted as GRMq(ν,m). The dual of a GRM code is also
a GRM code [17, 31, 80]. It is known that
GRMq(ν,m)⊥ = GRMq(ν⊥,m), (8.6)
where ν⊥ = m(q − 1)− 1− ν.
Let C be a linear code over Fnqs . Then we define C|Fq , the subfield subcode of C over
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F
n
q as the codewords of C which are entirely in Fnq , (see [76, pages 116-120]). Formally
this can be expressed as
C|Fq = {c ∈ C | c ∈ Fnq }. (8.7)
Let C ⊆ Fn
ql
. The the trace code of C over Fq is defined as
trql/q(C) = {trql/q(c) | c ∈ C}. (8.8)
There are interesting relations between the trace code and the subfield subcode. One of
which is the following result which we will need later.
Lemma VIII.3. Let C ⊆ Fn
ql
. Then C|Fq , the subfield subcode of C is contained in
trql/q(C), the trace code of C. In other words
C|Fq ⊆ trql/q(C).
Proof. Let c ∈ C|Fq ⊆ Fnq and α ∈ Fql . Then trql/q(αc) = c trql/q(α) as c ∈ Fnq . Since
trace is a surjective form, there exists some α ∈ Fql , such that trql/q(α) = 1. This implies
that c ∈ trql/q(C). Since c is an arbitrary element in C|Fq it follows that C|Fq ⊆ trql/q(C).
Let q = ps, then the Euclidean geometry code of order r over EG(m, ps) is defined as
the dual of the subfield subcode of GRMq((q−1)(m−r−1),m), [31, page 448]. The type-
I LDPC code C(1)EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) code is an Euclidean geometry code of order µ − 1 over
EG(m, ps), see [150]. Hence its dual is the subfield subcode of GRMq((q− 1)(m−µ),m)
code. In other words,
C
(1)
EG (m,µ, 0, s, p)
⊥ = GRMq((q − 1)(m− µ),m)|Fp . (8.9)
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Further, Delsarte’s theorem [48] tells us that
C
(1)
EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) = GRMq((q − 1)(m− µ),m)|⊥Fp ,
= trq/p
(
GRMq((q − 1)(m− µ),m)⊥
)
= trq/p(GRMq(µ(q − 1)− 1,m)).
Hence, C(1)EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) code can also be related to GRMq(µ(q − 1)− 1,m) as
C
(1)
EG (m,µ, 0, s, p) = trq/p(GRMq(µ(q − 1)− 1),m). (8.10)
3. New Families of Asymmetric Quantum Codes
With the previous preparation we are now ready to construct asymmetric quantum codes
from finite geometry LDPC codes.
Theorem VIII.4 (Asymmetric EG LDPC Codes). Let p be a prime, with q = ps and
s ≥ 1,m ≥ 2. Let 1 < µz < m and m− µz + 1 ≤ µx < m. Then there exists an
[[pms, kx + kz − pms, dx/dz]]p
asymmetric EG LDPC code, where
kx = dimC
(1)
EG (m,µx, 0, s, p); kz = dimC
(1)
EG (m,µz, 0, s, p).
For the distances dx ≥ AEG(m,µx, µx− 1, s, p) + 1 and dz ≥ AEG(m,µz, µz − 1, s, p) + 1
hold.
Proof. Let Cz = C(1)EG (m,µz, 0, s, p). Then from equation (8.10) we have
Cz = trq/p(GRMq(µz(q − 1)− 1,m).
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By Lemma VIII.3 we know that
Cz ⊇ GRMq(µz(q − 1)− 1,m)|Fp ,
Cz ⊇ GRMq((q − 1)(m− (m− µz + 1)),m)|Fp ,
where the last inclusion follows from the nesting property of the generalized Reed-Muller
codes. For any order µx such that m − µz + 1 ≤ µx < m, let Cx = C(1)EG (m,µx, 0, s, p).
Then Cx is an LDPC code whose dual C⊥x = GRMq((q − 1)(m − µx),m)|Fp is contained
in Cz. Thus we can use Lemma VIII.2 to form an asymmetric code with the parameters
[[pms, kx + kz − pms, dx/dz]]p
The distance of Cz and Cx are at lower bounded as dx ≥ AEG(m,µx, µx − 1, s, p) + 1 and
dz ≥ AEG(m,µz, µz − 1, s, p) + 1 (see [150]).
In the construction just proposed, we should chooseCz to be a stronger code compared
toCx. We have given the construction over a nonbinary alphabet even though the case p = 2
might be of particular interest.
We briefly turn our attention back to the depolarizing channel. The LDPC codes de-
signed for the asymmetric channels will not in general perform well on the depolarizing
channel. In fact constructing good quantum LDPC codes for the depolarizing channel re-
mains a difficult problem and a satisfactory solution is yet to be advanced. We contribute
to the ongoing discussion in this topic by drawing upon the finite geometry LDPC codes as
we did for the asymmetric codes. The codes presented in Theorem VIII.4 can under certain
conditions lead to LDPC codes that are suitable for use on the depolarizing channel.
Corollary VIII.5 (EG LDPC Codes for Depolaring Channel). Let p be a prime, with q =
ps and s ≥ 1,m ≥ 2. Let ⌈(m+ 1)/2⌉ ≤ µ < m. Then there exists an [[pms, 2k −
pms, d]]p symmetric EG LDPC code, where k = dimC(1)EG (m,µ, 0, s, p). For the distance
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d ≥ AEG(m,µ, µ− 1, s, p) + 1 holds.
Our next construction makes use of the cyclic finite geometry codes. Our goal will be
to find a small BCH code whose dual is contained in a cyclic Euclidean geometry LDPC
code. For solving this problem we need to know the cyclic structure of C(1)EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p).
Let α be a primitive element in Fpms . Then the roots of the generator polynomial of
C
(1)
EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p) are given by [79, Theorem 6], see also [81, 104]. Now,
Z = {αh | 0 < max
0≤l<s
Wps(hp
l) ≤ (ps − 1)(m− µ)},
where Wq(h) is the q-ary weight of h = h0 + h1q + · · · + hkqk−1, i. e., Wq(h) =
∑
hi.
The finite geometry code C(1)EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p) is actually an (µ− 1, ps) Euclidean geometry
code. The roots of the generator polynomial of the dual code are given by
Z⊥ = {αh | min
0≤l<s
Wps(hp
l) < µ(ps − 1)}.
In fact, the dual code is the even-like subcode of a primitive polynomial code of length
pms − 1 over Fp and order m − µ, whose generator polynomial, by [81, Theorem 6], has
the roots
Zp = {αh | 0 < min
0≤l<s
Wps(hp
l) < µ(ps − 1)}.
Thus Z⊥ = Zp∪{0}. Now by [81, Theorem 11], Zp and therefore Z⊥ contain the sequence
of consecutive roots, α, α2, . . . , αδ0−1, where δ0 = (R+ 1)pQs − 1 and m(ps − 1)− (m−
µ)(ps−1) = Q(ps−1)+R. Simplifying, we see thatR = 0 andQ = µ giving δ0 = pµs−1.
It follows that
C
(1)
EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p)
⊥ = GRMq(m, (q − 1)(m− µ))|Fp
⊆ BCH(δ0).
Thus we have solved the problem of construction of the asymmetric stabilizer codes in
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a dual fashion to that of [77]. Instead of finding an LDPC code whose parity check matrix
is contained in a given BCH code, we have found a BCH code whose parity check matrix
is contained in a given finite geometry LDPC code. This gives us the following result.
Theorem VIII.6 (Asymmetric BCH-LDPC stabilizer codes). Let Cz = C(1)EG,c(m,µ, 0, s, p)
and δ ≤ δ0 = pµs − 1. Let n = pms − 1 and Cx = BCH(δ) ⊆ Fnp . Then there exists an
[[n, kx + kz − n, dx/dz]]p
asymmetric stabilizer code where dz ≥ AEG(m,µ, µ − 1, s, p), dx ≥ δ and kx = dimCx,
kz = dimCz.
Perhaps an example will be helpful at this juncture.
Example VIII.7. Let m = s = p = 2 and µ = 1. Then C(1)EG,c(2, 1, 0, 2, 2) is a cyclic code
whose generator polynomial has roots given by
Z = {αh|0 < max
0≤l<2
W22(2
lh) ≤ (m− µ)(ps − 1) = 3}
= {α1, α2, α3, α4, α6, α8, α9, α12}.
As there are 4 consecutive roots and |Z| = 8, it defines a [15, 7,≥ 5] code. The roots of the
generator polynomial of the dual code are given by
Z⊥ = {αh|0 < min
0≤l<2
W22(2
lh) ≤ µ(ps − 1) = (22 − 1)}
= {α0, α1, α2, α4, α5, α8, α10}.
We see that Z⊥ has two consecutive roots excluding 1, therefore the dual code is contained
in a narrowsense BCH code with design distance 3. Note that pµs − 1 = 3. Thus we can
choose Cx = BCH(3) and Cz = C(1)EG,c(2, 1, 0, 2, 2) and apply Lemma VIII.2 to construct a
[[15, 3, 3/5]]2 asymmetric code.
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We can also state the above construction as in [77], that is given a primitive BCH
code of design distance δ, find an LDPC code whose dual is contained in it. It must be
pointed out that in case of asymmetric codes derived from LDPC codes, the asymmetry
factor dx/dz is not as indicative of the code performance as in the case of bounded distance
decoders. For m = p = 2, we can derive explicit relations for the parameters of the codes.
Corollary VIII.8. Let C = C(1)EG,c(2, 1, 0, s, 2) and δ = 2t + 1 ≤ 2s − 1. Then there exists
an
[[22s − 1, 22s − 3s − s(δ − 1), δ/2s + 1]]2
asymmetric stabilizer code.
Proof. The parameters of C are [22s−1, 22s−3s, 2s+1]2, see [104]. Since C⊥ is contained
in a BCH code of length 22s − 1 whose design distance δ ≤ 2s − 1, we can compute the
dimension of the BCH code as 22s−1−s(δ−1), see [107, Corollary 8]. By Lemma VIII.2
the quantum code has the dimension 22s − 3s − s(δ − 1).
Example VIII.9. For m = p = 2 and s = 4 we can obtain a [255, 175, 17] LDPC code. We
can choose any BCH code with design distance δ ≤ 24−1 = 15 to construct an asymmetric
code. Table III lists possible codes.
C. Performance Results
We now study the performance of the codes constructed in the previous section. We
assume that the overall probability of error in the channel is given by p, while the indi-
vidual probabilities of X , Y , and Z errors are px = p/(A + 2), py = p/(A + 2) and
pz = pA/(A+2) respectively. The exact performance would require us to simulate a 4-ary
channel and also account for the fact that some errors can be estimated modulo the stabi-
lizer. However, we do not account for this and in that sense these results provide an upper
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Table III. Asymmetric BCH-LDPC stabilizer codes
s δ Code Asymmetry Rate
[[n, k, dx/dz]]2 dz/dx
4 15 [[255, 119, 15/17]]2 ≈ 1 0.467
4 13 [[255, 127, 13/17]]2 ≈ 1.25 0.498
4 11 [[255, 135, 11/17]]2 ≈ 1.5 0.529
4 9 [[255, 143, 9/17]]2 ≈ 2 0.561
4 7 [[255, 151, 7/17]]2 ≈ 2.5 0.592
4 5 [[255, 159, 5/17]]2 ≈ 3 0.624
4 3 [[255, 167, 3/17]]2 ≈ 6 0.655
bound on the actual error rates. The 4-ary channel can be modeled as two binary sym-
metric channels – one modeling the bit flip channel and the other the phase flip channel.
For exact performance, these two channels should be dependent, however, a good approx-
imation is to model the channel as two independent BSCs with cross over probabilities
px + py = 2p/(A+ 2) and py + pz = p(A+ 1)/(A+ 2). In this case the overall error rate
in the quantum channel is the sum of the error rates in the two BSCs. While this approach
is going to slightly overestimate the error rates, nonetheless it is useful and has been used
before [105]. Since the X-channel uses a BCH code and decoded using a bounded distance
decoder, we can just compute P xe the X error rate, in closed form. The error rate in the Z
channel, P ze is obtained through simulations. The overall error rate is
Pe = 1− (1− P xe )(1− P ze ) = P xe + P ze − P xe P ze ≈ P xe + P ze .
Decoding LDPC Codes. The LDPC code was decoded using the an algorithm similar to
the hard decision bit flipping algorithm given in [98]. This is an instance of the bit flipping
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algorithm originally given by Gallager. The maximum number of iterations for decoding
is set to 50. A small modification had to be made to accommodate the special situation
of quantum syndrome decoding. By measuring the generators of the stabilizer group, we
obtain a classical syndrome, which due to the fact that only ±1 eigenspaces occur in all
of the generators, is hard information. We use the syndrome as shown in Figure 9 and
initialize all the bit nodes with 0 at the start of the algorithm. Then the algorithm proceeds
in the usual fashion as in [98]. We implemented this algorithm and ran several simulations
which are described next.
In figure 10 we see the performance of [[255, 159, 5/17]] as the channel asymmetry is
varied from 1 to 100. We see that as we increase the asymmetry the code starts to perform
better. As the asymmetry is increased eventually the performance of the quantum code
approaches the performance of the classical LDPC code.
Tolerating a little rate loss improves the performance as can be seen from figure 11.
If we increase the distance of the BCH code the code becomes more tolerant to variations
in channel asymmetry as can be seen by the performance of [[255, 143, 9/17]] in figure 12.
This plot also illustrates an important point. Our channel model assumes that as we vary
the channel asymmetry we keep the total probability of error in the channel fixed. This
implies that while the probability of X errors goes down, the probability of Z errors tends
to p, the total probability of error. Hence, the reduction in error rate in the X channel must
more than compensate for the increase in Z error rate. If on the other hand, we had fixed
the probability of error in the Z channel and varied the channel asymmetry then we would
observe a monotonic improvement in the error rate because on one hand the Z error rate
does not change but the X error rate does. We note that with larger lengths we can get an
even steep drop in the error rate as is apparent from the performance of [[1023, 731, 11/33]]
code shown in Figure 13.
The question naturally raises how do these codes compare with the codes proposed
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in [77]. Strictly speaking both constructions have regimes where they can perform better
than the other. But it appears that the algebraically constructed asymmetric codes have the
following benefits with respect to the randomly constructed ones of [77].
• They give comparable performance and higher data rates with shorter lengths.
• The benefits of classical algebraic LDPC codes are inherited, giving for instance lower
error floors compared to the random constructions.
• The code construction is systematic.
Our codes also offer flexibility in the rate and performance of the code because we can
choose many possible BCH codes for a given finite geometry LDPC code or vice versa.
The flip side however is that the codes given here have higher complexity of decoding.
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1
Fig. 9. Modification of the iterative message passing algorithm to the quantum case. The
initialization step is different from the classical case as no soft information from the
channel is available but rather only hard information about the measured syndrome
is available. The algorithms begins with initializing all bit nodes to 0 and the check
nodes with the syndrome. From then on, any classically known method for iterative
decoding can be applied. In the figure this principle is shown for the example of a
classical [7,4,3] Hamming code. Application to the quantum case is straightforward
as the decoding algorithm only works with classical information to compute the most
likely error.
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Fig. 10. Performance of a [[255, 159, 5/17]] code described in the text for choices
A = 1, 10, 100 of the channel asymmetry.
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Fig. 11. Performance of a [[255, 151, 7/17]] code described in the text for choices
A = 1, 10, 100 of the channel asymmetry.
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Fig. 12. Performance of a [[255, 143, 9/17]] code described in the text for choices
A = 1, 10, 100 of the channel asymmetry.
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Fig. 13. Performance of [[1023, 731, 11/33]] code for A = 100.
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CHAPTER IX
NEW RESULTS ON BCH CODES∗
The Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes [32, 33, 58, 75] are a well-studied class
of cyclic codes that have found numerous applications in classical and more recently in
quantum information processing. Recall that a cyclic code of length n over a finite field Fq
with q elements, and gcd(n, q) = 1, is called a BCH code with designed distance δ if its
generator polynomial is of the form
g(x) =
∏
z∈Z
(x− αz), Z = Cb ∪ · · · ∪ Cb+δ−2,
where Cx = {xqk mod n | k ∈ Z, k ≥ 0 } denotes the q-ary cyclotomic coset of x mod-
ulo n, α is a primitive element of Fqm , and m = ordn(q) is the multiplicative order of q
modulo n. Such a code is called primitive if n = qm − 1, and narrow-sense if b = 1.
An attractive feature of a (narrow-sense) BCH code is that one can derive many struc-
tural properties of the code from the knowledge of the parameters n, q, and δ alone. Perhaps
the most well-known facts are that such a code has minimum distance d ≥ δ and dimen-
sion k ≥ n − (δ − 1)ordn(q). In this chapter, we will show that a necessary condition for
a narrow-sense BCH code which contains its Euclidean dual code is that its designed dis-
tance δ = O(qn1/2). We also derive a sufficient condition for dual containing BCH codes.
Moreover, if the codes are primitive, these conditions are same. These results allow us to
derive families of quantum stabilizer codes. Along the way, we find new results concerning
the minimum distance and dimension of classical BCH codes.
To put our results into context, we give a brief overview of related work. This chapter
∗ c©2007 IEEE. Reprinted with permission from S. A. Aly, A. Klappenecker and P. K.
Sarvepalli, “On quantum and classical BCH codes”. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol 53,
no. 3, pp. 1183–1188, 2007.
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was motivated by problems concerning quantum BCH codes; specifically, our goal was
to derive the parameters of the quantum codes as a function of the design parameters.
Examples of certain binary quantum BCH codes have been given by many authors, see, for
example, [35, 68, 69, 145]. Steane [146] gave a simple criterion to decide when a binary
narrow-sense primitive BCH code contains its dual, given the design distance and the length
of the code. We generalize Steane’s result in various ways, in particular, to narrow-sense
(not necessarily primitive) BCH codes over arbitrary finite fields with respect to Euclidean
and Hermitian duality. These results allow one to derive quantum BCH codes; however, it
remains to determine the dimension, purity, and minimum distance of such quantum codes.
The dimension of a classical BCH code can be bounded by many different standard
methods, see [24, 76, 107] and the references therein. An upper bound on the dimension
was given by Shparlinski [143], see also [97, Chapter 17]. More recently, the dimension
of primitive narrow-sense BCH codes of designed distance δ < q⌈m/2⌉ + 1 was apparently
determined by Yue and Hu [156], according to reference [155]. We generalize their result
and determine the dimension of narrow-sense BCH codes that are not necessarily primitive
for a certain range of designed distances. As desired, this result allows us to explicitly
obtain the dimension of the quantum codes without computation of cyclotomic cosets.
The purity and minimum distance of a quantum BCH code depend on the minimum
distance and dual distance of the associated classical code. In general, it is a difficult
problem to determine the true minimum distance of BCH codes, see [38]. A lower bound
on the dual distance can be given by the Carlitz-Uchiyama-type bounds when the number
of field elements is prime, see, for example, [107, page 280] and [149]. Many authors
have determined the true minimum distance of BCH codes in special cases, see, for in-
stance, [118], [155].
This chapter also extends our previous work on primitive narrow-sense BCH codes [4],
simplifies some of the proofs and generalizes many of the results to the nonprimitive case.
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Notation. We denote the ring of integers by Z and the finite field with q elements by
Fq. We use the bracket notation of Iverson and Knuth that associates to [statement ] the
value 1 if statement is true, and 0 otherwise. For instance, we have [k even] = k−1 mod 2
and [k odd] = k mod 2 for an integer k. The Euclidean dual code C⊥ of a code C ⊆ Fnq is
given by C⊥ = {y ∈ Fnq |x · y = 0 for all x ∈ C}, while the Hermitian dual of C ⊆ Fnq2
is defined as C⊥h = {y ∈ Fnq2 | yq · x = 0 for all x ∈ C}. We denote a narrow-sense
BCH code of length n over Fq with designed distance δ by BCH(n, q; δ), and we omit the
parameter q if the finite field is clear from the context.
A. Euclidean Dual Codes
Recall that one can construct quantum stabilizer codes using classical codes that contain
their duals. In this section, our goal is to find such classical codes. Steane showed that a
primitive, narrow-sense, binary BCH code of length 2m − 1 contains its dual if and only
if its designed distance δ satisfies δ ≤ 2⌈m/2⌉ − 1, see [146]. We generalize this result in
various ways.
Lemma IX.1. LetC be a cyclic code of length n over the finite field Fq such that gcd(n, q) =
1, and let Z be the defining set of C. The code C contains its Euclidean dual code if and
only if Z ∩ Z−1 = ∅, where Z−1 denotes the set Z−1 = {−z mod n | z ∈ Z}.
Proof. See [70, Theorem 2]. See also [76, Theorem 4.4.11].
Let us first consider narrow-sense BCH codes of length n such that the multiplicative
order of q modulo n equals 1; for example, Reed-Solomon codes belong to this class of
codes. We can avoid some special cases in our subsequent arguments by treating this case
separately. Furthermore, the next lemma nicely illustrates the proof technique that will be
used throughout this section, so it can serve as a warm-up exercise.
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Lemma IX.2. Suppose that q is a power of a prime and n is a positive integer such that
q ≡ 1 mod n. We have BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ ⊆ BCH(n, q; δ) if and only if the designed distance
δ is in the range 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = ⌊(n+ 1)/2⌋.
Proof. The defining set Z of BCH(n, q; δ) is given by Z = {1, . . . , δ − 1}, since q has
multiplicative order 1 modulo n, and therefore all cyclotomic cosets are singleton sets. If
BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ ⊆ BCH(n, q; δ), then by Lemma IX.1, Z ∩ Z−1 = ∅. If x ∈ Z, then
n − x 6∈ Z and n − x > x; hence, δmax ≤ ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋. Conversely, if δ ≤ ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋,
then minZ−1 = min{n − 1, . . . , n − δ + 1} = n − δ + 1 ≥ n − ⌊(n + 1)/2⌋ + 1 =
⌈(n + 1)/2⌉ ≥ δmax; hence, Z ∩ Z−1 = ∅ and Lemma IX.1 implies that BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ ⊆
BCH(n, q; δ).
If the multiplicative order m of q modulo n is larger than 1, then the defining set of
the code has a more intricate structure, so proofs become more involved. The next theorem
gives a sufficient condition on the designed distances for which the dual code of a narrow-
sense BCH code is self-orthogonal.
Theorem IX.3. Suppose that m = ordn(q). If the designed distance δ is in the range
2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = ⌊κ⌋, where
κ =
n
qm − 1(q
⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (q − 2)[m odd]), (9.1)
then BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ ⊆ BCH(n, q; δ).
Proof. It suffices to show that BCH(n, q; δmax)⊥ ⊆ BCH(n, q; δmax) holds, since BCH(n, q; δ)
contains BCH(n, q; δmax), and the claim follows from these two facts.
Seeking a contradiction, we assume that BCH(n, q; δmax) does not contain its dual.
Let Z = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cδmax−1 be the defining set of BCH(n, q; δmax). By Lemma IX.1,
Z∩Z−1 6= ∅, which means that there exist two elements x, y ∈ {1, . . . , δmax−1} such that
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y ≡ −xqj mod n for some j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, where m is the multiplicative order of
q modulo n. Since gcd(q, n) = 1 and qm ≡ 1 mod n, we also have x ≡ −yqm−j mod n.
Thus, exchanging x and y if necessary, we can even assume that j is in the range 0 ≤ j ≤
⌊m/2⌋. It follows from (9.1) that
1 ≤ xqj ≤ (δmax − 1)qj
≤ n
qm − 1(q
m − qj − qj(q − 2)[m odd])− qj
< n,
for all j in the range 0 ≤ j ≤ ⌊m/2⌋. Since 1 ≤ xqj < n and 1 ≤ y < n, we can infer
from y ≡ −xqj mod n that y = n− xqj . But this implies
y ≥ n− xq⌊m/2⌋
≥ n− n
qm − 1(q
m − q⌊m/2⌋ − q⌊m/2⌋(q − 2)[m odd]) + q⌊m/2⌋
=
n
qm − 1(q
⌊m/2⌋ − 1 + q⌊m/2⌋(q − 2)[m odd])
+q⌊m/2⌋
≥ δmax ,
contradicting the fact that y < δmax.
Now we will derive a necessary condition on the design distance of narrow-sense,
nonprimitive BCH codes that contain their duals.
Theorem IX.4. Suppose that m = ordn(q). If the designed distance δ exceeds δmax =⌊
qn1/2
⌋
, then BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ 6⊆ BCH(n, q; δ).
Proof. Let n = n0 + n1q+ · · ·+ nd−1qd−1, where 0 ≤ ni ≤ q− 1 and δ ≥ δmax +1. Then
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the defining set Z ⊇ {1, . . . , ⌊qn1/2⌋}. We will show that Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅. Let,
s =
d−1∑
i=⌊d/2⌋
niq
i−⌊d/2⌋,
s ≤ (q − 1)
d−1∑
i=⌊d/2⌋
qi−⌊d/2⌋ = q⌈d/2⌉ − 1 < q⌈d/2⌉.
Since qd−1 < n < qd, we have q(d+1)/2 < qn1/2 < q(d+2)/2. If d is even then ⌈d/2⌉ < (d+
1)/2 and if d is odd, then ⌈d/2⌉ ≤ (d+1)/2. Hence we have s < q⌈d/2⌉ ≤ q(d+1)/2 < qn1/2.
Therefore s ∈ Z. Now consider,
s′ = n− sq⌊d/2⌋ =
d−1∑
i=0
niq
i − q⌊d/2⌋
d−1∑
i=⌊d/2⌋
niq
i−⌊d/2⌋,
=
⌊d/2−1⌋∑
i=0
niq
i < q⌊d/2⌋
< q(d+1)/2 < qn1/2.
Hence s′ ∈ Z and by definition s′ ∈ Z−1, which implies Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅; by Lemma IX.1 it
follows that BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ 6⊆ BCH(n, q; δ).
The condition we just derived can be strengthened under some restrictions. Especially,
if the constant κ in equation (9.1) is integral, then we can derive a necessary and sufficient
condition as shown below:
Theorem IX.5. We keep the notation of Theorem IX.4. Suppose that κ is integral, and that
m ≥ 2. We have BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ ⊆ BCH(n, q; δ) if and only if the designed distance δ is in
the range 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = κ.
Proof. Suppose that BCH(n, q; δ)⊥ ⊆ BCH(n, q; δ). Seeking a contradiction, we assume
that δ > δmax; thus, δmax is contained in the defining set Z of BCH(n, q; δ). If m is even,
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then
−δmaxq⌊m/2⌋ ≡ − nq
⌊m/2⌋
q⌊m/2⌋ + 1
≡ −n+ n
q⌊m/2⌋ + 1
≡ δmax (mod n),
hence, δmax ∈ Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅. If m is odd, then
−δmaxq⌊m/2⌋ ≡ −n(qm − q⌈m/2⌉ + q⌊m/2⌋)/(qm − 1)
≡ n(q⌈m/2⌉ − q⌊m/2⌋ − 1)/(qm − 1)
≡ s (mod n).
By definition, s ∈ Z−1; furthermore, s < δmax, so s ∈ Z ∩Z−1 6= ∅. In both cases, m even
and odd, we found that Z ∩Z−1 is not empty, so BCH(n, q; δ) cannot contain its Euclidean
dual code, contradiction. The converse follows from Theorem IX.3.
As a consequence of Theorem IX.5 we have the following test for primitive narrow-
sense BCH codes that contain their duals.
Corollary IX.6. A primitive narrow-sense BCH code of length n = qm − 1, m ≥ 2, over
the finite field Fq contains its Euclidean dual code if and only if its designed distance δ
satisfies
2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = q⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (q − 2)[m odd].
We observe that a narrow-sense BCH code containing its Euclidean dual code must
have a small designed distance (δ = O(√n)), when the multiplicative order of q modulo
n is greater than one. This raises the question whether one can allow larger designed
distances by considering non-narrow-sense BCH codes. Our next result shows that this is
not possible, at least in the case of primitive codes.
Theorem IX.7. Let C be a primitive (not necessarily narrow-sense) BCH code of length
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n = qm − 1 over Fq with designed distance δ. If m > 1 and δ exceeds
δmax =


qm/2 − 1, m ≡ 0 mod 2,
2(q(m+1)/2 − q + 1), m ≡ 1 mod 2,
then C cannot contain its Euclidean dual.
Proof. Let the defining set of C be Z = Cb ∪ Cb+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cb+δ−2. We will show that if
δ > δmax then Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅. If 0 ∈ Z, then 0 ∈ Z−1, so Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅. Therefore, we can
henceforth assume that 0 6∈ Z, which implies b ≥ 1 and b+ δ − 2 < n.
1. Suppose that m is even; thus, δmax = qm/2 − 1. If δ > δmax then the defining set Z
contains an element of the form s = αδmax for some integer α. However,
−sqm/2 ≡ −α(qm/2 − 1)qm/2 ≡ α(qm/2 − 1)
≡ s (mod n).
Hence, s ∈ Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅.
2. Suppose that m > 1 is odd; thus, δmax = 2q(m+1)/2 − 2q + 2. If δ > δmax then
there exists an integer α such that two multiples of δ′ = δmax/2 are contained in the
range b ≤ (α − 1)δ′ < αδ′ ≤ b + δ − 2. Since b ≥ 1 and αδ′ < n, it follows that
2 ≤ α ≤ q(m−1)/2.
The defining set Z of the code contains the element s = αδ′. The number s′ =
α(q(m+1)/2 − q(m−1)/2 − 1) lies in the range 0 ≤ s′ ≤ s and satisfies −sq(m−1)/2 ≡
s′ mod n, so s′ ∈ Z−1.
Suppose that b ≤ s′. Then s′ ∈ Z, which implies Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅.
Suppose that s′ < b. Since b ≤ (α − 1)δ′, we obtain the inequality s′ < (α − 1)δ′;
solving for α shows that α ≥ q; thus, q ≤ α ≤ q(m−1)/2. Let t′ = (α − 1)(q(m+1)/2 −
1) + q(m−1)/2 − 1; it is easy to check that t′ is in the range (α − 1)δ′ ≤ t′ ≤ αδ′ when
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α ≥ q; thus, t′ ∈ Z. Further, let t = s − (α − q + 1); since t ≥ s − δ′, we have t ∈ Z
as well. Since −tq(m−1)/2 ≡ t′ mod n, we can conclude that t′ ∈ Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅.
Therefore, we can conclude that if the designed distance of C is greater than δmax, then
Z ∩ Z−1 6= ∅, which proves the claim thanks to Lemma IX.1.
B. Dimension and Minimum Distance
While the results in the previous section are sufficient to tell us when we can construct
quantum BCH codes, they are still unsatisfactory because we do not know the dimension
of these codes. To this end, we determine the dimension of narrow-sense BCH codes of
length n with minimum distance d = O(n1/2). It turns out that these results on dimension
also allow us to sharpen the estimates of the true distance of some BCH codes.
First, we make some simple observations about cyclotomic cosets that are essential in
our proof.
Lemma IX.8. Let n be a positive integer and q be a power of a prime such that gcd(n, q) =
1 and q⌊m/2⌋ < n ≤ qm−1, where m = ordn(q). The cyclotomic coset Cx = {xqj mod n |
0 ≤ j < m} has cardinality m for all x in the range 1 ≤ x ≤ nq⌈m/2⌉/(qm − 1).
Proof. If m = 1, then |Cx| = 1 for all x and the statement is trivially true. Therefore, we
can assume that m > 1. Seeking a contradiction, we suppose that |Cx| < m, meaning that
there exists a divisor j of m such that xqj ≡ x mod n, or, equivalently, that x(qj − 1) ≡
0 mod n holds.
Suppose that m is even. The divisor j of m must be in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ m/2.
However, x(qj − 1) ≤ nqm/2(qm/2 − 1)/(qm − 1) < n; hence x(qj − 1) 6≡ 0 mod n,
contradicting the assumption |Cx| < m.
Suppose that m is odd. The divisor j of m must be in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ m/3. Since
q(m+1)/2 ≤ q2m/3 for m ≥ 3, we have x(qj − 1) ≤ nq(m+1)/2(qm/3 − 1)/(qm − 1) ≤
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nq2m/3(qm/3 − 1)/(qm − 1) < n. Therefore, x(qj − 1) 6≡ 0 mod n, contradicting the
assumption |Cx| < m.
The following observation tells us when some cyclotomic cosets are disjoint.
Lemma IX.9. Let n ≥ 1 be an integer and q be a power of a prime such that gcd(n, q) = 1
and q⌊m/2⌋ < n ≤ qm− 1, where m = ordn(q). If x and y are distinct integers in the range
1 ≤ x, y ≤ min{⌊nq⌈m/2⌉/(qm− 1)− 1⌋, n− 1} such that x, y 6≡ 0 mod q, then the q-ary
cyclotomic cosets of x and y modulo n are distinct.
Proof. If m = 1, then clearly Cx = {x}, Cy = {y} and distinct x, y implies that Cx
and Cy are disjoint. If m > 1, then x, y ≤ ⌊nq⌈m/2⌉/(qm − 1) − 1⌋ < n − 1. The set
S = {xqj mod n, yqj mod n | 0 ≤ j ≤ ⌊m/2⌋} contains 2(⌊m/2⌋+1) ≥ m+1 elements,
since q⌊m/2⌋ × ⌊nq⌈m/2⌉/(qm − 1) − 1⌋ < n and, thus, no two elements are identified
modulo n. If we assume that Cx = Cy, then the preceding observation would imply that
|Cx| = |Cy| ≥ |S| ≥ m + 1, which is impossible since the maximal size of a cyclotomic
coset is m. Hence, the cyclotomic cosets Cx and Cy must be disjoint.
With these results in hand, we can now derive the dimension of narrow-sense BCH
codes.
Theorem IX.10. Let q be a prime power and gcd(n, q) = 1 with ordn(q) = m. Then a
narrow-sense BCH code of length q⌊m/2⌋ < n ≤ qm − 1 over Fq with designed distance δ
in the range 2 ≤ δ ≤ min{⌊nq⌈m/2⌉/(qm − 1)⌋, n} has dimension
k = n−m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉. (9.2)
Proof. Let the defining set of BCH(n, q; δ) be Z = C1 ∪C2 · · · ∪Cδ−1; a union of at most
δ− 1 consecutive cyclotomic cosets. However, when 1 ≤ x ≤ δ− 1 is a multiple of q, then
Cx/q = Cx. Therefore, the number of cosets is reduced by ⌊(δ− 1)/q⌋. By Lemma IX.9, if
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x, y 6≡ 0 mod q and x 6= y, then the cosets Cx and Cy are disjoint. Thus, Z is the union of
(δ − 1)− ⌊(δ − 1)/q⌋ = ⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉ distinct cyclotomic cosets. By Lemma IX.8,
all these cosets have cardinality m. Therefore, the degree of the generator polynomial is
m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉, which proves our claim about the dimension of the code.
As a consequence of the dimension result, we can tighten the bounds on the minimum
distance of narrow-sense BCH codes generalizing a result due to Farr, see [107, p. 259].
Corollary IX.11. A BCH(n, q; δ) code
i) with length in the range q⌊m/2⌋ < n ≤ qm − 1, m = ordn(q),
ii) and designed distance in the range 2 ≤ δ ≤ min{⌊nq⌈m/2⌉/(qm − 1)⌋, n}
iii) such that
⌊(δ+1)/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i > qm⌈(δ−1)(1−1/q)⌉, (9.3)
has minimum distance d = δ or δ + 1; if δ ≡ 0 mod q, then d = δ + 1.
Proof. Seeking a contradiction, we assume that the minimum distance d of the code sat-
isfies d ≥ δ + 2. We know from Theorem IX.10 that the dimension of the code is
k = n − m⌈(δ − 1)(1 − 1/q)⌉. If we substitute this value of k into the sphere-packing
bound qk
∑⌊(d−1)/2⌋
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i ≤ qn, then we obtain
⌊(δ+1)/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i ≤
⌊(d−1)/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i
≤ qm⌈(δ−1)(1−1/q)⌉,
but this contradicts condition (9.3); hence, δ ≤ d ≤ δ + 1.
If δ ≡ 0 mod q, then the cyclotomic coset Cδ is contained in the defining set Z of the
code because Cδ = Cδ/q. Thus, the BCH bound implies that the minimum distance must
be at least δ + 1.
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We conclude this section with a minor result on the dual distance of BCH codes which
will be needed later for determining the purity of quantum codes.
Lemma IX.12. Suppose that C is a narrow-sense BCH code of length n over Fq with
designed distance 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = ⌊n(q⌈m/2⌉ − 1 − (q − 2)[m odd])/(qm − 1)⌋, then the
dual distance d⊥ ≥ δmax + 1.
Proof. Let N = {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} and Zδ be the defining set of C. We know that Zδmax ⊇
Zδ ⊃ {1, . . . , δ − 1}. Therefore N \ Zδmax ⊆ N \ Zδ. Further, we know that Z ∩ Z−1 = ∅
if 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax from Lemma IX.1 and Theorem IX.3. Therefore, Z−1δmax ⊆ N \ Zδmax ⊆
N \ Zδ.
Let Tδ be the defining set of the dual code. Then Tδ = (N \Zδ)−1 ⊇ Zδmax . Moreover
{0} ∈ N \ Zδ and therefore Tδ. Thus there are at least δmax consecutive roots in Tδ. Thus
the dual distance d⊥ ≥ δmax + 1.
C. Hermitian Dual Codes
Suppose that C is a linear code of length n over Fq2 . Recall that its Hermitian dual code is
defined by C⊥h = {y ∈ Fnq2 | yq · x = 0 for all x ∈ C}, where yq = (yq1, . . . , yqn) denotes
the conjugate of the vector y = (y1, . . . , yn).
Lemma IX.13. Assume that gcd(n, q) = 1. A cyclic code of length n over Fq2 with defining
set Z contains its Hermitian dual code if and only if Z∩Z−q = ∅, where Z−q = {−qz mod
n | z ∈ Z}.
Proof. Let N = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. If g(x) = ∏z∈Z(x − αz) is the generator polynomial
of a cyclic code C, then h†(x) =
∏
z∈N\Z(x − α−qz) is the generator polynomial of C⊥h .
Thus, C⊥h ⊆ C if and only if g(x) divides h†(x). The latter condition is equivalent to
Z ⊆ {−qz | z ∈ N \ Z}, which can also be expressed as Z ∩ Z−q = ∅.
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Now similar to Theorem IX.3 we will derive a sufficient condition for BCH codes that
contain their Hermitian duals.
Theorem IX.14. Suppose that m = ordn(q2). If the designed distance δ satisfies 2 ≤ δ ≤
δmax, where
δmax =
⌊
n
q2m − 1(q
m+[m even] − 1− (q2 − 2)[m even])
⌋
,
then BCH(n, q2; δ)⊥h ⊆ BCH(n, q2; δ).
Proof. Since BCH(n, q2; δ) contains BCH(n, q2; δmax), it suffices to show that the relation
BCH(n, q2; δmax)
⊥h ⊆ BCH(n, q2; δmax) holds.
Seeking a contradiction, we assume that BCH(n, q2; δmax) does not contain its dual.
Let Z = C1∪C2∪· · ·∪Cδmax−1 be the defining set of BCH(n, q2; δmax). By Lemma IX.13,
Z ∩ Z−q 6= ∅, which means that there exist two elements x, y ∈ {1, ..., δmax − 1} such
that y = −xq2j+1 mod n for some j ∈ {0, 1, ...,m − 1}, where m = ordn(q). Since
gcd(q, n) = 1 and q2m ≡ 1 mod n, we also have y ≡ −xq2m−2j−1 mod n, so we can
assume without loss of generality that j lies in the range 0 ≤ j ≤ ⌊(m− 1)/2⌋. It follows
that
xq2j+1 ≤ (δmax − 1)q2j+1
=
nq2j+1
q2m − 1(q
m+[m even] − 1− (q2 − 2)[m even])− q2j+1
< n
holds for all j in the range 0 ≤ j ≤ ⌊(m− 1)/2⌋.
Since 1 ≤ xq2j+1 < n, the congruence y ≡ −xq2j+1 mod n implies that y = n −
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xq2j+1. Therefore, y ≥ n− (δmax − 1)q2⌊(m−1)/2⌋+1, which is equivalent to
y ≥ n− nq
2⌊(m−1)/2⌋+1
q2m − 1 (q
m+[m even] − 1
−(q2 − 2)[m even]) + q2⌊(m−1)/2⌋+1.
If m is odd, this yields
y ≥ n− nq
m
q2m − 1(q
m − 1) + qm
=
n
q2m−1
(qm − 1) + qm ≥ δmax .
Similarly, if m is even, then
y ≥ n
q2m − 1(q
m+1 − qm−1 − 1) + qm−1
≥ δmax.
Both cases contradict the assumption 0 ≤ y < δmax. Therefore, we can conclude that
BCH(n, q; δmax) contains its Hermitian dual code.
Arguing as in Theorem IX.4 we can show that a BCH code must have its designed
distance δ = O(q2n1/2) if it contains its Hermitian dual. As the arguments are very similar
we illustrate it for a simpler case as shown below:
Lemma IX.15. Let C ⊆ Fnq2 be a nonnarrow-sense, nonprimitive BCH code of length
n ≡ 0 mod qm + 1, where m = ordn(q2). If its design distance δ ≥ δmax = n/(qm + 1),
then C cannot contain its Hermitian dual.
Proof. The defining set Z = Cb ∪ . . . ∪Cb+δ−2 contains {b, . . . , b+ δ − 2}. If δ > δmax =
n/(qm+1), then there exists an element s = αδmax ∈ Z for some positive integer α. Then
−qs(q2)(m−1)/2 ≡ −αnqm/(qm+1) ≡ αn/(qm+1) ≡ s mod n. Therefore, Z∩Z−q 6= ∅;
hence, C cannot contain its Hermitian dual code.
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Finally, we conclude this section on Hermitian duals by proving as in the Euclidean
case nonnarrow-sense BCH codes that contain their Hermitian duals cannot have too large
design distances.
Theorem IX.16. Let C ⊆ Fnq2 be a primitive (not necessarily narrow-sense) BCH code of
length n = q2m − 1, m = ordn(q), and designed distance δ. If δ exceeds
δmax =


qm − 1 if m is odd,
2(qm+1 − q2 + 1) if m 6= 2 is even,
then C cannot contain its Hermitian dual code.
Proof. Suppose that the defining set of C is given by Z = Cb ∪ · · · ∪ Cb+δ−2, where
Cx = {xq2j mod n | j ∈ Z}, and that δ > δmax. Seeking a contradiction, we assume that
C⊥h ⊆ C, which means thatZ∩Z−q = ∅. It follows that 0 6∈ Z, for otherwise 0 ∈ Z∩Z−q;
therefore, b ≥ 1 and b+ δ − 2 < n.
If m is odd, then there exists an integer α such that b ≤ αδmax ≤ b + δ − 2. We have
−qαδmaxqm−1 ≡ α(1−qm)qm ≡ α(qm−1) ≡ αδmax mod n; thus, αδmax ∈ Z ∩Z−q 6= ∅.
If m > 2 is even and δ > δmax = 2qm+1 − 2q2 + 2, then there exists an integer α such
that two multiples of δ′ = δmax/2 are contained in the range b ≤ (α−1)δ′ < αδ′ ≤ b+δ−2.
Since b ≥ 1 and αδ′ < n, it follows that 2 ≤ α ≤ qm−1 (which holds only if m > 2).
Clearly s = αδ′ ∈ Z. Let s′ ≡ −qsqm−2 mod n, so s′ ∈ Z−q, then 1 ≤ s′ =
α(qm+1 − qm−1 − 1) ≤ s for m > 2.
Suppose that b ≤ s′. Then s′ ∈ Z, which implies Z ∩ Z−q 6= ∅.
Suppose that s′ < b. Since b ≤ (α − 1)δ′, we obtain the inequality s′ < (α − 1)δ′;
solving for α shows that α ≥ q2; thus, q2 ≤ α ≤ qm−1. Let t′ = (α − 1)(qm+1 − 1) +
q(m−1)/2 − 1; it is easy to check that t′ is in the range (α − 1)δ′ ≤ t′ ≤ αδ′ when α ≥ q2;
thus, t′ ∈ Z. Further, let t = s − (α − q2 + 1); since t ≥ s − δ′, we have t ∈ Z as
well. Since −qtqm−2 ≡ t′ mod n, we can conclude that t′ ∈ Z ∩ Z−q 6= ∅. Hence, by
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Lemma IX.13 we conclude that C cannot contain its Hermitian dual if its design distance
exceeds δmax
D. Families of Quantum BCH Codes
In this section we shall study the construction of (nonbinary) quantum BCH codes. Calder-
bank, Shor, Rains and Sloane outlined the construction of binary quantum BCH codes
in [35]. Grassl, Beth and Pellizari developed the theory further by formulating a nice condi-
tion for determining which BCH codes can be used for constructing quantum codes [68,70].
The dimension and the purity of the quantum codes constructed were determined by numer-
ical computations. Steane simplified it further for the special case of binary narrow-sense
primitive BCH codes [146] and gave a very simple criterion based on the design distance
alone. Very little was done with respect to the nonprimitive and nonbinary quantum BCH
codes.
In this section we show how the results we have developed in the previous sections
help us to generalize the previous work on quantum codes and give very simple conditions
based on design distance alone. Further, we give precisely the dimension and tighten re-
sults on the purity of the quantum codes. The reader can refer to Chapters III and IV for
constructions on stabilizer codes.
Theorem IX.17. Let m = ordn(q) ≥ 2, where q is a power of a prime and δ1, δ2 are
integers such that 2 ≤ δ1 < δ2 ≤ δmax where
δmax =
n
qm − 1(q
⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (q − 2)[m odd]),
then there exists a quantum code with parameters
[[n,m(δ2 − δ1 − ⌊(δ2 − 1)/q⌋+ ⌊(δ1 − 1)/q⌋),≥ δ1]]q
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pure to δ2.
Proof. By Theorem IX.10, there exist BCH codes BCH(n, q; δi) with the parameters [n, n−
m(δi− 1)+m⌊(δi− 1)/q⌋,≥ δi]q for i ∈ {1, 2}. Further, BCH(n, q; δ2) ⊂ BCH(n, q; δ1).
Hence by the CSS construction there exists a quantum code with the parameters
[[n,m(δ2 − δ1 − ⌊(δ2 − 1)/q⌋+ ⌊(δ1 − 1)/q⌋),≥ δ1]]q.
The purity follows due to the fact that δ2 > δ1 and Lemma IX.12 by which the dual distance
of either BCH code is ≥ δmax + 1 > δ2.
When the BCH codes contain their duals, then we can derive the following codes.
Note that these cannot be obtained as a consequence of Theorem IX.17.
Theorem IX.18. Let m = ordn(q) where q is a power of a prime and 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax, with
δmax =
n
qm − 1(q
⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (q − 2)[m odd]),
then there exists a quantum code with parameters
[[n, n− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q)⌉,≥ δ]]q
pure to δmax + 1
Proof. Theorems IX.3 and IX.10 imply that there exists a classical BCH code with para-
meters [n, n−m⌈(δ−1)(1−1/q)⌉,≥ δ]q which contains its dual code. By Corollary III.21
an [n, k, d]q code that contains its dual code implies the existence of the quantum code with
parameters [[n, 2k − n,≥ d]]q. The purity follows from Lemma IX.12 by which the dual
distance ≥ δmax + 1 > δ.
Before we can construct quantum codes via the Hermitian construction, we will need
the following lemma.
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Lemma IX.19. Suppose that C is a primitive, narrow-sense BCH code of length n =
q2m− 1 over Fq2 with designed distance 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = ⌊n(qm− 1)/(q2m− 1)⌋, then the
dual distance d⊥ ≥ δmax + 1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of Lemma IX.12; just keep in mind that the
defining set Zδ is invariant under multiplication by q2 modulo n.
Theorem IX.20. Let m = ordn(q2) ≥ 2 where q is a power of a prime and 2 ≤ δ ≤
δmax = ⌊n(qm − 1)/(q2m − 1)⌋, then there exists a quantum code with parameters
[[n, n− 2m⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/q2)⌉,≥ δ]]q
that is pure up to δmax + 1.
Proof. It follows from Theorems IX.10 and IX.14 that there exists a primitive, narrow-
sense [n, n− 1−m⌈(δ− 1)(1− 1/q2)⌉,≥ δ]q2 BCH code that contains its Hermitian dual
code. By Corollary III.19 a classical [n, k, d]q2 code that contains its Hermitian dual code
implies the existence of an [[n, 2k−n,≥ d]]q quantum code. By Lemma IX.19 the quantum
code is pure to δmax + 1.
In the above theorem, quantum codes can also be constructed when the design distance
exceeds the given value of δmax, however we do not have exact knowledge of the dimension
in all those cases, hence we have not included them to keep the theorem precise.
These are not the only possible families of quantum codes that can be derived from
BCH codes. As pointed out in [68], we can expand BCH codes over Fql to get codes over
Fq. Once again the dimension and duality results of BCH codes makes it very easy to
specify such codes. We will just give one example in the Euclidean case. Similar results
can be derived for the Hermitian case.
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Theorem IX.21. Let m = ordn(ql) where q is a power of a prime and 2 ≤ δ ≤ δmax, with
δmax =
n
qlm − 1(q
l⌈m/2⌉ − 1− (ql − 2)[m odd]),
then there exists a quantum code with parameters
[[ln, ln− 2lm⌈(δ − 1)(1− 1/ql)⌉,≥ δ]]q
that is pure up to δ.
Proof. By Theorem IX.18 there exists a quantum BCH code with parameters [[n, n −
2m⌈(δ − 1)(1 − 1/ql)⌉,≥ δ]]ql . An [[n, k, d]]ql quantum code implies the existence of the
quantum code with parameters [[ln, lk,≥ d]]q by Lemma III.41 and the code follows.
E. Conclusions
In this chapter we have identified the classes of BCH codes that contain their Euclidean
(Hermitian) duals by a careful analysis of the cyclotomic cosets. In the process we have
been able to shed more light on the structure of dual containing BCH codes. We were
able to derive a formula for the dimension of narrow-sense BCH codes when the designed
distance is small. These results allowed us to identify easily which classical BCH codes
can be used for construct quantum codes. Further, the parameters of these quantum codes
are easily specified in terms of the design distance.
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